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Domain rules

This page is written by ianua-audit rules --markdown from the domain’s code, and a test fails when it falls behind. Do not edit it by hand.

Each table says what the code says, with the file and line it says it in. A row marked not read rests on code the reader could not work out; read the code there.

  • Decisions are the domain’s functions whose answer is chosen by a match over enums. One whose inputs are all enums is worked out for every combination, and any means the answer is the same whatever that input is. One that decides on values it works out itself is shown arm by arm, as written.
  • Status machines list the states, the moves the machine allows, the states no move leaves, and the changes that move a value into each state, with the use cases that call them and the right each takes.
  • Refusals list, for each change, what leads it to refuse and with which error.

The activity category an event belongs to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/activity/category.rs:56.

event_type Answer (ActivityCategory) Where
EventType::Authentication(_) Authentication domains/activity/category.rs:58
EventType::Proxy(_) | EventType::Routing(_) Access domains/activity/category.rs:59
EventType::Authorization(_) | EventType::Operator(_) | EventType::Agents(_) | EventType::Workflows(_) Administration domains/activity/category.rs:60
EventType::Identity(_) Identity domains/activity/category.rs:64
EventType::Organization(_) | EventType::Tenant(_) Provisioning domains/activity/category.rs:65
EventType::Federation(_) | EventType::OAuth(_) | EventType::Webhooks(_) | EventType::Messaging(_) | EventType::Consumers(_) | EventType::Signals(_) | EventType::Branding(_) | EventType::Crypto(_) | EventType::Notifications(_) Other domains/activity/category.rs:66

The cap the gateway counts requests against, when there is one.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:83.

self.max_requests Answer (Restriction) Where
Restriction::To(max_requests) Restriction::To(RequestBudget { max_requests, window_seconds : self.window_seconds, }) domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:85
Restriction::Unrestricted Unrestricted domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:89

Records what the check said of the answer waiting for it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:181.

verdict Answer (DomainError) Where
CheckVerdict::Passed self.pass_check() domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:190
CheckVerdict::Broken(said) { self.record_failed_check(&said)? ; if last_try { self.fail() ; } Ok(()) } domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:191
CheckVerdict::NotRun(why) { self.record_failed_check(&why)? ; self.fail() ; Ok(()) } domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:198

The standing of an agent with status that does or does not owe a re-attestation.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:42.

status reattestation Answer (AgentStanding) Where
Active Required MustReattest domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:46
Active Current Active domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:47
Suspended any Suspended domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:45
Revoked any Revoked domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:44

Reads a stored origin back, with the class its request was stored under.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:92.

stored action_class Answer (ApprovalOrigin) Where
StoredApprovalOrigin::Opened(by) any Ok(Self::Opened(by)) domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:97
StoredApprovalOrigin::Run(run) DeclaredAction::Declared(class) Ok(Self::Run(RunOrigin::stored(run, class))) domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:98
StoredApprovalOrigin::Run(_) DeclaredAction::Undeclared Err(DomainError::corrupt_row("approval request", "a run's request with no class"),) domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:101

The kind of workload token this method proves an agent with, or None for a method a platform vouches with.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:83.

self Answer (WorkloadKind) Where
Self::KubernetesServiceAccount Some(WorkloadKind::Kubernetes) domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:85
Self::GithubActions Some(WorkloadKind::GithubActions) domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:86
Self::OidcToken Some(WorkloadKind::Oidc) domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:87
Self::Spiffe | Self::AwsIam | Self::GcpInstanceIdentity | Self::Tpm | Self::AzureManagedIdentity None domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:88

What a task token minted for this delegation is bound to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:477.

&self.lineage Answer (TokenKey) Where
Lineage::Minted { signed_in_with,..} TokenKey::SignedInWith(* signed_in_with) domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:482
Lineage::Root | Lineage::Under(_) AgentsActiveKey domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:483

The attack this refusal looks like, or None when it may be the agent’s own slip.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:142.

self Answer (TokenAttack) Where
Self::NotSent | Self::ByAnotherKey Some(TokenAttack::StolenBinding) domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:144
Self::NotChecked None domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:145

Reads a state back from its stored status and held call.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:191.

status pending Answer (RunState) Where
RunStatus::Running any next_call(next).map(Self::Running) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:196
RunStatus::Paused any next_call(next).map(Self::Paused) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:197
RunStatus::AwaitingApproval Some(call) Ok(Self::AwaitingApproval(call)) when !call.is_approved() domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:198
RunStatus::AwaitingApproval any Err(DomainError::infra_msg("a stored run awaiting approval holds no call waiting for a person",)) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:201
RunStatus::Completed any Ok(Self::Completed) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:204
RunStatus::Failed any Ok(Self::Failed) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:205
RunStatus::Cancelled any Ok(Self::Cancelled) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:206
RunStatus::Halted any Ok(Self::Halted) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:207
RunStatus::OverBudget any Ok(Self::OverBudget) domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:208

How the token this destination takes is held to the agent’s key.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/runner.rs:92.

self Answer (TokenBinding) Where
Self::Gateway ProofOfPossession domains/agents/runner.rs:94
Self::Relay(_) Bearer domains/agents/runner.rs:95

The check a run starts with: asking once it spent ask_past, or never.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:41.

ask_past Answer (SpendCheck) Where
Restriction::To(mark) Self::AskAt(mark) domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:43
Restriction::Unrestricted Off domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:44

The kind of a request with this HTTP method, to a route the proxy classed as class.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:49.

method class Answer (TouchKind) Where
Get Read Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51
Post Read Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
Put Read Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
Patch Read Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
Delete Read Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
Head Read Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51
Options Read Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51
Any Read Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Write Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Delete Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Configure Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Communicate Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Financial Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52
any Admin Write domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52

The kind of a request with this HTTP method.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:36.

method Answer (TouchKind) Where
Get Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37
Post Write
Put Write
Patch Write
Delete Write
Head Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37
Options Read domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37
Any Write

The attestation method a token of this kind is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:53.

self Answer (AttestationMethod) Where
Kubernetes KubernetesServiceAccount domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:55
GithubActions GithubActions domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:56
Oidc OidcToken domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:57

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/identity/status.rs:40.

  • States: Active, Suspended, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked AgentIdentity::revoke, AgentIdentity::contain RevokeAgentUseCase (agents), ContainAgentUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Delete
Active to Suspended AgentIdentity::suspend DetectConvergenceUseCase (agents), EvaluateDriftUseCase (agents), HearConvergenceUseCase (agents), HearDriftUseCase (agents), HearEgressDenialUseCase (agents), RespondToEgressDenialUseCase (agents), SuspendAgentUseCase (agents) SuspendedBy, AgentAction::Update
Suspended to Active AgentIdentity::create, AgentIdentity::resume CreateAgentUseCase (agents), ResumeAgentUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Create, AgentAction::Update
Suspended to Revoked AgentIdentity::revoke, AgentIdentity::contain RevokeAgentUseCase (agents), ContainAgentUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Delete

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/oversight/approval_status.rs:53.

  • States: Pending, Approved, Denied, Expired, Consumed, Withdrawn
  • Final, which no move leaves: Denied, Expired, Consumed, Withdrawn
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Approved to Consumed ApprovalRequest::consume, ApprovalRequest::release ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents) ActionAuthority
Pending to Approved ApprovalRequest::approve ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents) Approver
Pending to Denied ApprovalRequest::deny DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents) Approver
Pending to Expired ApprovalRequest::approve, ApprovalRequest::deny, ApprovalRequest::expire, ApprovalRequest::withdraw, ApprovalRequest::supersede ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) Approver, RunCancelled, RevisedCall
Pending to Withdrawn ApprovalRequest::withdraw, ApprovalRequest::supersede ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) RunCancelled, RevisedCall

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/authority/delegation/record.rs:193.

  • States: Active, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked Delegation::revoke DeactivateUseCase (identity), DeleteOrgUserUseCase (organization), DeleteUseCase (identity), EvaluateDriftUseCase (agents), ExchangeTokenForAgentUseCase (agents), HearDriftUseCase (agents), ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), RequestOrgErasureUseCase (organization), RevokeUseCase (agents), UpdateOrgUserStatusUseCase (organization), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) Revoker

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/model_provider/status.rs:27.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled ModelProvider::disable UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage
Disabled to Active ModelProvider::create, ModelProvider::enable ConnectUseCase (agents), UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:44.

  • States: Running, Completed, Failed, Cancelled, Halted, AwaitingApproval, Paused, OverBudget
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, Failed, Cancelled, Halted, OverBudget
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
AwaitingApproval to Cancelled AgentRun::cancel ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) CancelOrder
AwaitingApproval to Failed AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail DriveUseCase (agents) none read
AwaitingApproval to Halted AgentRun::halt DriveUseCase (agents) none read
AwaitingApproval to OverBudget AgentRun::record_model_usage DriveUseCase (agents) none read
AwaitingApproval to Running AgentRun::start, AgentRun::start_without_tools, AgentRun::approve_pending, AgentRun::deny_pending, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::reply_to_pending, AgentRun::resume, AgentRun::record_allowed, AgentRun::record_denied AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ResumeUseCase (agents) RunStarter, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update, ReleasedCall, DeniedCall, AgentControl, AgentAction::Update
Paused to Cancelled AgentRun::cancel ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) CancelOrder
Paused to Failed AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Paused to Halted AgentRun::halt DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Paused to OverBudget AgentRun::record_model_usage DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Paused to Running AgentRun::start, AgentRun::start_without_tools, AgentRun::approve_pending, AgentRun::deny_pending, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::reply_to_pending, AgentRun::resume, AgentRun::record_allowed, AgentRun::record_denied AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ResumeUseCase (agents) RunStarter, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update, ReleasedCall, DeniedCall, AgentControl, AgentAction::Update
Running to AwaitingApproval AgentRun::await_approval, AgentRun::revise_pending DriveUseCase (agents), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Approve
Running to Cancelled AgentRun::cancel ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) CancelOrder
Running to Completed AgentRun::record_answer, AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::complete DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Running to Failed AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Running to Halted AgentRun::halt DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Running to OverBudget AgentRun::record_model_usage DriveUseCase (agents) none read
Running to Paused AgentRun::pause_at_spend_check, AgentRun::pause DriveUseCase (agents), PauseUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Update

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/tool/status.rs:24.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled AgentTool::disable UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage
Disabled to Active AgentTool::register, AgentTool::enable RegisterUseCase (agents), UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage
When Refused with Where
self.ending.has_ended() InvalidTransition domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:430
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(sender_owner, AgentAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:226
ensure_openable(&params) refuses what ensure_openable refuses domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:227
When Refused with Where
* agent.id() != self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:588, through ensure_may
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:597, through move_to
When Refused with Where
* agent.id() != self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:588, through ensure_may
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:597, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.offer.open_to(clock::now()) is not Some(offered) Conflict domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:270
!offered.is_same_account_as(recipient.by()) Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:276
ensure_may_own(recipient) refuses what ensure_may_own refuses domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:281
When Refused with Where
!control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Create) Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent.rs:123
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/agent.rs:429
When Refused with Where
handover is Handover::Given Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over
handover is Handover::OwnerLeft Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over
to.is_same_account_as(&self.owner) Conflict domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:361, through ensure_not_owner
When Refused with Where
!self.is_active() InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/agent/attesting.rs:177
always Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/attesting.rs:230, through ensure_trusts
When Refused with Where
handover is Handover::Given Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over
handover is Handover::OwnerLeft Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over
ensure_may_own(recipient) refuses what ensure_may_own refuses domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:206
to.is_same_account_as(&self.owner) Conflict domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:361, through ensure_not_owner
When Refused with Where
self.offer.open_to(now) is not Some(offered) Conflict domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:300
!offered.is_same_account_as(control.by()) and handover is Handover::Given Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over
!offered.is_same_account_as(control.by()) and handover is Handover::OwnerLeft Forbidden domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over
When Refused with Where
order.run_id() != &self.id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/announce.rs:120
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/announce.rs:126
When Refused with Where
released.run_id() != &self.id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:84
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:90
!released.call().matches(pending) Conflict domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:96
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:105
When Refused with Where
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act
self.status() != RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:48
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left
&self.state is RunState::Running(NextCall::Approved(_)) Conflict domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:152, through held_call
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::AwaitingApproval InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:56
When Refused with Where
order.run_id() != &self.id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:276
When Refused with Where
self.check != RunCheck::Unchecked InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:211
self.status() != RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Completed InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:221
When Refused with Where
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:139
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:145
self.status() != RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push
When Refused with Where
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:95, through ensure_may_steer
&self.state is not RunState::Running(next) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:41
When Refused with Where
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left
ensure_approved(admission, self.held_call(call.call())?) refuses what ensure_approved refuses domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:108
self.status() != RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push
When Refused with Where
self.due_check() is not Some(due) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:183
When Refused with Where
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left
&self.state is RunState::Running(NextCall::Approved(_)) Conflict domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:152, through held_call
self.status() != RunStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push
When Refused with Where
provider.id() != &self.provider_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:90
When Refused with Where
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:95, through ensure_may_steer
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act
&self.state is not RunState::Paused(next) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:76
When Refused with Where
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act
!editor.holds_agent(AgentAction::Approve) Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:235, through ensure_may_edit
editor.authority().data_clearance() < self.exposure Forbidden domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:241, through ensure_may_edit
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:210
ensure_revises(pending, &revised) refuses what ensure_revises refuses domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:215
When Refused with Where
start::ensure_step_limit(params.max_steps) refuses what ensure_step_limit refuses domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:126
start::ensure_spend_check_below_limit(&params) refuses what ensure_spend_check_below_limit refuses domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:127
start::ensure_startable(&starter, &params, delegation, agent, now) refuses what ensure_startable refuses domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:128
When Refused with Where
start::ensure_toolless(&params, agent, now) refuses what ensure_toolless refuses domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:153
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:318
self.state != SightingState::Unreviewed InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:320
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:291
matches !(self.state, SightingState::Registered {..}) InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:293
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses what ensure_manages_tools refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:502
self.is_active() InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:504
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses what ensure_manages_tools refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:428
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses what ensure_manages_tools refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:463
ensure_route_serves(route, params.method, &params.path) refuses what ensure_route_serves refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:464
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses what ensure_manages_tools refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:439
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses what ensure_manages_tools refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:252
ensure_route_serves(route, params.method, &params.path) refuses what ensure_route_serves refuses domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:253
When Refused with Where
self.origin.is_requester(by) || self.parties.include(by) Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:449, through ensure_not_answerable
approver.ensure_entitled(self.exposure()) refuses what ensure_entitled refuses domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:395
self.needs_presence() && approver.presence() != Presence::Proven Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:418, through ensure_present
self.has_lapsed(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open
!self.state.status().is_pending() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open
gave_the_first Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:464, through ensure_not_first_approver
self.state.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:624, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!self.grants_action_at(crate::shared::clock::now(), authority) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:501
self.state.clone() is not ApprovalState::Approved { approval, first } InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:507
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_entitled(self.exposure()) refuses what ensure_entitled refuses domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:480
self.has_lapsed(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open
!self.state.status().is_pending() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open
self.state.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:624, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.run() is not Some(run) Validation domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:530
!self.grants_action_at(crate::shared::clock::now(), authority) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:501, through consume
self.state.clone() is not ApprovalState::Approved { approval, first } InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:507, through consume
When Refused with Where
let ApprovalOrigin::Run(run) = &params.origin and ensure_fits_run(run, &params) refuses what ensure_fits_run refuses domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:100
ensure_parties_fit(&params) refuses what ensure_parties_fit refuses domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:102
When Refused with Where
self.run() is not Some(run) Validation domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:600
run.run_id() != revised.run_id() Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:606
run.pending_call() != revised.previous() Conflict domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:612
self.has_lapsed(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open
!self.state.status().is_pending() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open
When Refused with Where
self.run() is not Some(run) Validation domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:568
run.run_id() != cancelled.run_id() Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:574
self.has_lapsed(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open
!self.state.status().is_pending() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open
When Refused with Where
!self.is_valid_at(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/identity/challenge.rs:188
When Refused with Where
delegate.ensure_may_receive() refuses what ensure_may_receive refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:112
!params.granted.subset_of(held.caps()) Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:114
When Refused with Where
ensure_owned_and_held(agent, &request.granted, ceiling, now) refuses what ensure_owned_and_held refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:233
When Refused with Where
self.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:29
!self.granted.resources().contains(capability) and ensure_within(self, &widened, ceiling) refuses what ensure_within refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:51, through widen
When Refused with Where
self.lineage != Lineage::Root || !person_granted InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:79, through ensure_renewable_by
held.holder() != self.delegator Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:85, through ensure_renewable_by
!self.granted.subset_of(held.caps()) Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:91, through ensure_renewable_by
delegate.id() != self.delegate Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:51
delegate.ensure_may_receive() refuses what ensure_may_receive refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:56
!self.is_valid(now) InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:59
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_revoke(&self.delegator) refuses what ensure_may_revoke refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:556
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_revoke(&self.delegator) refuses what ensure_may_revoke refuses domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:77
self.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:79
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:373, through ensure_open
held.holder() != self.asked_of.principal() Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:299
delegate.id() != self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:305
When Refused with Where
identity.id() != agent.agent() || !identity.may_act_at(now) Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:156
When Refused with Where
!asked && !control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Manage) Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:347
agent.id() != &self.agent_id Forbidden domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:353
always InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:373, through ensure_open
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_lower(control, agent, &params) refuses what ensure_may_lower refuses domains/agents/identity/exposure_reset.rs:69
When Refused with Where
!control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Update) Forbidden domains/agents/identity/fleet_suspension.rs:36
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:315
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:399
change.model == self.model && change.pricing == self.pricing Conflict domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:401
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:144
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:463
self.is_active() InvalidTransition domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:465
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:431
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:444
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:558
ensure_kind_embeds(self.kind, &embeddings) refuses what ensure_kind_embeds refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:559
embeddings == self.embeddings Conflict domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:561
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:515
When Refused with Where
ensure_manages(control) refuses what ensure_manages refuses domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:357
self.kind.requires_key() && key == ProviderKey::Keyless Validation domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:359
key == self.credential_ref Conflict domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:365
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(owners.reviewed, AgentAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:198
control.ensure_may(owners.reviewer, AgentAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:199
Self::ensure_may_review(params) refuses what ensure_may_review refuses domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:200
When Refused with Where
control.by().is_same_person_as(reviewed_owner) Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:373, through ensure_may_end
always Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:382, through ensure_may_end
self.ending.has_ended() InvalidTransition domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:351
When Refused with Where
!self.is_active() Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:412
* reviewer.agent() != self.reviewer Forbidden domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:418
When Refused with Where
self.status() != TemplateStatus::Proposed InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:470
self.proposed_by.is_same_person_as(approver.by()) Validation domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:476
approver.holds().ensure_may_hand_out(self.ceiling.http(), &[]) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:481
When Refused with Where
ensure_proposable(&params) refuses what ensure_proposable refuses domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:301
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(&self.proposed_by, AgentAction::Delegate) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:508
&self.state is TemplateState::Retired {..} InvalidTransition domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:513

The scope an organization and a tenant give: the tenant when one is known, else the organization, else the platform.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/audit/record.rs:31.

tenant organization Answer (AuditScope) Where
Fact::Known(tenant) any Self::Tenant { organization, tenant, } domains/audit/record.rs:33
Fact::Unknown Fact::Known(organization) Self::Organization(organization) domains/audit/record.rs:37
Fact::Unknown Fact::Unknown Platform domains/audit/record.rs:38

What kind of destination this is, which records may name.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/audit/streaming.rs:370.

self Answer (StreamDestinationKind) Where
Self::Splunk(_) Splunk domains/audit/streaming.rs:372
Self::Datadog(_) Datadog domains/audit/streaming.rs:373
Self::Syslog(_) Syslog domains/audit/streaming.rs:374
Self::Http(_) Http domains/audit/streaming.rs:375

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/audit/export/state.rs:42.

  • States: Pending, Ready, Failed, Expired
  • Final, which no move leaves: Failed, Expired
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Pending to Failed AuditLogExport::give_up ExpireUseCase (audit) none read
Pending to Ready none read none read none read
Ready to Expired AuditLogExport::expire ExpireUseCase (audit) none read
When Refused with Where
self.state.downloadable_at(now) InvalidTransition domains/audit/export/mod.rs:277
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/audit/export/mod.rs:326, through move_to
When Refused with Where
now < self.requested_at.saturating_add(WRITE_DEADLINE) InvalidTransition domains/audit/export/mod.rs:260
When Refused with Where
access.log() != self.log Forbidden domains/audit/export/mod.rs:304
self.state is not AuditExportState::Ready { rows,..} Conflict domains/audit/export/mod.rs:310
!self.state.downloadable_at(now) Conflict domains/audit/export/mod.rs:316
When Refused with Where
file.seal.is_some() != is_sealed(self.log, ready) Validation domains/audit/export/mod.rs:241
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/audit/export/mod.rs:326, through move_to

Whether an account with signs is under attack at now, under the lockout policy.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:138.

  • reached is signs.networks >= attacking_networks(policy)
signs.mark reached Answer (AccountAttack) Where
AttackMark::Marked true | false Ongoing domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:141
AttackMark::Unmarked false Quiet domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:142
AttackMark::Unmarked true Self::Begun(AttackBegun { networks : signs.networks, until : attack_held_for(policy).ends_after(now), }) domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:143

The level the strongest factor used reaches.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:71.

strongest Answer (AssuranceLevel) Where
PasswordOrSso Aal1 domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:73
SoftwareMfa Aal2 domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:74
HardwareMfa Aal3 domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:75

What setting a password whose breach lookup gave found comes to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:112.

  • status is match(self, found) {(Self::Off, _) => return Ok(NewPasswordBreach::NotChecked),(Self::Block, Lookup::Unavailable) => { return Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("authentication-this-password-could-not-be-checked", "this password could not be checked against known data breaches; try again"))) ; }(Self::Warn, Lookup::Unavailable) => return Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Unchecked),(Self::Warn | Self::Block, Lookup::Unknown) => BreachStatus::Clean,(Self::Warn | Self::Block, Lookup::Known(status)) => * status, }
self status Answer (NewPasswordBreach) Where
any BreachStatus::Clean Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Clean) domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:126
Self::Block BreachStatus::Breached(_) Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("authentication-this-password-appears-in-known-data", "this password appears in known data breaches; choose another"))) domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:127
Self::Off | Self::Warn BreachStatus::Breached(count) Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Breached(count)) domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:131

The step a proof for a kind challenge leads to once the provider judged it: a passed one goes on, any other is refused and told to solve a fresh one.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:150.

self kind Answer (GateStep) Where
Passed any Proceed domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:152
Failed any Refuse domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:153

What a change owed for reason asks, where mail says whether a mail reaches the person and factor whether they hold a second factor that can answer here.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:47.

reason mail factor Answer (ChangeProof) Where
SetByAdmin Available NotEnrolled MailedLink domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:59
SetByAdmin NotSetUp NotEnrolled NotPossible domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:62
SetByAdmin any Enrolled OwnFactor domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:54
Expired any any PasswordAlone domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:49

What the change shows about the person beyond the password they proved: nothing, their mailbox, their own factor, or, refused, that nothing they hold is enough.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:79.

self Answer (PersonProof) Where
PasswordAlone Nothing domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:81
OwnFactor OwnFactor domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:83
MailedLink Mailbox domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:82
NotPossible Refused domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:84

The demand once a further signal asks too, such as a breached password.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:93.

self Answer (Demand) Where
Policy SignalAndPolicy domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:95
Signal Signal domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96
SignalAndPolicy SignalAndPolicy domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:95
OwnFactor Signal domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96
NotAsked Signal domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96

The kind of factor.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:99.

self Answer (MfaMethod) Where
Self::Totp(_) Totp domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:101
Self::EmailCode EmailCode domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:102
Self::SmsCode(_) SmsCode domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:103

Reads a state back from its stored columns.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:150.

  • confirmation is Confirmation::from_stored(verified_at, recovery_codes_hash)?
status confirmation disabled_at Answer (EnrollmentState) Where
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Pending None None Ok(Self::Pending) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:158
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Verified Some(confirmation) None Ok(Self::Verified(confirmation)) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:159
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled None Some(at) Ok(Self::Abandoned { at }) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:162
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled Some(confirmation) Some(at) Ok(Self::Disabled { confirmation, at }) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:163
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Pending | MfaEnrollmentStatus::Verified | MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled any any Err(DomainError::corrupt_row("MFA enrollment", "a status its confirmation and disable times contradict",)) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:166

What the sign-in’s session owes.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:251.

self Answer (SecondFactor) Where
NotOwed NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:253
Verify Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:254
Enrol Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:255
ConfirmByEmail ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:256
ConfirmThenEnrol ConfirmThenEnrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:257
Refused refused domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:258

What answering it shows about the person beyond their password.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:276.

self Answer (PersonProof) Where
NotOwed Nothing domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:278
Verify OwnFactor domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:280
Enrol Nothing domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:278
ConfirmByEmail Mailbox domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:279
ConfirmThenEnrol Mailbox domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:279
Refused Refused domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:281

Determines password sign-in requirements from policy, demand and available proof.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:181.

policy demand enrolment mail vouching Answer (FactorOwed) Where
Disabled Policy Enrolled any Fresh NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled Policy any any Absent NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled Signal Enrolled Available Fresh ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212
Disabled Signal any Available Absent ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212
Disabled SignalAndPolicy Enrolled Available Fresh ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212
Disabled SignalAndPolicy any Available Absent ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212
Disabled OwnFactor Enrolled any Fresh NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled OwnFactor any any Absent NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled NotAsked Enrolled any Fresh NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled NotAsked any any Absent NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Disabled any NotEnrolled any Fresh NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Optional Policy Enrolled any any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Optional Policy NotEnrolled any any Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Optional Signal Enrolled Available any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Optional Signal NotEnrolled Available Fresh NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Optional Signal NotEnrolled Available Absent ConfirmByEmail domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212
Optional Signal NotEnrolled NotSetUp Fresh Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Optional SignalAndPolicy Enrolled Available any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Optional SignalAndPolicy NotEnrolled Available Absent ConfirmThenEnrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213
Optional SignalAndPolicy NotEnrolled any Fresh Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Optional OwnFactor Enrolled any any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Optional OwnFactor NotEnrolled any any NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Optional NotAsked any any any NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209
Required Policy Enrolled NotSetUp any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Required Policy NotEnrolled any Absent Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Required Signal NotEnrolled Available Absent ConfirmThenEnrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213
Required SignalAndPolicy NotEnrolled Available Absent ConfirmThenEnrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213
Required OwnFactor Enrolled NotSetUp any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Required OwnFactor NotEnrolled any Absent Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Required NotAsked Enrolled NotSetUp any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Required NotAsked NotEnrolled any Absent Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
Required any Enrolled Available any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210
Required any NotEnrolled any Fresh Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211
any Signal Enrolled NotSetUp any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:222
any Signal NotEnrolled NotSetUp Absent Refused domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:227
any SignalAndPolicy Enrolled NotSetUp any Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:222
any SignalAndPolicy NotEnrolled NotSetUp Absent Refused domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:227

The factor as storage keeps it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:112.

self Answer (MfaFactor) Where
Self::NoneYet None domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:114
Self::Proved(factor) Some(factor) domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:115

The answer as a [Fact].

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:216.

self Answer (Fact) Where
Self::Known(answer) Fact::Known(answer) domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:218
Self::Unknown | Self::Unavailable Unknown domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:219

Takes this factor away from an account that passes to a new holder, whether it is in force or still being set up.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:452.

self.state Answer (MfaEnrollmentError) Where
EnrollmentState::Verified(_) self.turn_off() domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:457
EnrollmentState::Pending self.give_up() domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:458
EnrollmentState::Abandoned {..} | EnrollmentState::Disabled {..} Ok(()) domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:459

The assurance a password sign-in reaches once this factor is answered.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:53.

self Answer (AssuranceLevel) Where
Totp Aal2 domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:55
EmailCode Aal1 domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:56
SmsCode Aal1 domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:56

Where the code to answer this factor comes from.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:62.

self Answer (CodeDelivery) Where
Totp Generated domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:64
EmailCode Sent domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:65
SmsCode Sent domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:65

What following this link would do for holder, answered without using it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:422.

self.state Answer (TokenState) Where
ResetState::Completed {..} Consumed domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:427
ResetState::Expired | ResetState::Cancelled Expired domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:428
ResetState::Pending self.pending_state(holder, now) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:429

How pressure moved from before to this.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:125.

self before Answer (PressureShift) Where
Normal Normal Held domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:129
Normal High Eased domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:128
High Normal Rose domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:127
High High Held domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:129

The record of this shift in tenant_id’s password sign-in, made by the platform, or none when pressure held.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:152.

self Answer (DomainEvent) Where
Self::Rose Some(scoped(tenant_id, SignInPressureRose { failures : failures.get(), threshold : threshold.get(), occurred_at, },).system(),) domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:160
Self::Eased Some(scoped(tenant_id, SignInPressureEased { threshold : threshold.get(), occurred_at, },).system(),) domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:171
Self::Held None domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:181

What it means that failures failures from one origin against one account are now counted in the window, the latest at now.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:104.

failures.cmp(&max) Answer (AttemptOutcome) Where
Ordering::Less AttemptOutcome::Allowed { remaining : max.saturating_sub(failures), } domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:108
Ordering::Equal AttemptOutcome::LockedOut(OriginLockout { failed_attempts : failures, until, }) domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:111
Ordering::Greater AttemptOutcome::PastTheLimit { until } domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:115

The kind to solve, when one can be set.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:58.

self Answer (ChallengeKind) Where
Self::Solve(kind) Some(kind) domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:60
Self::Unavailable None domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:61

Reads a state back from its stored status and completion time.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:117.

status completed_at Answer (ResetState) Where
ResetStatus::Completed Some(at) Ok(Self::Completed { at }) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:122
ResetStatus::Pending None Ok(Self::Pending) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:123
ResetStatus::Expired None Ok(Self::Expired) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:124
ResetStatus::Cancelled None Ok(Self::Cancelled) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:125
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} password reset has a completion time that contradicts it"))) domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:126

What a sign-in owes when nothing but the person’s own factor asks.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:347.

policy enrolment Answer (SecondFactor) Where
Disabled any NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:301
Optional Enrolled Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:310
Optional NotEnrolled NotOwed domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:308
Required Enrolled Verify domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:323
Required NotEnrolled Enrol domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:334

What one use of this session, seen at now, comes to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:37.

  • last is self.last_use.known()
last place Answer (UseNoted) Where
Some(last) any { self.last_use = Fact::Known(last.stamped(place, now)) ; UseNoted::Moved } when last.network() == &network domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:41
Some(last) Fact::Known(place) LooksTakenOver when last.is_fast_travel_to(&place, now) domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:45
any Fact::Known(place) { self.last_use = Fact::Known(LastUse::new(network, place, now)) ; UseNoted::Moved } domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:48
any Fact::Unknown Unchanged domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:52

Whether a sign-in from here is from a country the person has signed in from before.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:47.

here Answer (Familiarity) Where
Fact::Known(place) Known when self.countries.contains(place.country_code()) domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:52
Fact::Known(_) | Fact::Unknown New domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:55

Why this sign-in is asked for a second factor, if it is.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:450.

  • signal_asks is self.signal_fired(ctx) && !current.satisfies(self.asked_aal(ctx))
  • policy_asks is !current.satisfies(self.required_aal(ctx))
signal_asks policy_asks ctx.device Answer (Demand) Where
true true any SignalAndPolicy domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:455
true false any Signal domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:456
false true any Policy domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:457
false false Familiarity::New OwnFactor domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:458
false false Familiarity::Known NotAsked domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:459

The step signals lead to while sign-in is under high pressure.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:130.

signals.device signals.setup signals.proof Answer (GateStep) Where
Familiarity::Known any any Proceed domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:132
Familiarity::New ChallengeSetup::Unconfigured any GateStep::Refuse(RequiredChallenge::Unavailable) domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:133
Familiarity::New ChallengeSetup::Configured(kind) None GateStep::Refuse(RequiredChallenge::Solve(kind)) domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:136
Familiarity::New ChallengeSetup::Configured(kind) Some(proof) GateStep::CheckProof(kind, proof) domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:139

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/device_status.rs:34.

  • States: Trusted, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Trusted to Revoked TrustedDevice::revoke RevokeOrgDeviceUseCase (organization) AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_status.rs:37.

  • States: Pending, Verified, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Disabled to Pending MfaEnrollment::begin BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgBeginUseCase (organization) FactorOffer, FactorSetupProof
Pending to Disabled MfaEnrollment::turn_off_with_code, MfaEnrollment::reset_by_admin, MfaEnrollment::abandon, MfaEnrollment::withdraw DisableUseCase (authentication), OrgDisableUseCase (organization), ResetMfaUseCase (organization), AbandonUseCase (authentication), BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgAbandonUseCase (organization), OrgBeginUseCase (organization), InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) AnsweredCode, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn, FactorSetupProof, FactorWithdrawal
Pending to Verified MfaEnrollment::verify ConfirmUseCase (authentication), OrgConfirmUseCase (organization) AnsweredCode
Verified to Disabled MfaEnrollment::turn_off_with_code, MfaEnrollment::reset_by_admin, MfaEnrollment::abandon, MfaEnrollment::withdraw DisableUseCase (authentication), OrgDisableUseCase (organization), ResetMfaUseCase (organization), AbandonUseCase (authentication), BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgAbandonUseCase (organization), OrgBeginUseCase (organization), InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) AnsweredCode, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn, FactorSetupProof, FactorWithdrawal

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:71.

  • States: Pending, Completed, Expired, Cancelled
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, Expired, Cancelled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Pending to Cancelled none read none read none read
Pending to Completed PasswordResetRequest::complete, PasswordResetRequest::complete_in_sign_in AppResetPasswordUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), ResetConfirmUseCase (authentication), AppChangePasswordUseCase (authentication), ChangeDueUseCase (authentication), TenantChangeDueUseCase (authentication) none read
Pending to Expired none read none read none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:56.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled DirectoryServiceAccount::disable ChangeStatusUseCase (directory) DirectoryControlCheck
Disabled to Active DirectoryServiceAccount::create, DirectoryServiceAccount::enable CreateUseCase (directory), ChangeStatusUseCase (directory) DirectoryControlCheck

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/sessions/status.rs:41.

  • States: Active, Suspended, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked Session::revoke, Session::sign_out, Session::end_with_account, Session::stop_taken_over, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::revoke AnswerAppUseCase (federation), AnswerProviderUseCase (federation), AppLogOutUseCase (authentication), EndSessionUseCase (oauth), LogoutUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), RevokeSessionUseCase (identity), SignOutOtherSessionsUseCase (identity), DeactivateUseCase (identity), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity), WatchUseUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLogoutUseCase (organization), RevokeMemberSessionUseCase (organization) AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ShutOut, OrgSessionCheck, ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update)
Active to Suspended Session::suspend, Session::stop_taken_over WatchUseUseCase (authentication) none read
Suspended to Active Session::create, Session::rotate, Session::hand_over, Session::resume, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::create AppPasskeyConfirmUseCase (authentication), AppSsoCallbackUseCase (authentication), ConsumeMagicLinkUseCase (authentication), LinkedTenantSwitchUseCase (organization), LoginConfirmUseCase (authentication), OidcLoginUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), SamlLoginUseCase (authentication), TokenRefreshUseCase (authentication), ExchangeSignInCodeUseCase (authentication), ResumeSessionUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLoginConfirmUseCase (organization), OrgMagicLinkUseCase (organization), OrgSsoCallbackUseCase (organization) MaySignIn, SessionCheck, ProvedFactor, OrgSessionCheck, OrgSignInStart
Suspended to Revoked Session::revoke, Session::sign_out, Session::end_with_account, Session::stop_taken_over, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::revoke AnswerAppUseCase (federation), AnswerProviderUseCase (federation), AppLogOutUseCase (authentication), EndSessionUseCase (oauth), LogoutUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), RevokeSessionUseCase (identity), SignOutOtherSessionsUseCase (identity), DeactivateUseCase (identity), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity), WatchUseUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLogoutUseCase (organization), RevokeMemberSessionUseCase (organization) AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ShutOut, OrgSessionCheck, ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update)
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_grant(scope.access()) refuses what ensure_may_grant refuses domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:272
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_grant(new.scope.access()) refuses what ensure_may_grant refuses domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:139
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_grant(self.scope.access()) refuses what ensure_may_grant refuses domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:327
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_grant(self.scope.access()) refuses what ensure_may_grant refuses domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:247
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/authentication/operations/factor_reset.rs:78
ensure_all_held_by(account, &held) refuses what ensure_all_held_by refuses domains/authentication/operations/factor_reset.rs:79
When Refused with Where
!proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(params.user_id)) Forbidden domains/authentication/ldap_certificate.rs:156
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&PrincipalId::from(self.user_id), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn,) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/ldap_certificate.rs:308
When Refused with Where
!self.is_open(now, max_failed_attempts) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:180
When Refused with Where
!waiting Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:76
lifetime.ensure_at_most(CHALLENGE_LONGEST, "a second-factor challenge") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:81
When Refused with Where
!proof.lets_set_up(&self.subject_id) MfaEnrollmentError::NotProvedNow domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:434
When Refused with Where
self.method().delivery() != CodeDelivery::Generated CodeRefused::OtherKind domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:330
self.state is EnrollmentState::Abandoned {..} | EnrollmentState::Disabled {..} CodeRefused::Retired domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:507, through ensure_answers > ensure_in_use
self.is_locked_out(lockout) CodeRefused::Locked domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:354, through ensure_answers
matched is not Some(step) CodeRefused::Wrong domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:338
When Refused with Where
offer.method() != factor.method() MfaEnrollmentError::NotOffered domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:100
!proof.lets_set_up(&subject_id) MfaEnrollmentError::NotProvedNow domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:103
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&account, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:420
When Refused with Where
!answer.is_for(self.subject_id, self.enrolled_at) MfaEnrollmentError::NotItsCode domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:402
When Refused with Where
!answer.is_for(self.subject_id, self.enrolled_at) MfaEnrollmentError::NotItsCode domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:381
self.status() may not move to to InvalidTransition domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:517, through ensure_moves_to
When Refused with Where
!by.withdraws_from(&self.subject_id) MfaEnrollmentError::NotThisAccount domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:454
When Refused with Where
ensure_sendable(factor) refuses what ensure_sendable refuses domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:118
lifetime.ensure_at_most(SENT_CODE_LONGEST, "a sent code") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:119
When Refused with Where
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id || factor.enrolled_at() != self.enrolled_at CodeRefused::ForAnotherAccount domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:283
factor.ensure_answers(lockout) refuses what ensure_answers refuses domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:285
!self.takes_tries_at(now) CodeRefused::Lapsed domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:288
* hash != self.code_hash CodeRefused::Wrong domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:293
When Refused with Where
self.usage.is_used() Validation domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:362
self.purpose != expected Validation domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:369
now >= self.expires_at Validation domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:377
When Refused with Where
!proof.lets_set_up(&params.user_id.into()) Forbidden domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:270
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.user_id.into(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:446
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.user_id.into(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:425
When Refused with Where
new_count <= self.sign_count && self.sign_count > 0 Unauthorized domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:407
When Refused with Where
!proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(* account.id())) Forbidden domains/authentication/operations/password_change.rs:40
When Refused with Where
self.initiator == ResetInitiator::System TokenRefused::other_kind() domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:467
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:503, through finish_reset
self.status().try_transition(ResetStatus::Completed).is_err() TokenRefused::spent() domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:510, through finish_reset
When Refused with Where
self.initiator != ResetInitiator::System TokenRefused::other_kind() domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:490
When Refused with Where
params.initiator == ResetInitiator::System Validation domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:234
ensure_may_sign_in(holder) refuses what ensure_may_sign_in refuses domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:239
ensure_proved_address(holder) refuses what ensure_proved_address refuses domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:240
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(RESET_LONGEST, "a reset link") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:241
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_sign_in(holder) refuses what ensure_may_sign_in refuses domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:268
lifetime.ensure_at_most(IN_SIGN_IN_LONGEST, "a sign-in's password change") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:269
When Refused with Where
answer.subject() != subject_id Forbidden domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:183
ensure_each_hash_once(&hashes) refuses what ensure_each_hash_once refuses domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:189
When Refused with Where
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id CodeRefused::ForAnotherAccount domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:373, through ensure_stands_in_for
!factor.is_active() CodeRefused::Retired domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:376, through ensure_stands_in_for
factor.is_locked_out(lockout) CodeRefused::Locked domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:379, through ensure_stands_in_for
!self.spend(hash) CodeRefused::Wrong domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:356
When Refused with Where
!proof.lets_set_up(&self.subject_id) Forbidden domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:232
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id || !factor.is_active() Forbidden domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:238
ensure_each_hash_once(&hashes) refuses what ensure_each_hash_once refuses domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:244
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id SignInRefused::ForAnotherAccount domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:657
When Refused with Where
let SessionChannel::App(_) = self.channel InvalidTransition domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:618
When Refused with Where
* holder.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:587
holder.can_authenticate() Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:593
When Refused with Where
!handed RotationRefused::NotUsable domains/authentication/sessions/session/rotation.rs:84
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id || proof.for_account(own).is_err() Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:110
!self.status.is_active() || !self.progress.is_complete() Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:116
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id || !proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(self.user_id)) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:47
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id || holder.subject() != own Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:77
When Refused with Where
!device.is_trusted_by(PrincipalId::from(self.user_id)) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:346
!fresh InvalidTransition domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:354
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_suspended() InvalidTransition domains/authentication/sessions/session/suspension.rs:80
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&holder, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:527
When Refused with Where
!check.admits(parent) RotationRefused::NotUsable domains/authentication/sessions/session/rotation.rs:36
When Refused with Where
* presented != self.refresh_token_hash Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:556
When Refused with Where
!session.is_usable(now) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:124
lifetime.ensure_at_most(HANDOFF_LONGEST, "a handoff code") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:129
When Refused with Where
!self.admits(landing, now) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:250
When Refused with Where
!session.status().is_active() || session.is_expired(now) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:86
lifetime.ensure_at_most(SIGN_IN_CODE_LONGEST, "a sign-in code") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:91
When Refused with Where
* dashboard != self.dashboard_hash Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:183
!self.is_live_at(now) Forbidden domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:189
When Refused with Where
!holder.can_authenticate() Forbidden domains/authentication/operations/sign_in_link.rs:34
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.subject_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:447
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.subject_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:459
When Refused with Where
!progress.is_complete() || progress.assurance_level() < AssuranceLevel::Aal2 DeviceTrustRefused::SecondFactorNotProven domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:287

Checks the condition can mean what it says.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:119.

self Answer (ValidationError) Where
Self::CountryIn(countries) | Self::CountryNotIn(countries) validate_count("countries", countries.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:121
Self::MethodIn(methods) validate_count("methods", methods.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:124
Self::SourceIpIn(ranges) | Self::SourceIpNotIn(ranges) validate_count("ranges", ranges.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:125
Self::HostIn(hosts) validate_count("hosts", hosts.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:128
Self::PathPrefix(_) | Self::PathExact(_) | Self::RoleIs(_) | Self::RoleIsNot(_) | Self::DeviceUnknown | Self::DeviceKnown | Self::RiskAtLeast(_) | Self::SensitiveOperation | Self::GroupIs(_) | Self::GroupIsNot(_) | Self::PermissionHeld(_) | Self::ClaimEquals {..} | Self::TimeWithin(_) Ok(()) domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:129

The right that changes which roles principal holds.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:76.

principal Answer (SystemPermission) Where
PrincipalRef::User(_) | PrincipalRef::OrgUser(_) SystemPermission::Users(UserAction::Update) domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:78
PrincipalRef::Agent(_) SystemPermission::Agents(AgentAction::Update) domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:81
PrincipalRef::Consumer(_) SystemPermission::Consumers(ConsumersAction::Update) domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:82

The user right acting on someone else’s account needs.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authorization/granter.rs:235.

action Answer (SystemPermission) Where
any Users domains/authorization/granter.rs:237

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/access_request.rs:155.

  • States: Pending, Approved, Denied, Cancelled, Expired
  • Final, which no move leaves: Approved, Denied, Cancelled, Expired
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Pending to Approved AccessRequest::approve ApproveUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)
Pending to Cancelled AccessRequest::cancel CancelUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority
Pending to Denied AccessRequest::deny DenyUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)
Pending to Expired AccessRequest::expire ExpireUseCase (authorization) none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/access_review.rs:119.

  • States: Open, Completed, Cancelled
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, Cancelled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Open to Cancelled AccessReview::cancel CancelUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority
Open to Completed AccessReview::finish CompleteOverdueUseCase (authorization), CompleteUseCase (authorization) ReviewCompletion

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/policy/status.rs:54.

  • States: Draft, Review, Active, Archived
  • Final, which no move leaves: Archived
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Archived PolicySet::archive ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority
Draft to Archived PolicySet::archive ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority
Draft to Review PolicySet::submit_for_review none read TenantAuthority
Review to Active PolicySet::activate ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) PolicyApprover, SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Activate)
Review to Draft PolicySet::start_draft, PolicySet::reject StartDraftUseCase (authorization) TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)
When Refused with Where
self.status may not move to to InvalidTransition domains/authorization/access_request.rs:569, through answerable
now >= self.answer_by() Conflict domains/authorization/access_request.rs:571, through answerable
grant.asked() != self.asked Conflict domains/authorization/access_request.rs:577, through answerable
approver.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) Forbidden domains/authorization/access_request.rs:583, through answerable
grant.ensure_given_by(&self.requester.principal(), &approver.standing()) refuses what ensure_given_by refuses domains/authorization/access_request.rs:588, through answerable
When Refused with Where
!by.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) Forbidden domains/authorization/access_request.rs:495
When Refused with Where
self.status may not move to to InvalidTransition domains/authorization/access_request.rs:569, through answerable
now >= self.answer_by() Conflict domains/authorization/access_request.rs:571, through answerable
grant.asked() != self.asked Conflict domains/authorization/access_request.rs:577, through answerable
approver.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) Forbidden domains/authorization/access_request.rs:583, through answerable
grant.ensure_given_by(&self.requester.principal(), &approver.standing()) refuses what ensure_given_by refuses domains/authorization/access_request.rs:588, through answerable
When Refused with Where
now < self.answer_by() Conflict domains/authorization/access_request.rs:519
When Refused with Where
new.length.ensure_at_most(limits.longest().duration(), "access asked for") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/authorization/access_request.rs:291
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ACCESS) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/request_policy.rs:109
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(RUNS_REVIEWS) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/access_review.rs:526
When Refused with Where
item.ensure_review(self) refuses what ensure_review refuses domains/authorization/access_review.rs:369, through ensure_decider
!names(&self.reviewers, person) Forbidden domains/authorization/access_review.rs:372, through ensure_decider
person.principal() == * item.holder() Forbidden domains/authorization/access_review.rs:378, through ensure_decider
(pending, removed) is not (Some(pending), Some(removed)) Infrastructure: access review domains/authorization/access_review.rs:443, through changed_counts
ensure_counts(self.holder_count, pending, removed) refuses what ensure_counts refuses domains/authorization/access_review.rs:448, through changed_counts
When Refused with Where
completion.ensure_finished(self) refuses what ensure_finished refuses domains/authorization/access_review.rs:501
self.holder_count.checked_sub(completion.removed()) is missing an error domains/authorization/access_review.rs:502
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(RUNS_REVIEWS) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/access_review.rs:405
self.status != AccessReviewStatus::Open || crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.due Conflict domains/authorization/access_review.rs:415, through ensure_open
When Refused with Where
ensure_grantable(&grant, policy, now) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:370
ensure_approver_may_give(&approved_by, &ceiling) refuses what ensure_approver_may_give refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:373
ceiling.ensure_may_hand_out(grant.access.system(), grant.access.custom()) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:374
When Refused with Where
!self.may_be_revoked_by(by) Forbidden domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:509
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_within(&self.tenant_id) refuses what ensure_within refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:264
held.ensure_controls(HANDS_USERS_RIGHTS, &self.self_service.handout()) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:266
held.ensure_may_give(&self_service.handout()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:267
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to) refuses what ensure_may_clear refuses domains/authorization/clearance.rs:156
self.position(&rule.permission).is_some() Conflict domains/authorization/clearance.rs:158
When Refused with Where
ensure_above_internal(up_to) refuses what ensure_above_internal refuses domains/authorization/clearance.rs:192
self.position(permission) is missing an error domains/authorization/clearance.rs:193
self.rules.get_mut(at) is missing an error domains/authorization/clearance.rs:194
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to.max(up_to)) refuses what ensure_may_clear refuses domains/authorization/clearance.rs:195
When Refused with Where
self.position(permission) is missing an error domains/authorization/clearance.rs:220
self.rules.get(at) is missing an error domains/authorization/clearance.rs:221
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to) refuses what ensure_may_clear refuses domains/authorization/clearance.rs:222
When Refused with Where
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:404
granter.ensure_may_give(&role.grants()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:405
When Refused with Where
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:172
inherited.ensure_for(params.place) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:173
granter.ensure_may_give(&inherited.handout()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:174
When Refused with Where
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(self.id)) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:473
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete), &conferred.handout(),) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:474
tree.has_subgroups(&self.id) Conflict domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:547, through ensure_no_subgroups
When Refused with Where
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses what ensure_speaks refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:510
self.origin is GroupOrigin::Dashboard Forbidden domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:564, through ensure_kept_by_directory
tree.has_subgroups(&self.id) Conflict domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:547, through ensure_no_subgroups
When Refused with Where
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses what ensure_speaks refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:196
When Refused with Where
current.ensure_for(self.place) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:365
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update), &current.handout(),) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:366
inherited.lineage().contains(&self.id) Validation domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:371
granter.ensure_may_give(&inherited.handout()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:376
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:326
When Refused with Where
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses what ensure_speaks refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:493
self.origin is GroupOrigin::Dashboard Forbidden domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:564, through ensure_kept_by_directory
When Refused with Where
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign), &role.grants()) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:436
When Refused with Where
group.id != self.group_id Forbidden domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(self.group_id)) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:251
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign), &conferred.handout(),) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:252
When Refused with Where
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses what ensure_speaks refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:273
group.id != self.group_id Forbidden domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of
group.ensure_kept_by_directory() refuses what ensure_kept_by_directory refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:275
When Refused with Where
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses what ensure_speaks refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:132
group.ensure_kept_by_directory() refuses what ensure_kept_by_directory refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:133
When Refused with Where
ensure_ends_later(holding.until, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses what ensure_ends_later refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:85
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:86
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(group.id)) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:87
granter.ensure_may_give(&conferred.handout()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:88
When Refused with Where
group.id != self.group_id Forbidden domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of
ensure_lapsed(self.expires, now) refuses what ensure_lapsed refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:204
When Refused with Where
group.id != self.group_id Forbidden domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of
removals.ensure_names(&self.principal, ReviewScope::Group(self.group_id)) refuses what ensure_names refuses domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:294
When Refused with Where
ensure_second_person(&self.submitted, approver) refuses what ensure_second_person refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:517
approver.authority().ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Activate)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:518
self.status may not move to PolicyStatus::Active InvalidTransition domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:521
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
viewer.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::View)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:620
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:413
history.ensure_no_open_draft() refuses what ensure_no_open_draft refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:414
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by
!self.status.is_editable() Conflict domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by
When Refused with Where
ensure_written_by(&self.object, &self.link, catalogue, by) refuses what ensure_written_by refuses domains/authorization/relationship.rs:230
When Refused with Where
ensure_written_by(&new.object, &new.link, catalogue, by) refuses what ensure_written_by refuses domains/authorization/relationship.rs:196
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:189
params.key.ensure_not_reserved("resource_type_key") refuses what ensure_not_reserved refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:190
ensure_concrete("resource_type_key", &params.key) refuses what ensure_concrete refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:191
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&params.key, &[], &params.actions)?) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:193
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:498
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &[], &self.actions)?) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:499
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:471, through redraw_actions
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &self.actions, &actions)?) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:473, through redraw_actions
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &actions, &self.actions)?) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:474, through redraw_actions
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:403, through rename
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:446, through reclassify
class < self.data_class && editor.data_clearance() < self.data_class Forbidden domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:448, through reclassify
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:420, through describe
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_make_default(assignment, editor) refuses what ensure_may_make_default refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:372
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_may_hand_out(&moves.grant_system, &moves.grant_custom) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/authorization/role/permission_moves.rs:62
When Refused with Where
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:133
ensure_may_make_default(role.assignment, granter) refuses what ensure_may_make_default refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:134
granter.ensure_may_hand_out(&role.system_permissions, &role.custom_permissions) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:135
When Refused with Where
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete), &self.grants()) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:402
When Refused with Where
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:338
When Refused with Where
ensure_ends_later(holding.until, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses what ensure_ends_later refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:135
When Refused with Where
!role.is_default() Forbidden domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:176
When Refused with Where
held.ensure_holds(assignment_right(&principal)) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:110
held.ensure_may_give(&role.grants()) refuses what ensure_may_give refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:111
When Refused with Where
invitation.status() != InvitationStatus::Accepted Conflict domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:286
invitation.role_id() != role.id() Conflict domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:292
invitee.id() != invitation.user_id() Conflict domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:298
When Refused with Where
* role.id() != self.role_id Forbidden domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:440
ensure_lapsed(self.expires, now) refuses what ensure_lapsed refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:445
When Refused with Where
* role.id() != self.role_id Forbidden domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:370
granter.ensure_controls(assignment_right(&self.principal), &role.grants()) refuses what ensure_controls refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:375
When Refused with Where
* role.id() != self.role_id Forbidden domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:400
removals.ensure_names(&self.principal, ReviewScope::Role(self.role_id)) refuses what ensure_names refuses domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:405
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ROLES) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/separation.rs:75
first.id() == second.id() Validation domains/authorization/separation.rs:77
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ROLES) refuses what ensure_holds refuses domains/authorization/separation.rs:109

What kind of provider this is, which records may name.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:233.

self Answer (MailProviderKind) Where
Self::Platform Platform domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:235
Self::Smtp(_) Smtp domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:236
Self::SendGrid {..} SendGrid domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:237
Self::Ses {..} Ses domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:238
Self::Postmark {..} Postmark domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:239
Self::Mailgun {..} Mailgun domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:240

The provider mail goes out through now: the one named once a test send through it worked, the platform’s own until then.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:389.

self.check Answer (MailProvider) Where
ProviderCheck::Verified {..} &self.provider domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:391
ProviderCheck::Unverified | ProviderCheck::Failed {..} &PLATFORM_MAIL domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:392
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/email_template.rs:443
template.ensure_placeholders_fit() refuses what ensure_placeholders_fit refuses domains/branding/email_template.rs:456
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/email_template.rs:557
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:253
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:272
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:190
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:234
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:290
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:315
domain.verification_status() != VerificationStatus::Verified Forbidden domains/branding/config.rs:317
!address.domain().eq_ignore_ascii_case(domain.domain().as_str()) Forbidden domains/branding/config.rs:326
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:344
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/config.rs:213
When Refused with Where
self.provider == MailProvider::Platform Conflict domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:445
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change() refuses what ensure_may_change refuses domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:419
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses what ensure_proved_recently refuses domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:420

Refuses a JWT credential naming tenant_issuer, the tenant’s own token issuer.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/consumers/credential.rs:54.

self Answer (DomainError) Where
Self::JwtBearer { issuer,..} Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("consumers-a-consumer-s-tokens-come-from", "a consumer's tokens come from its own issuer, not the tenant's"))) when issuer == tenant_issuer domains/consumers/credential.rs:56
Self::ApiKey {..} | Self::ClientCert {..} | Self::JwtBearer {..} Ok(()) domains/consumers/credential.rs:62

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/consumers/consumer.rs:49.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled Consumer::disable DisableUseCase (consumers), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) ConsumerControl, ConsumersAction::Update
Disabled to Active Consumer::create, Consumer::enable CreateUseCase (consumers), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), EnableUseCase (consumers) ConsumerControl, ConsumersAction::Create, ConsumersAction::Update
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:297
control.ensure_may_clear(clearance) refuses what ensure_may_clear refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:298
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:448
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:530
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:477
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:144
control.ensure_may_clear(params.clearance) refuses what ensure_may_clear refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:145
params.credential.ensure_foreign_to(tenant_issuer) refuses what ensure_foreign_to refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:146
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:563
self.is_active() Forbidden domains/consumers/consumer.rs:565
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:360, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:360, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:419
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:505
When Refused with Where
takeover.ensure_for(&self.id) refuses what ensure_for refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:389
rotation.credential.ensure_foreign_to(tenant_issuer) refuses what ensure_foreign_to refuses domains/consumers/consumer.rs:390

Reads a state back from its stored status and rotation time.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/crypto/key_status.rs:84.

status rotated_at Answer (KeyState) Where
KeyStatus::Active None Ok(Self::Active) domains/crypto/key_status.rs:89
KeyStatus::Rotated Some(at) Ok(Self::Rotated { at }) domains/crypto/key_status.rs:90
KeyStatus::Revoked None Ok(Self::Revoked { before : PriorRotation::NotRotated, }) domains/crypto/key_status.rs:91
KeyStatus::Revoked Some(at) Ok(Self::Revoked { before : PriorRotation::RotatedAt(at), }) domains/crypto/key_status.rs:94
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} key has a rotation time that contradicts it"))) domains/crypto/key_status.rs:97

Reads a state back from its stored status and target key.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:74.

status target_key_id Answer (MigrationState) Where
MigrationStatus::Planned None Ok(Self::Planned) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:79
MigrationStatus::Cancelled None Ok(Self::Cancelled) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:80
MigrationStatus::InProgress Some(key) Ok(Self::InProgress(key)) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:81
MigrationStatus::Validating Some(key) Ok(Self::Validating(key)) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:82
MigrationStatus::Completed Some(key) Ok(Self::Completed(key)) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:83
MigrationStatus::RolledBack Some(key) Ok(Self::RolledBack(key)) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:84
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} algorithm migration has a target key that contradicts it"))) domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:85

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/crypto/key_status.rs:162.

  • States: Active, Rotated, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked none read none read none read
Active to Rotated AgentCredential::rotate RotateUseCase (agents) AgentControl, AgentAction::Update
Rotated to Revoked none read none read none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/crypto/migration_status.rs:64.

  • States: Planned, InProgress, Validating, Completed, RolledBack, Cancelled
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, RolledBack, Cancelled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
InProgress to RolledBack none read none read none read
InProgress to Validating none read none read none read
Planned to Cancelled AlgorithmMigration::cancel CancelUseCase (crypto) CryptoControlCheck, SystemPermission::Crypto(CryptoAction::Update)
Planned to InProgress AlgorithmMigration::start StartUseCase (crypto) CryptoControlCheck, SystemPermission::Crypto(CryptoAction::Update)
Validating to Completed none read none read none read
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:403
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:355
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:334
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:381
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:300
* target.kid() == self.source_key_id Validation domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:302
target.algorithm() != self.target_algorithm Validation domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:308
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!self.is_due(schedule, now) Conflict domains/crypto/assertion_key.rs:400
self.keys.iter().any(| key | key.kid() == new_key.kid()) Conflict domains/crypto/assertion_key.rs:406
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:416
always Conflict domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:582, through ensure_new_kid
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:492, through revoke_migrated_key
this_signs && !another_signs Conflict domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through revoke_migrated_key > ensure_not_last_signer
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:492
this_signs && !another_signs Conflict domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through ensure_not_last_signer
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:513
this_signs && !another_signs Conflict domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through ensure_not_last_signer
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses what ensure_may_change_keys refuses domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:434
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses what ensure_may_change_rules refuses domains/data_classification/classification.rs:255
matches !(rule.redaction(), RedactionStrategy::Encrypt) Validation domains/data_classification/classification.rs:257
self.classify(rule.field_path().as_str()).is_some() Conflict domains/data_classification/classification.rs:263
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses what ensure_may_change_rules refuses domains/data_classification/classification.rs:335
matches !(redaction, RedactionStrategy::Encrypt) Validation domains/data_classification/classification.rs:337
self.rules.iter_mut().find(| r | r.id() == rule_id) is missing an error domains/data_classification/classification.rs:342
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses what ensure_may_change_rules refuses domains/data_classification/classification.rs:154
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses what ensure_may_change_rules refuses domains/data_classification/classification.rs:300

The protocol this configuration speaks.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/connection/config.rs:186.

self Answer (FederationProtocol) Where
Self::Saml(_) Saml domains/federation/connection/config.rs:188
Self::Oidc(_) Oidc domains/federation/connection/config.rs:189

The built-in permission this right is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/federation/control.rs:42.

self Answer (SystemPermission) Where
CreateConnection Federation domains/federation/control.rs:44
EditConnection Federation domains/federation/control.rs:45
TrustConnection Federation domains/federation/control.rs:46
DeleteConnection Federation domains/federation/control.rs:47
ConfigureScim Scim domains/federation/control.rs:48

How a link made on these grounds was made.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/link.rs:122.

self Answer (LinkSource) Where
Self::Admitted(_) FirstSignIn domains/federation/link.rs:124
Self::Control(_) Admin domains/federation/link.rs:125
Self::Holder(_) Holder domains/federation/link.rs:126

The status an answer’s top-level and second-level codes say.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:68.

  • partial is Self::Partial.sub_code() == Some(sub)
top == Self::Success.status_code() partial Answer (LogoutStatus) Where
true true Partial domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:71
true false Success domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:72
false any Failed domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:73

Reads OIDC’s amr claim from RFC 8176.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:70.

says("mfa") says("hwk") Answer (ProviderFactor) Where
true true HardwareKey domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:73
true false Performed domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:74
false true | false NotPerformed domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:75

Reads a SAML assertion’s AuthnContextClassRef.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:82.

class_ref Answer (ProviderFactor) Where
Fact::Known(class) HardwareKey when HARDWARE_KEY_SAML_CONTEXTS.contains(&class) domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:84
Fact::Known(class) Performed when MULTI_FACTOR_SAML_CONTEXTS.contains(&class) domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:85
Fact::Known(_) | Fact::Unknown NotPerformed domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:86

Who removes a link on these grounds.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/link.rs:231.

self Answer (UnlinkSource) Where
Self::Control(_) Admin domains/federation/link.rs:233
Self::Holder(_) Holder domains/federation/link.rs:234

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/federation/connection_status.rs:33.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled FederatedIdpConnection::disable, SamlServiceProvider::disable, OrgIdentityProvider::add DisableUseCase (federation), ChangeStatusUseCase (federation), AddOrgUseCase (organization) FederationControl, FederationRight::EditConnection, OrgControl
Disabled to Active FederatedIdpConnection::create, FederatedIdpConnection::activate, SamlServiceProvider::create, SamlServiceProvider::activate CreateUseCase (federation), ActivateUseCase (federation), ChangeStatusUseCase (federation) FederationControl, FederationRight::CreateConnection, FederationRight::TrustConnection
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:356

FederatedIdpConnection::change_assurance_trust

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::change_assurance_trust”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(trust.needs()) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/trust.rs:25
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(self.right_to_bind(&allowed)) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:485
let Some(twice) = first_repeat(&allowed) Validation domains/federation/connection.rs:487
!hint_is_allowed(&domains.hint, &allowed) Conflict domains/federation/connection.rs:493

FederatedIdpConnection::change_email_trust

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::change_email_trust”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(trust.needs()) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/trust.rs:81
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::CreateConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:152
config.ensure_stable_subject() refuses what ensure_stable_subject refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:153
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::DeleteConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:582
self.is_active() Forbidden domains/federation/connection.rs:584
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:375
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:71

FederatedIdpConnection::map_provider_groups

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::map_provider_groups”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:134

FederatedIdpConnection::provision_new_accounts

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::provision_new_accounts”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:48
When Refused with Where
&saml.metadata_url is not Setting::Set(followed) Conflict domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:99
metadata.source() != &Setting::Set(followed.clone()) Conflict domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:105
metadata.entity_id() != &saml.entity_id Conflict domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:111
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:559

FederatedIdpConnection::replace_attribute_mapping

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::replace_attribute_mapping”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:531
let Some(field) = first_repeat(mapping.values()) Validation domains/federation/connection.rs:533

FederatedIdpConnection::roll_over_certificate

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::roll_over_certificate”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:145
&mut self.config is not ConnectionConfig::Saml(saml) not_saml() domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:147

FederatedIdpConnection::stop_mapping_groups

Section titled “FederatedIdpConnection::stop_mapping_groups”
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:157
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:76
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:417
config.provider() != self.config.provider() Conflict domains/federation/connection.rs:419
config.ensure_stable_subject() refuses what ensure_stable_subject refuses domains/federation/connection.rs:424
When Refused with Where
connection.id() != identity.connection_id() Forbidden domains/federation/link.rs:273
grounds.ensure_allows(identity, account) refuses what ensure_allows refuses domains/federation/link.rs:278
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/federation/link.rs:364, through ensure_ends
* connection.id() != self.connection_id Forbidden domains/federation/link.rs:370, through ensure_ends
ensure_fresh_holder(proof, account) refuses what ensure_fresh_holder refuses domains/federation/link.rs:344
When Refused with Where
grounds is UnlinkGrounds::Control(control) and control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/federation/link.rs:451
grounds is UnlinkGrounds::Holder(person) and ensure_holder(* person, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/federation/link.rs:453
* account.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/federation/link.rs:364, through ensure_ends
* connection.id() != self.connection_id Forbidden domains/federation/link.rs:370, through ensure_ends
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/service_provider.rs:446
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::CreateConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/service_provider.rs:121
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/service_provider.rs:122
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::DeleteConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/service_provider.rs:477
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/service_provider.rs:462
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:343, through change_default_role
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:395, through change_activation
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:410, through change_removal
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:123
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:262
self.enabled == Enablement::Disabled InvalidTransition domains/federation/scim.rs:264
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:240
self.enabled == Enablement::Enabled InvalidTransition domains/federation/scim.rs:242
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/federation/scim.rs:287
When Refused with Where
!connection.is_active() Forbidden domains/federation/sign_in_start.rs:36

Refuses a filter value this kind could never be compared with as text, such as 2026-9-1 for a date.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:403.

self Answer (DomainError) Where
Self::Date | Self::DateTime self.check_format(value) domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:405
Self::Text | Self::LongText | Self::WholeNumber | Self::Decimal | Self::Money | Self::Percent | Self::YesNo | Self::SingleChoice | Self::MultipleChoice | Self::Tags | Self::Email | Self::Phone | Self::Link | Self::Colour | Self::Country | Self::Rating Ok(()) domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:406

Refuses writer when they may not write an attribute in this namespace.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:73.

self writer Answer (DomainError) Where
User Holder not read domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:79
App Holder refused domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:75
any Administrator not read domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:79

How many values this operator compares against.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:103.

self Answer (OperandArity) Where
Is One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
IsNot One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
Contains One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
IsOneOf Many domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106
GreaterThan One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
GreaterThanOrEqual One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
LessThan One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
LessThanOrEqual One domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107
HasAny Many domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106
HasAll Many domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106
IsPresent None domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:105
IsAbsent None domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:105

Reads a state back from its stored status and completion time.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:113.

status completed_at Answer (ErasureState) Where
ErasureStatus::Completed Some(at) Ok(Self::Completed { at }) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:118
ErasureStatus::Pending None Ok(Self::Pending) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:119
ErasureStatus::Processing None Ok(Self::Processing) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:120
ErasureStatus::Cancelled None Ok(Self::Cancelled) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:121
ErasureStatus::Held None Ok(Self::Held) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:122
ErasureStatus::Failed None Ok(Self::Failed) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:123
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} erasure request has a completion time that contradicts it"))) domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:124

Reads a state back from its stored status and times.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:99.

status ready_at available_until Answer (ExportState) Where
ExportStatus::Requested None None Ok(Self::Requested) domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:105
ExportStatus::Ready Some(at) Some(available_until) Ok(Self::Ready { at, available_until, }) domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:106
ExportStatus::Expired None None Ok(Self::Expired) domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:110
any any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {} data export has times that contradict it", status.as_str()))) domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:111

Reads a state back from its stored status and the time it began.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:185.

status since Answer (ImpersonationState) Where
ImpersonationStatus::AwaitingConsent None Ok(Self::AwaitingConsent) domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:190
ImpersonationStatus::Active Some(since) Ok(Self::Active { since }) domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:191
ImpersonationStatus::Declined Some(at) Ok(Self::Declined { at }) domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:192
ImpersonationStatus::Ended Some(at) Ok(Self::Ended { at }) domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:193
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {} support impersonation has a time that contradicts it", status.as_str()))) domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:194

Closes invitee’s account once this invitation ended without being accepted: it expired, was declined or was revoked.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:397.

self.status() Answer (DomainError) Where
InvitationStatus::Expired | InvitationStatus::Declined | InvitationStatus::Revoked Ok(invitee.close_unanswered_invite()?) domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:400
InvitationStatus::Pending | InvitationStatus::Accepted Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("identity-only-an-invitation-nobody-accepted-closes", "only an invitation nobody accepted closes its account"))) domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:403

What following the link at now gets you.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:193.

self.state Answer (InvitationLifecycle) Where
OfferState::Pending Pending when now < self.expires_at domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:195
OfferState::Pending | OfferState::Expired Expired domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:196
OfferState::Accepted {..} | OfferState::Declined | OfferState::Revoked Closed domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:197

What following the link shows about the person: that they hold the invited mailbox when it was mailed there, nothing when it was handed over.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:44.

self Answer (PersonProof) Where
Mailed Mailbox domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:46
HandedOver Nothing domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:47

The route a link takes on a deployment whose mail is as mail says: mailed where a mail reaches, handed to the inviter otherwise.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:33.

mail Answer (InvitationRoute) Where
Available Mailed domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:35
NotSetUp HandedOver domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:36

Reads a state back from its stored status and acceptance time.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:52.

status accepted_at Answer (OfferState) Where
InvitationStatus::Accepted Some(at) Ok(Self::Accepted { at }) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:57
InvitationStatus::Pending None Ok(Self::Pending) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:58
InvitationStatus::Declined None Ok(Self::Declined) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:59
InvitationStatus::Expired None Ok(Self::Expired) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:60
InvitationStatus::Revoked None Ok(Self::Revoked) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:61
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} invitation has an acceptance time that contradicts it"))) domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:62

Reads a value of this type from text.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:74.

self Answer (MetadataValue) Where
Self::Text | Self::TextArray Some(MetadataValue::String(text.to_owned())) domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:76
Self::Integer text.parse().ok().map(MetadataValue::Integer) domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:77
Self::Number text.parse::< f64 >().ok().filter(| n | n.is_finite()).map(MetadataValue::Number) domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:78
Self::Boolean match text { "true" => Some(MetadataValue::Bool(true)), "false" => Some(MetadataValue::Bool(false)), _ => None, } domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:83

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/privacy/erasure_status.rs:56.

  • States: Pending, Processing, Completed, Cancelled, Held, Failed
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, Cancelled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Failed to Processing ErasureRequest::start_processing, ErasureRequest::retry, OrgErasureRequest::start_processing, OrgErasureRequest::retry ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) none read
Held to Cancelled ErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, ErasureRequest::cancel_for, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_for CancelErasureUseCase (identity), CancelOrgErasureByLinkUseCase (organization), CancelOrgErasureUseCase (organization) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl
Held to Pending ErasureRequest::submit, ErasureRequest::submit_for, ErasureRequest::release, OrgErasureRequest::submit, OrgErasureRequest::submit_for, OrgErasureRequest::release RequestErasureUseCase (identity), HoldErasureUseCase (identity), ReleaseErasureUseCase (identity), RequestOrgErasureUseCase (organization), HoldOrgErasureUseCase (organization), ReleaseOrgErasureUseCase (organization) SignedInPerson, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgControl, OrgAccountControl
Pending to Cancelled ErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, ErasureRequest::cancel_for, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_for CancelErasureUseCase (identity), CancelOrgErasureByLinkUseCase (organization), CancelOrgErasureUseCase (organization) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl
Pending to Held ErasureRequest::hold, OrgErasureRequest::hold HoldErasureUseCase (identity), ReleaseErasureUseCase (identity), HoldOrgErasureUseCase (organization), ReleaseOrgErasureUseCase (organization) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl
Pending to Processing ErasureRequest::start_processing, ErasureRequest::retry, OrgErasureRequest::start_processing, OrgErasureRequest::retry ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) none read
Processing to Completed ErasureRequest::complete, OrgErasureRequest::complete ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) none read
Processing to Failed ErasureRequest::fail, OrgErasureRequest::fail ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:39.

  • States: Requested, Ready, Expired
  • Final, which no move leaves: Expired
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Ready to Expired DataExportRequest::expire ExpireExportsUseCase (identity) none read
Requested to Ready DataExportRequest::mark_ready BuildExportsUseCase (identity) none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:116.

  • States: AwaitingConsent, Active, Declined, Ended
  • Final, which no move leaves: Declined, Ended
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Ended SupportImpersonation::end EndUseCase (identity) SignedInPerson
AwaitingConsent to Active SupportImpersonation::approve ApproveUseCase (identity) SignedInPerson
AwaitingConsent to Declined SupportImpersonation::decline DeclineUseCase (identity) SignedInPerson
AwaitingConsent to Ended SupportImpersonation::end EndUseCase (identity) SignedInPerson

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/account/import/state.rs:40.

  • States: Pending, Running, Finished, Failed
  • Final, which no move leaves: Finished, Failed
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Pending to Failed none read none read none read
Pending to Running UserImport::take_up RunUseCase (identity) none read
Running to Failed none read none read none read
Running to Finished none read none read none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/invitations/status.rs:78.

  • States: Pending, Accepted, Declined, Expired, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Accepted, Declined, Expired, Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Pending to Accepted none read none read none read
Pending to Declined none read none read none read
Pending to Expired none read none read none read
Pending to Revoked none read none read none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/account/user_status.rs:89.

  • States: Invited, PendingVerification, Active, Locked, Deactivated, Closing
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Closing none read none read none read
Active to Deactivated none read none read none read
Active to Locked none read none read none read
Closing to Active User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail
Closing to Deactivated none read none read none read
Deactivated to Active User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail
Invited to Active User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail
Invited to Deactivated none read none read none read
Locked to Active User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail
Locked to Deactivated none read none read none read
PendingVerification to Active User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail
PendingVerification to Deactivated none read none read none read
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:543
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:462
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:521
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:573
lowers && !by.clearance().admits_sensitive() Forbidden domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:576
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:158
definition.ensure_fits_its_kind() refuses what ensure_fits_its_kind refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:180
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:412
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:444
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:428
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:487
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses what ensure_may_change_schema refuses domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:394
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:225
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:99
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&user_id, AccountAction::RecordForThem) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:140
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:394
!self.state.downloadable_at(now) Conflict domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:396
When Refused with Where
self.state.downloadable_at(now) InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:417
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:431, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:431, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, account.id()) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:227
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::Export) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:242
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:461
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:466
When Refused with Where
* account.id() != self.user_id || * account.email() != self.sent_to Forbidden domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:437
When Refused with Where
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:492
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:510
self.state != ErasureState::Held InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:512
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.state != ErasureState::Failed InvalidErasureTransition { from : self.status(), to : ErasureStatus::Processing, } domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:552
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.state == ErasureState::Pending && now < self.scheduled_at InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:396
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, account.id()) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:215
departure.ensure_may_leave(account.id()) refuses what ensure_may_leave refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:216
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:238
When Refused with Where
role.invited_role_id() != self.role_id Conflict domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:292
!inviter.is_inviter(&self.invited_by) Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:298
role.ensure_offered_by(inviter) refuses what ensure_offered_by refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:303
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for
invitee.status() != UserStatus::Invited Conflict domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:306
When Refused with Where
role.ensure_offered_by(granter) refuses what ensure_offered_by refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:118
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:119
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_sent_for
When Refused with Where
presented != self.offer.token_hash() Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:480
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for
invitee.status() != UserStatus::Invited Conflict domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:527, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent
invitee.credentials_changed_at().since(self.created_at) Conflict domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:533, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent
self.offer.state(now) == InvitationLifecycle::Pending Conflict domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:489
renewed.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:494
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_sent_for
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:351
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Invitation) refuses what ensure_may_open refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:446
* invitee.id() != self.user_id Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for
new_lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:448

PendingEmailChange::cancel_from_old_address

Section titled “PendingEmailChange::cancel_from_old_address”
When Refused with Where
account.id != self.principal_id || * account.email != self.from_email Forbidden domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:458
self.state != ChangeState::Waiting InvalidTransition domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:464
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(account, now)) refused domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:425
When Refused with Where
!proof.proves_recently(&account.id) Forbidden domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:198
When Refused with Where
* presented != self.token_hash Forbidden domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:513
ensure_only_ran_out(self.state_for(account, now)) refuses what ensure_only_ran_out refuses domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:518
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/identity/tokens/secure.rs:225
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:250
now >= self.requested_at.saturating_add(CONSENT_WAIT) Conflict domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:344, through ensure_not_lapsed
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:268
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:364, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!(by.is_holder_of(&self.admin) || by.is_holder_of(&self.user_id)) Forbidden domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:295
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:364, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_act_as(&terms.admin, account, signed_in, control) refuses what ensure_may_act_as refuses domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:112
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::LetIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:90, through let_in
self.status == UserStatus::Closing InvalidTransition domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:92, through let_in
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:466
self.status == UserStatus::Deactivated Conflict domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:468
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:407
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_edit refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:140
let Some(locale) = locale and by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_edit refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:161, through change_locale
let Some(timezone) = timezone and by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_edit refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:173, through change_timezone
When Refused with Where
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:518, through finish_onboarding > apply_transition
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:124, through shut_out
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:495
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:142
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Import) refuses what ensure_may_open refuses domains/identity/account/user/import.rs:41
import.records.names_as_own_manager(&id) Validation domains/identity/account/user/import.rs:43
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Invitation) refuses what ensure_may_open refuses domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:175
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:124, through shut_out
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Registration) refuses what ensure_may_open refuses domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:126
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_edit refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:113
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::LetIn) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:106, through let_back_in
self.status != UserStatus::Locked InvalidUserTransition { from : self.status, to : UserStatus::Active, }.into() domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:108, through let_back_in
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_edit refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:39
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::EditRecords) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:70
records.names_as_own_manager(&self.id) Validation domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:72
When Refused with Where
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:518, through finish_onboarding > apply_transition
When Refused with Where
self.state != ImportState::Running InvalidTransition domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:358
expected != Some(outcome.end) || worked != taken Conflict domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:390, through ensure_covers
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Import) refuses what ensure_may_open refuses domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:186

The class as stored, with None for nothing declared.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/action.rs:248.

self Answer (ActionClass) Where
Self::Undeclared None types/action.rs:250
Self::Declared(class) Some(class) types/action.rs:251

The event type, regardless of scope.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/events/event.rs:248.

self Answer (EventType) Where
Self::Tenant { event,..} event.event_type() shared/events/event.rs:250
Self::Organization { event,..} event.event_type() shared/events/event.rs:251
Self::Platform { event,..} event.event_type() shared/events/event.rs:252

Where the event came from: outside any workflow, or from an execution’s work.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/events/event.rs:191.

self Answer (EventOrigin) Where
Self::Tenant { origin,..} * origin shared/events/event.rs:193
Self::Organization {..} | Self::Platform {..} Outside shared/events/event.rs:194

The fact borrowed.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/choice/fact.rs:53.

self Answer (Fact) Where
Self::Known(value) Fact::Known(value) types/choice/fact.rs:55
Self::Unknown Unknown types/choice/fact.rs:56

The same fact about something derived from it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/choice/fact.rs:44.

self Answer (Fact) Where
Self::Known(value) Fact::Known(derive(value)) types/choice/fact.rs:46
Self::Unknown Unknown types/choice/fact.rs:47

The account or machine, as a principal.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/actor/person.rs:187.

self Answer (PrincipalRef) Where
Self::Human(human) human.principal() types/actor/person.rs:189
Self::Agent(id) PrincipalRef::Agent(* id) types/actor/person.rs:190
Self::Consumer(id) PrincipalRef::Consumer(* id) types/actor/person.rs:191

Joined at now, or unchanged if it already joined.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/joining.rs:33.

self Answer (Joining) Where
Self::NotYet Self::Joined { at : now } types/lifecycle/joining.rs:35
Self::Joined {..} self types/lifecycle/joining.rs:36

The token status alone, without the policy.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:90.

self Answer (TokenStatus) Where
Self::Valid(_) | Self::ValidWithoutPassword Valid types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:92
Self::Expired Expired types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:93
Self::AlreadyUsed AlreadyUsed types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:94
Self::Invalid Invalid types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:95

The answer for a link that offers no password form, or None when the link is usable and the answer still needs the policy it will be held to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:79.

status Answer (PasswordLinkStatus) Where
TokenStatus::Valid None types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:81
TokenStatus::Expired Some(Self::Expired) types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:82
TokenStatus::AlreadyUsed Some(Self::AlreadyUsed) types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:83
TokenStatus::Invalid Some(Self::Invalid) types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:84

The account of the person this refers to, or None for an agent or a consumer, which no person signs in as.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/actor/principal_ref.rs:100.

self Answer (HumanAccount) Where
Self::User(id) Some(HumanAccount::User(* id)) types/actor/principal_ref.rs:102
Self::OrgUser(id) Some(HumanAccount::OrgUser(* id)) types/actor/principal_ref.rs:103
Self::Agent(_) | Self::Consumer(_) None types/actor/principal_ref.rs:104

What self may be when it sits under ceiling.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/model/restriction.rs:43.

ceiling self Answer (Restriction) Where
Self::Unrestricted any Some(asked) shared/model/restriction.rs:48
Self::To(limit) Self::Unrestricted Some(Self::To(limit.clone())) shared/model/restriction.rs:49
Self::To(limit) Self::To(asked) fits(&asked, limit).then_some(Self::To(asked)) shared/model/restriction.rs:50

Revoked at now, or unchanged if it is already revoked.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:49.

self Answer (Revocation) Where
Self::InForce Self::Revoked { at : now } types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:51
Self::Revoked {..} self types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:52

Refuses a URL whose host is an IP address this policy does not permit, or, where it permits no internal network, a name that can only be internal.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/security/ssrf.rs:89.

url.host() Answer (ValidationError) Where
UrlHost::Address(ip) self.check_ip(ip, field) shared/security/ssrf.rs:91
UrlHost::Name(name) Err(internal_refused(field)) when self.0.is_empty() && is_never_public(name) shared/security/ssrf.rs:92
UrlHost::Name(_) Ok(()) shared/security/ssrf.rs:95

Fails with the first error from the chain, if any.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/validation/validator.rs:472.

self.errors.into_iter().next() Answer (ValidationError) Where
Some(err) Err(err) shared/validation/validator.rs:474
None Ok(()) shared/validation/validator.rs:475

Who made it, as the actor an audit record names.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/control.rs:144.

self Answer (ActorRef) Where
Self::Person(person) ActorRef::from(person.account()) domains/messaging/control.rs:146
Self::Consumer(id) ActorRef::Service(* id) domains/messaging/control.rs:147

How messages are delivered.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/subscription.rs:246.

self.delivery Answer (DeliveryMode) Where
SubscriptionDelivery::Pull Pull domains/messaging/subscription.rs:248
SubscriptionDelivery::Push(_) Push domains/messaging/subscription.rs:249

Refuses this subscription joining the group member belongs to unless the two read alike.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/subscription.rs:283.

same_group && reads_alike Answer (DomainError) Where
true Ok(()) domains/messaging/subscription.rs:291
false Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("messaging-a-consumer-group-s-subscriptions-filter", "a consumer group's subscriptions filter and acknowledge alike"))) domains/messaging/subscription.rs:292

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/messaging/topic.rs:84.

  • States: Active, Paused, Archived
  • Final, which no move leaves: Archived
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Archived Topic::archive none read MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Delete
Active to Paused Topic::pause none read MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Manage
Paused to Active Topic::create, Topic::resume CreateUseCase (messaging) MessagingCreator, MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Manage
Paused to Archived Topic::archive none read MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Delete
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/schema.rs:394
self.versions.len() >= MAX_VERSIONS Validation domains/messaging/schema.rs:396
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/schema.rs:434
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_create() refuses what ensure_may_create refuses domains/messaging/schema.rs:227
When Refused with Where
subscriber.ensure_may_subscribe() refuses what ensure_may_subscribe refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:159
ensure_subscribable(topic, clearance) refuses what ensure_subscribable refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:160
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:473
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:499, through move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_consume() refuses what ensure_may_consume refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:450
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:499, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/subscription.rs:372
&self.delivery is not SubscriptionDelivery::Push(endpoint) Conflict domains/messaging/subscription.rs:374
When Refused with Where
!self.is_active() Forbidden domains/messaging/topic.rs:319
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:414
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived InvalidTransition domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived InvalidTransition domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable
When Refused with Where
creator.ensure_may_create() refuses what ensure_may_create refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:174
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:543
self.is_active() Conflict domains/messaging/topic.rs:545
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:376
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived InvalidTransition domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable
data_class < self.data_class Forbidden domains/messaging/topic.rs:510
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/messaging/topic.rs:395

What kind of place it posts to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:175.

self.0 Answer (DestinationKind) Where
Target::Slack(_) Slack domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:177
Target::Teams(_) Teams domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:178
Target::Webhook {..} Webhook domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:179

The record that mail was given up on, in the trail of the tenant it was sent for, or the platform’s for the platform’s own mail.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/events.rs:218.

sent_for Answer (DomainEvent) Where
MailSentFor::Tenant(tenant_id) crate::shared::events::raised::scoped(tenant_id, body) domains/notifications/events.rs:227
MailSentFor::Platform DomainEvent::platform(Box::new(body)) domains/notifications/events.rs:230

The record it is about: the group offered, or none.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/notice.rs:65.

self Answer (AboutResource) Where
Self::Nothing Nothing domains/notifications/notice.rs:67
Self::JoinGroup(group, _) AboutResource::Resource(* group.as_uuid()) domains/notifications/notice.rs:68

The category an event type belongs to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/category.rs:116.

event_type Answer (NotificationCategory) Where
EventType::Identity(_) Identity domains/notifications/category.rs:118
EventType::Notifications(event) Self::of_notifications(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:119
EventType::Crypto(_) Crypto domains/notifications/category.rs:120
EventType::OAuth(_) OAuth domains/notifications/category.rs:121
EventType::Authorization(event) Self::of_authorization(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:122
EventType::Agents(_) Agents domains/notifications/category.rs:123
EventType::Federation(event) Self::of_federation(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:124
EventType::Routing(_) Routing domains/notifications/category.rs:125
EventType::Proxy(event) Self::of_proxy(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:126
EventType::Signals(_) Signals domains/notifications/category.rs:127
EventType::Webhooks(_) Webhooks domains/notifications/category.rs:128
EventType::Branding(event) Self::of_branding(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:129
EventType::Authentication(_) Authentication domains/notifications/category.rs:130
EventType::Organization(_) | EventType::Operator(_) Organization domains/notifications/category.rs:131
EventType::Tenant(event) Self::of_tenant(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:132
EventType::Messaging(event) Self::of_messaging(* event) domains/notifications/category.rs:133
EventType::Consumers(_) Consumers domains/notifications/category.rs:134
EventType::Workflows(_) Workflows domains/notifications/category.rs:135

The permission needed to see this category’s notifications in a tenant.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/notifications/category.rs:371.

self Answer (SystemPermission) Where
Identity Users domains/notifications/category.rs:373
Crypto Crypto domains/notifications/category.rs:374
OAuth ApiKeys domains/notifications/category.rs:375
Authorization Roles domains/notifications/category.rs:376
Federation Federation domains/notifications/category.rs:377
Routing Routing domains/notifications/category.rs:378
Pipeline Pipeline domains/notifications/category.rs:379
Signals Signals domains/notifications/category.rs:380
Webhooks Webhooks domains/notifications/category.rs:381
Branding Branding domains/notifications/category.rs:382
Authentication AuthConfig domains/notifications/category.rs:383
Organization AuditLog domains/notifications/category.rs:384
Tenant TenantSettings domains/notifications/category.rs:385
Agents Agents domains/notifications/category.rs:386
Consumers Consumers domains/notifications/category.rs:387
Messaging Messaging domains/notifications/category.rs:388
Domains Domains domains/notifications/category.rs:389
Mtls Mtls domains/notifications/category.rs:390
Scim Scim domains/notifications/category.rs:391
Classification Classification domains/notifications/category.rs:392
Policy PolicySet domains/notifications/category.rs:393
Audit AuditLog domains/notifications/category.rs:394
Workflows Workflows domains/notifications/category.rs:395

How the person is reached, given the channel they chose for the category and whether their address was proved theirs.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/reach.rs:90.

self address Answer (NotificationChannel) Where
Self::ByRights | Self::Addressed any chose domains/notifications/reach.rs:92
Self::OwnAccount MailAddress::Confirmed InAppAndEmail domains/notifications/reach.rs:93
Self::OwnAccount MailAddress::Unconfirmed InApp domains/notifications/reach.rs:94

How someone told about an event of event_type as told_as is reached: on their own account’s safety whatever they hold, and by their rights otherwise.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/reach.rs:62.

told_as Answer (NotificationReach) Where
ToldAs::Subject OwnAccount when concerns_account_safety(event_type) domains/notifications/reach.rs:64
ToldAs::Addressee Addressed when is_addressed_notice(event_type) domains/notifications/reach.rs:65
ToldAs::Subject | ToldAs::Addressee | ToldAs::Overseer ByRights domains/notifications/reach.rs:66

MemberNotificationPreferences::change_channel

Section titled “MemberNotificationPreferences::change_channel”
When Refused with Where
!by.is_member(&self.org_user_id) Forbidden domains/notifications/personal.rs:164
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, UPDATES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/personal.rs:169
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(member.organization_id(), UPDATES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/personal.rs:101
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/destination.rs:185
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/destination.rs:338
self.state != from InvalidTransition domains/notifications/destination.rs:394, through move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/destination.rs:314
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/destination.rs:380
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/notifications/destination.rs:359
self.state != from InvalidTransition domains/notifications/destination.rs:394, through move_to

OperatorNotificationPreferences::change_channel

Section titled “OperatorNotificationPreferences::change_channel”
When Refused with Where
by.operator() != &self.operator_id Forbidden domains/notifications/personal.rs:261

The token_endpoint_auth_method this is (RFC 7591 2).

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:47.

self Answer (TokenEndpointAuthMethod) Where
Self::Secret(secret) match secret.sent_by { SecretSentBy::Basic => TokenEndpointAuthMethod::ClientSecretBasic, SecretSentBy::Post => TokenEndpointAuthMethod::ClientSecretPost, } domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:49
Self::PrivateKeyJwt(_) PrivateKeyJwt domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:53
Self::TlsClientAuth(_) TlsClientAuth domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:54
Self::Public None domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:55

Whether the person’s consent covers a request, given what they recorded: a first-party client is covered without asking.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:57.

self recorded Answer (ConsentStanding) Where
AskPerson Missing Missing
FirstParty Missing Covers domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:60
any Covers Covers domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:60

Reads a state back from its stored status and approver.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:73.

status approved_by Answer (DeviceAuthState) Where
DeviceAuthStatus::Approved Some(by) Ok(Self::Approved { by }) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:78
DeviceAuthStatus::Redeemed Some(by) Ok(Self::Redeemed { by }) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:79
DeviceAuthStatus::Pending None Ok(Self::Pending) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:80
DeviceAuthStatus::Denied None Ok(Self::Denied) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:81
DeviceAuthStatus::Expired None Ok(Self::Expired) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:82
any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} device authorization has an approver that contradicts it"))) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:83

The built-in permission this right is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/oauth/control.rs:29.

self Answer (SystemPermission) Where
any ApiKeys domains/oauth/control.rs:31

The assurance the sign-in reached, when it is known.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:246.

&self.facts Answer (AssuranceLevel) Where
SignInFacts::Stated { assurance,..} Some(* assurance) domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:248
SignInFacts::NotStated None domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:249

What the person must still do before a code is issued, as facts say.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:275.

  • ask_consent is facts.consent == ConsentStanding::Missing || facts.prompts.asks(Prompt::Consent)
  • silent is facts.prompts.asks(Prompt::None)
ask_consent silent Answer (Interaction) Where
true true Interaction::Refuse(AuthorizeRefusal::ConsentRequired) domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:287
true false Consent domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:288
false any IssueNow domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:289

The request for client, sending its answers to redirect_uri, asking asked, screened.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:142.

refusal(client, asked) Answer (RequestScreen) Where
Some(refused) RequestScreen::TellClient(refused) domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:151
None Proceed domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:152

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/oauth/grants/device_auth_status.rs:45.

  • States: Pending, Approved, Denied, Expired, Redeemed
  • Final, which no move leaves: Denied, Expired, Redeemed
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Approved to Redeemed DeviceAuthorization::redeem CollectDeviceTokensUseCase (oauth) none read
Pending to Approved DeviceAuthorization::approve ApproveDeviceUseCase (oauth) SignedInPerson
Pending to Denied DeviceAuthorization::deny DenyDeviceUseCase (oauth) SignedInPerson
Pending to Expired DeviceAuthorization::expire ExpireDeviceAuthorizationsUseCase (oauth) none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/oauth/clients/status.rs:34.

  • States: Active, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked OAuthClient::revoke, OAuthClient::deregister RevokeUseCase (oauth) OAuthControl, OAuthRight::Revoke, SelfManagement
When Refused with Where
!may Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:261
let Some(scope) = client.first_unallowed_scope(&scopes) Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:267
When Refused with Where
* client.id() != params.client_id Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:232
ensure_tunnel_for(client, route) refuses what ensure_tunnel_for refuses domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:237
When Refused with Where
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:525
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_create(&key, control, now) refuses what ensure_may_create refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:163
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:362
self.standing != KeyStanding::Working InvalidTransition domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:364
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:390
ensure_grantable(&self.scopes, control.holds().system()) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:391
self.standing == KeyStanding::Working InvalidTransition domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:393
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:499
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:476
When Refused with Where
self.is_consumed() AuthCodeError::AlreadyConsumed domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:463
self.is_expired(now) AuthCodeError::Expired domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:466
!client_may_exchange AuthCodeError::ClientRefused domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:484, through ensure_exchanged_by
client.first_unallowed_scope(&self.scopes).is_some() AuthCodeError::ScopeWithdrawn domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:487, through ensure_exchanged_by
!self.matches_redirect_uri(exchange.redirect_uri) AuthCodeError::RedirectMismatch domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:490, through ensure_exchanged_by
!self.answers_challenge(exchange.verifier_challenge) AuthCodeError::VerifierMismatch domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:493, through ensure_exchanged_by
When Refused with Where
ensure_code_client(client, &params.redirect_uri, &params.scopes) refuses what ensure_code_client refuses domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:217
session.signed_in(consenting.check) is not Some(person) Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:220
When Refused with Where
ensure_signed_in_as(by, &user_id) refuses what ensure_signed_in_as refuses domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:449
self.is_expired(now) DeviceAuthError::Expired domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:451
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_device_client(client, &params.scopes) refuses what ensure_device_client refuses domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:255
When Refused with Where
ensure_signed_in_as(by, &user_id) refuses what ensure_signed_in_as refuses domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:477
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to
When Refused with Where
too_soon DeviceAuthError::SlowDown domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:423
When Refused with Where
!may_redeem DeviceAuthError::ClientRefused domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:509
self.is_expired(now) DeviceAuthError::Expired domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:512
self.state is not DeviceAuthState::Approved { by } DeviceAuthError::InvalidTransition(InvalidDeviceAuthTransition { from : self.status(), to : DeviceAuthStatus::Redeemed, },) domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:515
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to
When Refused with Where
spent Unauthorized domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:215
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:102
new.lifetime.ensure_at_most(LONGEST_LIFETIME, "an initial access token") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:104
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:232
self.revocation.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:234
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:172
When Refused with Where
always Forbidden domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:607, through ensure_managed_by
When Refused with Where
ensure_self_registrable(&client.grant_types, &client.settings) refuses what ensure_self_registrable refuses domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:200
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:446
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:592, through ensure_editable
always Conflict domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:596, through ensure_editable
&self.credential is not ClientCredential::Secret(secret) Conflict domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:531
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:592, through ensure_editable
always Conflict domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:596, through ensure_editable
When Refused with Where
always Forbidden domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:607, through ensure_managed_by
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:146
always Conflict domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:191, through ensure_given_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:69
When Refused with Where
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses what ensure_holder refuses domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:173
always Conflict domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:191, through ensure_given_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_refresh(client, code.client_id()) refuses what ensure_may_refresh refuses domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:195
!code.is_consumed() Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:197
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_refresh(client, device.client_id()) refuses what ensure_may_refresh refuses domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:224
device.collected_by() is not Some(user_id) Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:226
When Refused with Where
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) Forbidden domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:505
When Refused with Where
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) RefreshRefusal::OtherClient domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:409
!client.is_active() || !client.supports_grant_type(GrantType::RefreshToken) RefreshRefusal::ClientRefused domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:412
!self.binding.admits(&request.proof) RefreshRefusal::UnprovedKey domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:415
self.state is RefreshState::Rotated {..} self.reused(client, now) domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:440, through ensure_usable
self.state is RefreshState::Revoked {..} RefreshRefusal::Revoked domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:441, through ensure_usable
self.state is RefreshState::Active and now >= self.expires_at RefreshRefusal::Expired domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:442, through ensure_usable
asked is RefreshScopes::Narrowed(_) RefreshRefusal::ScopeWidened domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:478, through kept_scopes
When Refused with Where
screen(Some(client), &parameters.redirect_uri, &parameters.asked) is RequestScreen::TellClient(refused) refused domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:187
screen(Some(client), &parameters.redirect_uri, &parameters.asked) is RequestScreen::TellBrowser AuthorizeRefusal::InvalidRequest domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:188
When Refused with Where
self.client_id != * client.id() PushedRefusal::OtherClient domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:299, through ensure_usable_by
self.usage.is_used() PushedRefusal::Used domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:302, through ensure_usable_by
now >= self.expires_at PushedRefusal::Expired domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:305, through ensure_usable_by

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/operator/status.rs:31.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled Operator::disable DisableOperatorUseCase (operator) OperatorAuthority
Disabled to Active Operator::create, Operator::install_first, Operator::enable CreateOperatorUseCase (operator), InstallFirstOperatorUseCase (operator), EnableOperatorUseCase (operator) OperatorAuthority
When Refused with Where
ensure_tenant_allows_impersonation(tenant, tenant_id) refuses what ensure_tenant_allows_impersonation refuses domains/operator/impersonation.rs:158
ensure_within_window(expires_at, now) refuses what ensure_within_window refuses domains/operator/impersonation.rs:160
When Refused with Where
* by.operator() != self.operator_id Forbidden domains/operator/impersonation.rs:443
self.revocation.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/operator/impersonation.rs:449
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_manages_another(&id) refuses what ensure_manages_another refuses domains/operator/identity.rs:63
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_manages_another(&self.id) refuses what ensure_manages_another refuses domains/operator/identity.rs:183
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_manages_another(&self.id) refuses what ensure_manages_another refuses domains/operator/identity.rs:202
When Refused with Where
holder.id() != by.operator() Forbidden domains/operator/api_key.rs:91
When Refused with Where
* by.operator() != self.operator_id Forbidden domains/operator/api_key.rs:247, through revoke_without_event
self.revocation.is_revoked() InvalidTransition domains/operator/api_key.rs:253, through revoke_without_event

The account as a principal.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:50.

self Answer (PrincipalRef) Where
Self::User(user) PrincipalRef::User(* user.id()) domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:52
Self::Member(now) PrincipalRef::OrgUser(* now.member.id()) domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:53

The cloud this credential opens.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:234.

self Answer (CloudProvider) Where
Self::AwsAssumeRole {..} Aws domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:236
Self::GcpServiceAccount {..} Gcp domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:237
Self::AzureServicePrincipal {..} Azure domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:238
Self::DigitalOceanToken {..} DigitalOcean domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:239
Self::KubernetesServiceAccount {..} Kubernetes domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:240

The cloud.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:163.

self Answer (CloudProvider) Where
Self::Aws {..} Aws domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:165
Self::Gcp Gcp domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:166
Self::Azure Azure domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:167
Self::DigitalOcean DigitalOcean domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:168
Self::Kubernetes Kubernetes domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:169

Closes invitee’s account once this invitation ended without being accepted: it expired, was declined or was revoked.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:386.

self.status() Answer (DomainError) Where
InvitationStatus::Expired | InvitationStatus::Declined | InvitationStatus::Revoked invitee.close_unanswered_invite() domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:394
InvitationStatus::Pending | InvitationStatus::Accepted Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("identity-only-an-invitation-nobody-accepted-closes", "only an invitation nobody accepted closes its account"))) domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:397

How far this role reaches into the organization’s tenants.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/organization/members/membership.rs:124.

self Answer (TenantReach) Where
Viewer Nothing domains/organization/members/membership.rs:128
Billing Nothing domains/organization/members/membership.rs:128
Member Granted domains/organization/members/membership.rs:127
Admin Every domains/organization/members/membership.rs:126
Owner Every domains/organization/members/membership.rs:126

Records that a charge failed, so a payment is owed from now.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:437.

self.state Answer (DomainError) Where
SubscriptionState::Trialing {..} Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("organization-nothing-is-charged-while-a-trial", "nothing is charged while a trial runs"))) domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:439
SubscriptionState::PastDue {..} Ok(()) domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:443
SubscriptionState::Active { self.touch() ; self.state = SubscriptionState::PastDue { since : self.updated_at, } ; self.raised.raise_organization(OrgPaymentFailed { organization_id : self.organization_id, occurred_at : self.updated_at, }) ; Ok(()) } domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:444

Where the session opened here works.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/access/landing.rs:86.

self Answer (SessionPlace) Where
Self::Tenant(tenant) SessionPlace::Tenant(* tenant.id()) domains/organization/access/landing.rs:88
Self::Organization Organization domains/organization/access/landing.rs:89

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:44.

  • States: Active, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked OrgApiKey::revoke RevokeOrgUseCase (organization) ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::ApiKeys(OrgApiKeyAction::Revoke)

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/members/org_user_status.rs:115.

  • States: Invited, PendingVerification, Active, Locked, Deactivated, Closing
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Closing none read none read none read
Active to Deactivated none read none read none read
Active to Locked none read none read none read
Closing to Active OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress
Closing to Deactivated none read none read none read
Deactivated to Active OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress
Deactivated to Invited OrgUser::reopen_for_invitation InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) OrgControl, MemberAction::Invite, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Escalate)
Invited to Active OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress
Invited to Deactivated none read none read none read
Locked to Active OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress
Locked to Deactivated none read none read none read
PendingVerification to Active OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress
PendingVerification to Deactivated none read none read none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/status.rs:39.

  • States: Active, Suspended, Closed
  • Final, which no move leaves: Closed
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Closed none read none read none read
Active to Suspended Organization::suspend_for_non_payment SuspendOverdueOrganizationsUseCase (organization) none read
Suspended to Active Organization::lift_non_payment_suspension, Organization::create, Organization::create_installation ReceivePaymentNoticeUseCase (organization), ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding) none read
Suspended to Closed none read none read none read
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, UPDATE) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:310
ensure_credential_fits(&self.setup, &credential) refuses what ensure_credential_fits refuses domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:311
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&organization_id, UPDATE) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:224
When Refused with Where
self.state.credential().cloned() is not Some(credential) Conflict domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:381
When Refused with Where
self.state.credential().cloned() is not Some(credential) Conflict domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:338
let CloudBinding::Bound(tied) = &self.binding && * tied != identity Forbidden domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:346
When Refused with Where
* organization.id() != self.organization_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:445, through ensure_organization
ensure_tenant_of(organization, by.tenant_id()) refuses what ensure_tenant_of refuses domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:508
ensure_tenant_of(organization, account.tenant_id()) refuses what ensure_tenant_of refuses domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:509
!linked || account.email != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:589, through ensure_member_account
account.email != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:512
self.is_linked_to(account.tenant_id()) Conflict domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:527, through ensure_not_linked
self.links.iter().any(| link | link.user_id == account.user_id) Conflict domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:537, through ensure_not_linked
When Refused with Where
ensure_tenant_of(organization, first.tenant_id()) refuses what ensure_tenant_of refuses domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:281
When Refused with Where
by is LinkRemoval::Holder(account) and !linked || account.email != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:589, through ensure_member_account
by is LinkRemoval::Organization(acted) and ensure_platform_or_may(acted, &self.organization_id, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update),) refuses what ensure_platform_or_may refuses domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:561
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&params.organization_id, OrgPermission::ApiKeys(OrgApiKeyAction::Create),) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:150
ensure_grantable(&params.scopes, &by.held()) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:155
params.expires_at.has_passed(crate::shared::clock::now()) Validation domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:157
ensure_within_parent(params.expires_at, by) refuses what ensure_within_parent refuses domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:162
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/branding.rs:142
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/branding.rs:159
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/branding.rs:180
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/branding.rs:193
When Refused with Where
ensure_in_person(member, by) refuses what ensure_in_person refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/consent.rs:79
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_on(member.id(), AccountAction::RecordForThem) refuses what ensure_on refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/consent.rs:97
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:349
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_on refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:354
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || * member.email() != self.sent_to Forbidden domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:325
When Refused with Where
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_on refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:378
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_on refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:398
self.state != ErasureState::Held InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:400
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.state != ErasureState::Failed InvalidErasureTransition { from : self.status(), to : ErasureStatus::Processing, } domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:266
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
self.state == ErasureState::Pending && now < self.scheduled_at InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:248
self.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_in_person(member, by) refuses what ensure_in_person refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:85
member.ensure_an_owner_stays(owners) refuses what ensure_an_owner_stays refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:86
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_on(member.id(), AccountAction::Erase) refuses what ensure_on refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:104
member.ensure_an_owner_stays(owners) refuses what ensure_an_owner_stays refuses domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:105
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&new.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:144
ensure_requests_unsigned(&new.config) refuses what ensure_requests_unsigned refuses domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:145
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:267
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:306
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:292
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for
!still_may Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:307, through ensure_inviter_still_may
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses what ensure_waiting refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:267
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(invitee.organization_id(), INVITE) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:108
ensure_may_hand_out(invitee.role(), by.by()) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:109
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses what ensure_waiting refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:110
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:111
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for
When Refused with Where
presented != self.offer.token_hash() Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:468
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses what ensure_waiting refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:494, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent
invitee.credentials_changed_at().since(self.created_at) Conflict domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:496, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent
self.offer.state(now) == InvitationLifecycle::Pending Conflict domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:477
renewed.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:482
When Refused with Where
ensure_platform_or_may(by, &self.organization_id, INVITE) refuses what ensure_platform_or_may refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:325
When Refused with Where
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for
* invitee.email() != self.email Forbidden domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, INVITE) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:428
new_lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:429
When Refused with Where
self.usage.is_used() Validation domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:202
self.purpose != expected Validation domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:209
now >= self.expires_at Validation domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:217
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id SignInRefused::ForAnotherAccount domains/organization/access/session.rs:485
When Refused with Where
member != * entry.member.id() Forbidden domains/organization/access/session.rs:189
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(Duration::seconds(i64::from(MAX_SESSION_SECS)), "an organization session",) refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/organization/access/session.rs:194
ensure_may_enter(&entry, params.place) refuses what ensure_may_enter refuses domains/organization/access/session.rs:198
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || !proof.proves_recently(&own) Forbidden domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:48

OrgSession::keep_through_own_factor_addition

Section titled “OrgSession::keep_through_own_factor_addition”
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || proof.for_account(own).is_err() Forbidden domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:109
self.status != SessionStatus::Active || !self.progress.is_complete() Forbidden domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:115
When Refused with Where
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || holder.subject() != own Forbidden domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:76
When Refused with Where
!check.admits(from) Forbidden domains/organization/access/session/switch.rs:53
ensure_may_enter(&to.entry, SessionPlace::Tenant(to.tenant_id)) refuses what ensure_may_enter refuses domains/organization/access/session/switch.rs:59
When Refused with Where
self.state is not SubscriptionState::Trialing { ends_at } Conflict domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:392
crate::shared::clock::now() < ends_at Conflict domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:398
When Refused with Where
self.state is SubscriptionState::Trialing {..} Conflict domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:439
When Refused with Where
founding.organization_id() != organization.id() Forbidden domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:177
When Refused with Where
Self::ensure_grantable(&request) refuses what ensure_grantable refuses domains/organization/members/tenant_grant.rs:85
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem
When Refused with Where
founding.ensure_installation() refuses what ensure_installation refuses domains/organization/access/token.rs:116
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/organization/access/token.rs:298
When Refused with Where
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) refused domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem
When Refused with Where
self.status != OrgUserStatus::Invited Conflict domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:604
accepted.email() != self.email() Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:610
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_edit_profile(self, by) refuses what ensure_may_edit_profile refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:39
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take_over(self, by) refuses what ensure_may_take_over refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:69
When Refused with Where
&self.password_hash is not OrgPassword::Set(hash) Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:129, through sign_in_with_password
!hasher.verify(raw, hash)? Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:135, through sign_in_with_password
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take_over(self, by) refuses what ensure_may_take_over refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:43
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_edit_profile(self, by) refuses what ensure_may_edit_profile refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:197
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may_act_on refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:558
ensure_may_hand_out(role, by.by()) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:559
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may_act_on refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:410
to == OrgUserStatus::Invited InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:412
to == OrgUserStatus::Closing || self.status == OrgUserStatus::Closing InvalidTransition domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:418
When Refused with Where
self.joining == Joining::NotYet Conflict domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:138
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_bring_in(params.role, &params.organization_id, added_by, MemberAction::Create,) refuses what ensure_may_bring_in refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:145
When Refused with Where
!by.is_member(&self.id) || by.session().is_none() Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:65, through ensure_hands_over_own
by.ensure_genuine(&self.organization_id) refuses what ensure_genuine refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:70, through ensure_hands_over_own
self.role != OrgRole::Owner Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:72, through ensure_hands_over_own
ensure_may_inherit(self, heir) refuses what ensure_may_inherit refuses domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:45
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_bring_in(params.role, &params.organization_id, AddedBy::Member(* by), MemberAction::Invite,) refuses what ensure_may_bring_in refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:174
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Remove) refuses what ensure_may_act_on refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:487
by.is_member(&self.id) Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:490
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Invite) refuses what ensure_may_act_on refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:460
ensure_may_hand_out(role, by.by()) refuses what ensure_may_hand_out refuses domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:461
When Refused with Where
proof.as_email() != self.email() Forbidden domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:93
When Refused with Where
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(&self.id, OrgPermission::Organization(action)) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:543, through ensure_may_move
to == OrganizationStatus::Active && matches !(self.suspended_by, Suspension::ByPlatform(_)) Forbidden domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:547, through ensure_may_move
When Refused with Where
ensure_organization_label(&params.slug, &[]) refuses what ensure_organization_label refuses domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:166
When Refused with Where
!self.suspended_for_non_payment() InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle/non_payment.rs:62
When Refused with Where
ensure_platform_or_may(by, &self.id, OrgPermission::Tenants(TenantAction::Delete)) refuses what ensure_platform_or_may refuses domains/organization/lifecycle/tenants.rs:61
When Refused with Where
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_open
by.ensure_may(&self.id, OrgPermission::Organization(OrganizationAction::AuthConfig),) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:377
by.session() is not Some(session) Forbidden domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:382
When Refused with Where
matches !(self.suspended_by, Suspension::ByPlatform(_)) InvalidTransition domains/organization/lifecycle/non_payment.rs:37
When Refused with Where
lifetime.ensure_at_most(LONGEST_LINK, "a sign-up link") refuses what ensure_at_most refuses domains/organization/signup.rs:90

Who the caller is in the tenant’s records.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/context.rs:108.

self Answer (PrincipalRef) Where
Self::User { user_id,..} PrincipalRef::User(* user_id) domains/proxy/request/context.rs:110
Self::Agent { agent_id,..} PrincipalRef::Agent(* agent_id) domains/proxy/request/context.rs:111
Self::Consumer { consumer_id,..} PrincipalRef::Consumer(* consumer_id) domains/proxy/request/context.rs:112

Writes the answer onto ctx: its headers for whatever answers the request, and for a preflight the empty answer served instead of the upstream’s.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:91.

self Answer (StageDecision) Where
Self::NotCrossOrigin pass("cors: not a cross-origin request") domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:93
Self::Allowed(headers) { ctx.response_headers.extend(headers) ; pass("cors: origin allowed") } domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:94
Self::Preflight(headers) { ctx.response_headers.extend(headers) ; ctx.response = ResponseSource::Ready(preflight_response()) ; pass("cors: preflight answered") } domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:98

The decision this stage takes on a client read as client: a pass when no automation was recognised, otherwise the configured action, a challenge to enroll as an agent among them.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:113.

self.action Answer (StageDecision) Where
FingerprintAction::Allow StageDecision::Pass { reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} allowed by the stage"), } domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:121
FingerprintAction::Deny StageDecision::Deny { status : DenialStatus::FORBIDDEN, reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} refused"), } domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:124
FingerprintAction::Challenge StageDecision::Challenge { challenge_type : ChallengeType::DeviceEnroll, answer_at : AnswerAt::Retry, reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} must enroll as an agent"), } domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:128

Whether the request proved possession of the key its credential is bound to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:26.

self Answer (DpopBinding) Where
Self::Anonymous Unbound domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:28
Self::Proven(proven) proven.binding domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:29

The call method makes on target, the value of its target_parameter.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:117.

method target Answer (McpCall) Where
McpMethod::AuthorityFree any Some(Self::AuthorityFree) domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:119
any Fact::Unknown None domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:120
McpMethod::CallTool Fact::Known(name) Some(Self::Tool(name)) domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:121
McpMethod::ReadResource Fact::Known(uri) Some(Self::Resource(uri)) domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:122
McpMethod::GetPrompt Fact::Known(name) Some(Self::Prompt(name)) domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:123

The class of action the method is, when the method alone says it: reading a resource and fetching a prompt are reads.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:90.

self Answer (ActionClass) Where
Self::ReadResource | Self::GetPrompt Some(ActionClass::Read) domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:92
Self::CallTool | Self::AuthorityFree None domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:93

The stage decision the outcome comes to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:188.

self Answer (StageDecision) Where
Self::Permit StageDecision::Pass { reason : "access_permitted".to_owned(), } domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:190
Self::Deny(code) code.decision() domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:193
Self::Challenge(challenge) challenge.decision() domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:194

The device a request names: the verified device certificate when the connection presented one, else the session’s trusted device.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/device.rs:34.

session_device Answer (RequestDevice) Where
Fact::Known(device) Self::SessionTrusted(device) domains/proxy/request/device.rs:42
Fact::Unknown Unknown domains/proxy/request/device.rs:43

The trusted device the session recorded, when that is what names the device.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/device.rs:51.

self Answer (Fact) Where
Self::SessionTrusted(device) Fact::Known(device) domains/proxy/request/device.rs:53
Self::Certified(_) | Self::Unknown Unknown domains/proxy/request/device.rs:54

Refuses this stage when it reads classification rules other than own, the tenant’s, or when the tenant has classified nothing.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:287.

own Answer (DomainError) Where
TenantRules::Classified(own) Ok(()) when own == read domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:292
TenantRules::Classified(_) Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("proxy-stage-reads-another-tenants-rules", "the stage reads classification rules that are not this tenant's"))) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:293
TenantRules::Unclassified Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("proxy-stage-reads-no-rules", "the tenant has classified no fields, so the stage has no rules to read"))) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:297

The stage’s kind on its own, without its settings.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:211.

self Answer (StageKindName) Where
Self::Waf(_) Waf domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:213
Self::GeoFence(_) GeoFence domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:214
Self::DevicePosture(_) DevicePosture domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:215
Self::Identity Identity domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:216
Self::DataClassify(_) DataClassify domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:217
Self::Policy Policy domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:218
Self::TokenExchange(_) TokenExchange domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:219
Self::RateLimit(_) RateLimit domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:220
Self::TokenRateLimit(_) TokenRateLimit domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:221
Self::StepUp(_) StepUp domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:222
Self::RequestSign(_) RequestSign domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:223
Self::Redact(_) Redact domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:224
Self::ResponseSign(_) ResponseSign domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:225
Self::Cache(_) Cache domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:226
Self::Custom(_) Custom domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:227
Self::Cors(_) Cors domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:228
Self::HoneypotRoutes(_) HoneypotRoutes domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:229
Self::ReconDetection(_) ReconDetection domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:230
Self::Fingerprint(_) Fingerprint domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:231
Self::SecurityHeaders(_) SecurityHeaders domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:232
Self::IpReputation(_) IpReputation domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:233
Self::CanaryToken(_) CanaryToken domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:234
Self::Terminate(_) Terminate domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:235
Self::GraphQl(_) GraphQl domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:236
Self::RequestTransform(_) RequestTransform domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:237
Self::ResponseTransform(_) ResponseTransform domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:238
Self::Mcp Mcp domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:239

Which chains this stage runs in.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:361.

self Answer (StagePhase) Where
Self::Redact(_) | Self::ResponseSign(_) | Self::ResponseTransform(_) Response domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:363
Self::Cache(_) | Self::CanaryToken(_) | Self::TokenRateLimit(_) Both domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:367
Self::Waf(_) | Self::GeoFence(_) | Self::DevicePosture(_) | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify(_) | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange(_) | Self::RateLimit(_) | Self::StepUp(_) | Self::RequestSign(_) | Self::Custom(_) | Self::Cors(_) | Self::HoneypotRoutes(_) | Self::ReconDetection(_) | Self::Fingerprint(_) | Self::SecurityHeaders(_) | Self::IpReputation(_) | Self::Terminate(_) | Self::GraphQl(_) | Self::RequestTransform(_) | Self::Mcp Request domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:369

Checks that the settings this kind carries can do their job.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:46.

self Answer (DomainError) Where
Self::Waf(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:48
Self::GeoFence(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:49
Self::TokenExchange(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:50
Self::RateLimit(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:51
Self::RequestSign(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:52
Self::ResponseSign(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:53
Self::Cache(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:54
Self::Cors(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:55
Self::HoneypotRoutes(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:56
Self::ReconDetection(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:57
Self::SecurityHeaders(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:58
Self::IpReputation(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:59
Self::CanaryToken(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:60
Self::Custom(c) c.validate() domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:61
Self::Identity | Self::DevicePosture(_) | Self::DataClassify(_) | Self::Policy | Self::TokenRateLimit(_) | Self::StepUp(_) | Self::Redact(_) | Self::Fingerprint(_) | Self::Terminate(_) | Self::GraphQl(_) | Self::RequestTransform(_) | Self::ResponseTransform(_) | Self::Mcp Ok(()) domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:62

What this kind reads of a request body before the proxy decides, or None when it decides on the request line and headers alone.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:149.

self Answer (BodyReader) Where
Self::Waf Some(BodyReader::Waf) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:151
Self::RequestSign Some(BodyReader::RequestSign) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:152
Self::Mcp Some(BodyReader::Mcp) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:153
Self::GraphQl Some(BodyReader::GraphQl) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:154
Self::GeoFence | Self::DevicePosture | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange | Self::RateLimit | Self::TokenRateLimit | Self::StepUp | Self::Redact | Self::ResponseSign | Self::Cache | Self::Custom | Self::Cors | Self::HoneypotRoutes | Self::ReconDetection | Self::Fingerprint | Self::SecurityHeaders | Self::IpReputation | Self::CanaryToken | Self::Terminate | Self::RequestTransform | Self::ResponseTransform None domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:155

Where this kind acts on the upstream’s answer, or None when it acts on the request alone.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:188.

self Answer (ResponseSlot) Where
Self::Redact Some(ResponseSlot::Redact) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:190
Self::TokenRateLimit Some(ResponseSlot::ChargeTokens) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:191
Self::ResponseTransform Some(ResponseSlot::Transform) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:192
Self::CanaryToken Some(ResponseSlot::CanaryScan) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:193
Self::ResponseSign Some(ResponseSlot::Sign) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:194
Self::Cache Some(ResponseSlot::CacheStore) domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:195
Self::Waf | Self::GeoFence | Self::DevicePosture | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange | Self::RateLimit | Self::StepUp | Self::RequestSign | Self::Custom | Self::Cors | Self::HoneypotRoutes | Self::ReconDetection | Self::Fingerprint | Self::SecurityHeaders | Self::IpReputation | Self::Terminate | Self::GraphQl | Self::RequestTransform | Self::Mcp None domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:196

Decides one request.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:49.

screened(question) Answer (AccessDecision) Where
Ok(requester) tenant::ruled(question, &requester) domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:51
Err(code) AccessDecision::refused(code) domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:52

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:53.

  • States: Active, Paused
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Paused LogShippingTarget::pause none read RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update
Paused to Active LogShippingTarget::create, LogShippingTarget::resume CreateLogTargetUseCase (proxy) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Create, RoutingRight::Update

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/proxy/pipeline_status.rs:40.

  • States: Draft, Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled Pipeline::disable ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline
Disabled to Active Pipeline::activate ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline
Disabled to Draft Pipeline::with_defaults ConfigureUseCase (proxy), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::CreatePipeline
Draft to Active Pipeline::activate ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/issued.rs:38
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:271
settings.destination.ensure_reachable_with(&settings.credential) refuses what ensure_reachable_with refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:272
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:126
settings.destination.ensure_reachable_with(&settings.credential) refuses what ensure_reachable_with refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:127
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:340
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:351, through move_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:290
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:351, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:292
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.pipeline_id() != self.id) PipelineError::ForeignRoute domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:367, through ensure_its_own
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
stage.mandatory() PipelineError::CannotAddMandatory domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:403
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::DeletePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:352
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.pipeline_id() != self.id) PipelineError::ForeignRoute domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:367, through ensure_its_own
!routes.is_empty() PipelineError::InUse domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:355
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:319
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing an error domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:514
stage.mandatory() PipelineError::CannotRemoveMandatory domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:521
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing an error domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:485
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing an error domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:35
stage.mandatory() PipelineError::CannotReconfigureMandatory domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:41
stage.kind().name() != kind.name() PipelineError::OtherKind domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:44
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
self.stages.iter().enumerate().find(|(_, s) | s.id() == stage_id) is missing an error domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:451
stage.mandatory() PipelineError::CannotRemoveMandatory domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:459
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:191
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable
!self.status.allows_mutation() PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable
!names_each_stage_once || !self.stages.iter().all(| s | named.contains(s.id())) PipelineError::IncompleteOrder domains/proxy/pipeline/order.rs:52
When Refused with Where
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::CreatePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:92
When Refused with Where
removal.ensure_fits(&kind) refuses what ensure_fits refuses domains/proxy/stages/stage/mod.rs:184
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/proxy/issued.rs:76

The claim for the service service, whose assertions are set to name audience.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:40.

audience Answer (AssertionAudienceClaim) Where
AssertionAudience::ServiceId Self::Service(service) domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:42
AssertionAudience::Named(name) Self::Named(name) domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:43

Whether this policy lets request out.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/egress.rs:304.

request.agent_mark Answer (EgressDecision) Where
AgentMark::Unattributed EgressDecision::Deny(EgressDenial::Unattributed) when self.max_data_class < DataClassLevel::Restricted domains/routing/egress.rs:313
AgentMark::Marked(mark) EgressDecision::Deny(EgressDenial::DataTooSensitive) when mark > self.max_data_class domains/routing/egress.rs:316
AgentMark::Unattributed | AgentMark::Marked(_) Allow domains/routing/egress.rs:319

What this way of picking asks of the sticky key.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:43.

self Answer (StickyKeyNeed) Where
RoundRobin Either domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:45
LeastConnections Refused domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:46
ConsistentHash Required domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:47

What kind of action this route takes.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:50.

self.reach self.action_class Answer (DeclaredAction) Where
RouteReach::OpenEnded DeclaredAction::Declared(declared) DeclaredAction::Declared(declared) when declared.is_high_risk() domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:52
RouteReach::OpenEnded any DeclaredAction::Declared(ActionClass::Communicate) domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:57
RouteReach::Fixed any declared domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:58

How a signed-in caller stands against this policy.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/policy.rs:94.

self Answer (PolicyStanding) Where
Self::Public | Self::Authenticated Met domains/routing/policy.rs:96
Self::RequireSystemPermission(wanted) one_of(wanted, | permission | holds_system(caller, permission)) domains/routing/policy.rs:97
Self::RequireCustomPermission(wanted) one_of(wanted, | permission | holds_custom(caller, permission)) domains/routing/policy.rs:100
Self::RequireScope(wanted) scope_standing(wanted, caller) domains/routing/policy.rs:103

The built-in permission this right is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/routing/control.rs:40.

self Answer (SystemPermission) Where
Create Routing domains/routing/control.rs:42
Update Routing domains/routing/control.rs:43
Delete Routing domains/routing/control.rs:44
CreatePipeline Pipeline domains/routing/control.rs:45
ChangePipeline Pipeline domains/routing/control.rs:48
DeletePipeline Pipeline domains/routing/control.rs:45

What the gateway does with caller on a route that checks policy on the wire.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/stream/access.rs:121.

self caller Answer (StreamVerdict) Where
Self::AnyHolder any Admit when policy == StreamPolicy::Public domains/routing/stream/access.rs:127
Self::AnyHolder StreamCaller::UnnamedCertificate | StreamCaller::Consumer(_) Admit domains/routing/stream/access.rs:128
Self::People(rule) StreamCaller::Person StreamVerdict::CheckPolicy(rule) domains/routing/stream/access.rs:131
Self::Consumers(named) StreamCaller::Consumer(id) Admit when named.names(id) domains/routing/stream/access.rs:132
Self::AnyHolder | Self::People(_) | Self::Consumers(_) any Refuse domains/routing/stream/access.rs:135

Checks a request against a route’s rules.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:131.

request.body Answer (ParameterViolation) Where
BodyFields::None Ok(()) domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:154
BodyFields::Unreadable Err(ParameterViolation::BodyUnreadable) domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:155
BodyFields::Fields(fields) { ensure_unique_keys("body", fields.iter().map(|(name, _) | name.as_str()))? ; fields.iter().try_for_each(|(name, value) | judge_body(rules, name, value)) } domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:156

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:63.

  • States: Active, Revoked
  • Final, which no move leaves: Revoked
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Revoked PrivateConnector::revoke RevokeUseCase (routing) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/routing/route_status.rs:33.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled Route::disable, Service::disable, StreamRoute::disable DisableUseCase (routing), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), SetStatusUseCase (routing) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update
Disabled to Active Route::create, Route::activate, Service::create, Service::activate, StreamRoute::create, StreamRoute::activate CreateUseCase (routing), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), ActivateUseCase (routing), SetStatusUseCase (routing) RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Create, RoutingRight::Update
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/egress.rs:271
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/egress.rs:112
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/egress.rs:289
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/egress.rs:251
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/egress.rs:235
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:367
self.status == ConnectorStatus::Revoked InvalidTransition domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:422, through ensure_active
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:136
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:402
self.status == ConnectorStatus::Active InvalidTransition domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:404
reaching > 0 Conflict domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:410
When Refused with Where
&self.enrollment is not ConnectorEnrollment::Awaiting { code_hash, expires_at, } enrollment_refused() domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:292
self.status != ConnectorStatus::Active || now >= * expires_at || code_hash != code enrollment_refused() domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:295
When Refused with Where
&self.enrollment is not ConnectorEnrollment::Enrolled { key : enrolled, certificate_expires_at, enrolled_at, } renewal_refused() domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:330
self.status != ConnectorStatus::Active || enrolled != key renewal_refused() domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:333
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:384
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:415
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/conditions.rs:36
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:303
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:591
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:569
ensure_matchable(&pattern) refuses what ensure_matchable refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:570
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:530
* service.id() != self.service_id Conflict domains/routing/route/mod.rs:532
pipeline.pipeline_id() != self.pipeline_id Conflict domains/routing/route/mod.rs:538
ensure_audience_pinned(&policy, service.upstream()) refuses what ensure_audience_pinned refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:543
ensure_cache_private(&policy, pipeline) refuses what ensure_cache_private refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:544
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:610
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:77
self.workflow_use == WorkflowUse::Closed InvalidTransition domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:79
When Refused with Where
Self::ensure_creatable(&params, service, pipeline, by) refuses what ensure_creatable refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:122
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:82
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:37
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:108
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:457, through ensure_deletable
self.is_active() InvalidTransition domains/routing/route/mod.rs:459, through ensure_deletable
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:434
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/attack.rs:120
!self.attack_mode.in_force_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) InvalidTransition domains/routing/route/attack.rs:122
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:334
ensure_cache_private(&self.policy, pipeline) refuses what ensure_cache_private refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:335
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:501
ensure_audience_pinned(&self.policy, service.upstream()) refuses what ensure_audience_pinned refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:502
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:52
self.workflow_use == WorkflowUse::Open InvalidTransition domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:54
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/mod.rs:625
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:136
ensure_ruled_once(&rules) refuses what ensure_ruled_once refuses domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:137
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/route/attack.rs:98
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:353
* accepted.owner() == self.id Validation domains/routing/service.rs:360
!self.app_sign_in.is_unset() own_or_borrowed() domains/routing/service.rs:366
accepted.needs_own_audience() && self.upstream.expected_audience().is_none() audience_required() domains/routing/service.rs:369
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:426
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:317
turning_on && self.upstream.expected_audience().is_none() audience_required() domains/routing/service.rs:320
turning_on && !self.accepted_sign_in.is_unset() own_or_borrowed() domains/routing/service.rs:323
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:398
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:111
params.upstream.ensure_consistent() refuses what ensure_consistent refuses domains/routing/service.rs:112
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:473
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.service_id() != self.id) Conflict domains/routing/service.rs:507, through ensure_own
accepting.iter().any(| other | other.accepts_app_sign_in_of() != Some(&self.id)) Conflict domains/routing/service.rs:479
!routes.is_empty() Conflict domains/routing/service.rs:485
!accepting.is_empty() Conflict domains/routing/service.rs:491
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:439
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:413
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/service.rs:283
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.service_id() != self.id) Conflict domains/routing/service.rs:507, through ensure_own
upstream.ensure_consistent() refuses what ensure_consistent refuses domains/routing/service.rs:285
self.needs_audience() && upstream.expected_audience().is_none() audience_required() domains/routing/service.rs:287
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:510
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:308
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:493
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:472
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:162
self.workflow_use == StreamWorkflowUse::Closed InvalidTransition domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:164
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:172
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:542
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:524
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:128
!matches !(self.access, StreamAccess::People(_)) Validation domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:130
self.workflow_use == StreamWorkflowUse::Open InvalidTransition domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:136
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:429
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:449

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/scheduling/job_status.rs:35.

  • States: Pending, Running, Completed, Failed, Dead, Superseded
  • Final, which no move leaves: Completed, Superseded
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Dead to Pending ScheduledJob::new, ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon, ScheduledJob::retry AddDomainUseCase (domain), AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), ApproveUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), FanOutUseCase (notifications), FireSchedulesUseCase (workflows), PlanAccountChecksUseCase (workflows), PlanBackChannelUseCase (oauth), PlanEventStartsUseCase (workflows), PlanPushesUseCase (messaging), PlanStreamsUseCase (audit), PlanUseCase (signals), PlanUseCase (tenant), PlanUseCase (webhooks), ReconcileUseCase (scheduling), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), RequestForOrgUseCase (audit), RequestForPlatformUseCase (audit), RequestForTenantUseCase (audit), RequestTlsUseCase (domain), RerunUseCase (workflows), ResumeUseCase (agents), RetryUseCase (domain), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunStepUseCase (tenant), RunUseCase (workflows), SaveUseCase (workflows), SaveVersionUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StartTrialUseCase (workflows), StartUseCase (identity), StartUseCase (tenant), StartUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling), RetryDeadUseCase (scheduling) none read
Dead to Superseded ScheduledJob::supersede none read none read
Failed to Dead ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) none read
Failed to Pending ScheduledJob::new, ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon, ScheduledJob::retry AddDomainUseCase (domain), AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), ApproveUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), FanOutUseCase (notifications), FireSchedulesUseCase (workflows), PlanAccountChecksUseCase (workflows), PlanBackChannelUseCase (oauth), PlanEventStartsUseCase (workflows), PlanPushesUseCase (messaging), PlanStreamsUseCase (audit), PlanUseCase (signals), PlanUseCase (tenant), PlanUseCase (webhooks), ReconcileUseCase (scheduling), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), RequestForOrgUseCase (audit), RequestForPlatformUseCase (audit), RequestForTenantUseCase (audit), RequestTlsUseCase (domain), RerunUseCase (workflows), ResumeUseCase (agents), RetryUseCase (domain), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunStepUseCase (tenant), RunUseCase (workflows), SaveUseCase (workflows), SaveVersionUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StartTrialUseCase (workflows), StartUseCase (identity), StartUseCase (tenant), StartUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling), RetryDeadUseCase (scheduling) none read
Pending to Running ScheduledJob::mark_running none read none read
Running to Completed ScheduledJob::mark_completed ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) none read
Running to Failed ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) none read
When Refused with Where
self.status != JobStatus::Dead Conflict domains/scheduling/job.rs:339
self.max_attempts.checked_add(1) is not Some(more) Conflict domains/scheduling/job.rs:345

The signal it goes out as.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/report.rs:33.

self Answer (SignalEvent) Where
Self::RiskLevel(current) SignalEvent::RiskLevelChanged { current } domains/signals/report.rs:35
Self::CredentialCompromised(credential) SignalEvent::CredentialCompromised { credential } domains/signals/report.rs:36
Self::DeviceCompromised DeviceCompromised domains/signals/report.rs:39

The type streams subscribe to.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/signal.rs:195.

self Answer (SecuritySignalType) Where
Self::AssuranceChanged {..} AssuranceChanged domains/signals/signal.rs:197
Self::CredentialCompromised {..} CredentialCompromised domains/signals/signal.rs:198
Self::IdentifierChanged IdentifierChanged domains/signals/signal.rs:199
Self::AccountPurged AccountPurged domains/signals/signal.rs:200
Self::SessionRevoked SessionRevoked domains/signals/signal.rs:201
Self::SessionSuspended SessionSuspended domains/signals/signal.rs:202
Self::CredentialChanged {..} CredentialChanged domains/signals/signal.rs:203
Self::AccountLocked AccountLocked domains/signals/signal.rs:204
Self::AccountDisabled AccountDisabled domains/signals/signal.rs:205
Self::PermissionsChanged {..} PermissionsChanged domains/signals/signal.rs:206
Self::DeviceCompromised DeviceCompromised domains/signals/signal.rs:207
Self::TokenCompromised TokenCompromised domains/signals/signal.rs:208
Self::RiskLevelChanged {..} RiskLevelChanged domains/signals/signal.rs:209

Whether the endpoint has shown it is the receiver’s.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/stream.rs:399.

self.verification Answer (StreamVerificationStatus) Where
EndpointVerification::Pending(_) Pending domains/signals/stream.rs:401
EndpointVerification::Verified Verified domains/signals/stream.rs:402

The subjects a new stream starts with.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/signals/subjects.rs:46.

default Answer (StreamSubjects) Where
All AllExcept domains/signals/subjects.rs:48
None Only domains/signals/subjects.rs:49

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/signals/stream.rs:184.

  • States: Active, Paused, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: Disabled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled SignalStream::disable, SignalStream::record_failure DisableUseCase (signals), DispatchSignalUseCase (signals) SignalsControlCheck
Active to Paused SignalStream::pause PauseUseCase (signals) SignalsControlCheck
Paused to Active SignalStream::register, SignalStream::resume RegisterUseCase (signals), ResumeUseCase (signals) SignalsControlCheck
Paused to Disabled SignalStream::disable, SignalStream::record_failure DisableUseCase (signals), DispatchSignalUseCase (signals) SignalsControlCheck
When Refused with Where
ensure_fits_the_subject(&subject, &event) refuses what ensure_fits_the_subject refuses domains/signals/signal.rs:383
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_manage refuses domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:54
When Refused with Where
&self.verification is not EndpointVerification::Pending(challenge) InvalidTransition domains/signals/stream.rs:496
challenge != echoed Forbidden domains/signals/stream.rs:502
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:591
self.status != StreamStatus::Disabled Conflict domains/signals/stream.rs:593
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:556
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:520
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:313
ensure_names_a_type(&params.signal_types) refuses what ensure_names_a_type refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:314
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_manage refuses domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:85
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses what ensure_may_manage refuses domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:119
!self.is_delivering() Conflict domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:121
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream.rs:539
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:47
let Some(signal_types) = &update.signal_types and ensure_names_a_type(signal_types) refuses what ensure_names_a_type refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:52
let Some(delivery_method) = update.delivery_method and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:109, through change_delivery_method
let Some(authorization) = update.authorization and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:125, through change_authorization
let Some(signal_types) = update.signal_types and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses what ensure_may_change_streams refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:143, through replace_signal_types
let Some(signal_types) = update.signal_types and ensure_names_a_type(&signal_types) refuses what ensure_names_a_type refuses domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:144, through replace_signal_types

Who renews it: the platform for one from ACME, the tenant for one it uploaded.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:212.

self.source Answer (Renewal) Where
CertificateSource::Acme ByPlatform domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:214
CertificateSource::Uploaded(_) ByTenant domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:215

The jurisdiction this region sits in.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:143.

self Answer (DataResidency) Where
UsEast1 Us domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:145
UsWest2 Us domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:145
CaCentral1 Canada domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:146
EuWest1 Eu domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147
EuWest2 Uk domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:150
EuWest3 Eu domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147
EuCentral1 Eu domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147
EuCentral2 Switzerland domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:151
EuNorth1 Eu domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147
EuSouth1 Eu domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147
SaEast1 Brazil domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:152
ApSouth1 India domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:153
ApNortheast1 Japan domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:154
ApSoutheast2 Australia domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:156
ApSoutheast1 Singapore domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:155

Reads a proof back from its stored status and times.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:123.

status verified_at failed_at Answer (DomainProof) Where
VerificationStatus::Pending None None Ok(Self::Unproved) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:129
VerificationStatus::Verified Some(at) None Ok(Self::Verified { at }) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:130
VerificationStatus::Failed Some(verified_at) Some(failed_at) Ok(Self::Lost { verified_at, failed_at, }) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:131
any any any Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} domain has proof times that contradict it"))) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:135

The record type this value answers as.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:296.

self Answer (RecordKind) Where
Self::Address(address) Aaaa when address.is_ipv6() domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:298
Self::Address(_) A domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:299
Self::Alias(_) Cname domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:300
Self::Text(_) Txt domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:301
Self::Mail(_) Mx domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:302
Self::Service(_) Srv domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:303
Self::Authority(_) Caa domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:304

The value of kind that a zone file spelling names.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:342.

kind Answer (RecordValue) Where
RecordKind::A | RecordKind::Aaaa Self::parse_address(kind, value) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:346
RecordKind::Cname Ok(Self::Alias(host(value)?)) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:347
RecordKind::Txt Ok(Self::Text(TxtValue::new(value)?)) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:348
RecordKind::Mx Self::parse_mail(value) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:349
RecordKind::Srv Self::parse_service(value) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:350
RecordKind::Caa Self::parse_authority(value) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:351

Refuses renewing this domain’s certificate.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:97.

self.tls_status Answer (DomainError) Where
TlsStatus::NotRequired Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("tenant-never-asked-for-a-certificate-so", format !("{} never asked for a certificate, so there is none to renew", self.domain)))) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:108
TlsStatus::NoCertificate Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("tenant-had-its-certificate-removed-so-there", format !("{} had its certificate removed, so there is none to renew", self.domain)))) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:115
TlsStatus::Provisioning | TlsStatus::Active | TlsStatus::Expired Ok(()) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:122

What proves this domain is its tenant’s, the first time and on every later check.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:388.

self.connection Answer (ProofRoute) Where
DomainConnection::SelfManaged Token domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:393
DomainConnection::Delegated Delegation domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:394

The record a bare domain uses, when the tenant holds the zone and an address is known.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:189.

self Answer (TrafficRecord) Where
Self::SelfManaged { address,..} address.known() domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:191
Self::Delegated {..} None domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:192

The record a subdomain uses, when the tenant holds the zone.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:179.

self Answer (TrafficRecord) Where
Self::SelfManaged { alias,..} Some(alias) domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:181
Self::Delegated {..} None domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:182

What we answer for name and kind.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:114.

self.zone_for(name) Answer (Resolution) Where
Some(zone) resolve(zone, &self.authority, name, kind) domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:116
None Refused domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:117

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/status.rs:110.

  • States: Provisioning, Active, Suspended, Archived, Deleted
  • Final, which no move leaves: Deleted
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Archived Tenant::archive ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) Steward
Active to Suspended Tenant::suspend SuspendTenantUseCase (tenant) Steward
Archived to Active Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) Steward
Archived to Deleted Tenant::delete, Tenant::delete_early DeleteArchivedUseCase (tenant) Steward
Provisioning to Active Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) Steward
Provisioning to Archived Tenant::archive ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) Steward
Suspended to Active Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) Steward
Suspended to Archived Tenant::archive ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) Steward

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/verification_status.rs:98.

  • States: NotRequired, Provisioning, Active, Expired, NoCertificate
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Expired RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_expired RenewUseCase (domain) none read
Active to NoCertificate RegisteredDomain::remove_uploaded RemoveUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
Expired to Active RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
Expired to NoCertificate RegisteredDomain::remove_uploaded RemoveUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
Expired to Provisioning none read none read none read
NoCertificate to Active RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
NoCertificate to Provisioning none read none read none read
NotRequired to Active RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
NotRequired to Provisioning none read none read none read
Provisioning to Active RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains
Provisioning to Expired RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_expired RenewUseCase (domain) none read

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/verification_status.rs:37.

  • States: Pending, Verified, Failed
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Failed to Verified RegisteredDomain::mark_verified, RegisteredDomain::prove_on_arrival RetryUseCase (domain), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), AddDomainUseCase (domain) none read
Pending to Verified RegisteredDomain::mark_verified, RegisteredDomain::prove_on_arrival RetryUseCase (domain), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), AddDomainUseCase (domain) none read
Verified to Failed RegisteredDomain::mark_verification_failed DomainHealthCheckUseCase (domain) none read
When Refused with Where
ensure_trusted(scope, by, proof) refuses what ensure_trusted refuses domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:158
new.existing_streams >= MAX_AUDIT_STREAMS Conflict domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:160
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:299
!self.is_sending() Conflict domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending
When Refused with Where
ensure_trusted(scope, by, proof) refuses what ensure_trusted refuses domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:272
When Refused with Where
!self.is_sending() Conflict domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending
When Refused with Where
!self.is_sending() Conflict domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:339
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:314
self.is_sending() Conflict domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:316
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:136
domain.verification_status() != VerificationStatus::Verified Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:138
When Refused with Where
* from.id() != self.from || * to.id() != self.to Forbidden domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:125
let HandoverOfferState::Accepted {..} = self.state Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:157, through ensure_open_at
now >= self.expires_at() Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:163, through ensure_open_at
to.ensure_changeable(by, TenantArea::Domains) refuses what ensure_changeable refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:132
DomainHandover { from, to, domain : &self.domain, }.ensure_still_possible() refuses what ensure_still_possible refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:133
When Refused with Where
handover.ensure_allowed(by) refuses what ensure_allowed refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:81
When Refused with Where
parsed.subject_names.len() != 2 || !parsed.subject_names.contains(&row.root) || !parsed.subject_names.contains(&wildcard) || parsed.not_before > now || parsed.not_after <= now Infrastructure: the issued platform certificate does not cover its names and current time domains/tenant/hosts/certificate.rs:65
When Refused with Where
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:64
When Refused with Where
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:99, through ensure_renewable
self.tls_status is TlsStatus::NotRequired Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:108, through ensure_renewable
self.tls_status is TlsStatus::NoCertificate Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:115, through ensure_renewable
cert.renewal() == Renewal::ByTenant Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:138

RegisteredDomain::mark_verification_failed

Section titled “RegisteredDomain::mark_verification_failed”
When Refused with Where
self.proof is not DomainProof::Verified { at } self.refused("verification", self.proof.status(), VerificationStatus::Failed,) domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:565
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through move_proof_to
When Refused with Where
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through proved_now > move_proof_to
When Refused with Where
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through proved_now > move_proof_to
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::DomainClaims) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:236
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::DomainRemoval) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:487
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:276, through ensure_uploaded_here
cert.domain_id() != &self.id Forbidden domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:278, through ensure_uploaded_here
cert.source() is not CertificateSource::Uploaded(details) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:284, through ensure_uploaded_here
When Refused with Where
cert.renewal() != Renewal::ByTenant || cert.domain_id() != &self.id Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:252
When Refused with Where
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:31
self.tls_status == TlsStatus::Active Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:40
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:276, through ensure_uploaded_here
cert.domain_id() != &self.id Forbidden domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:278, through ensure_uploaded_here
cert.source() is not CertificateSource::Uploaded(details) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:284, through ensure_uploaded_here
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) Conflict domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:180
When Refused with Where
let ActedBy::By(_) = by Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:69
self.status != from InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Archive) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:132
(by, self.status) is (ActedBy::By(_), TenantStatus::Provisioning) Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:255, through ensure_setup_stopped_by_platform
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses what ensure_proved_recently refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:323
limits.ensure_allows(&posture) refuses what ensure_allows refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:324
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
* owned.tenant() != self.id Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:224, through primary_from
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
clone.ensure_copies(ClonePart::Settings, source.id(), &self.id) refuses what ensure_copies refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:359
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_open
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Delete) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:169
self.status != from InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in
self.deletable_from() is not Some(from) Conflict domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:266, through ensure_grace_over
now < from Conflict domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:273, through ensure_grace_over
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
let ActedBy::By(_) = by Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:199
self.status != from InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &params.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Provision) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle.rs:175
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, step) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:237, through ensure_may_bring_back
(by, self.hold) is (ActedBy::By(_), PlatformHold::Held) Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:239, through ensure_may_bring_back
self.status != from InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, step) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:237, through ensure_may_bring_back
(by, self.hold) is (ActedBy::By(_), PlatformHold::Held) Forbidden domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:239, through ensure_may_bring_back
self.status != from InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Suspend) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:90
self.status may not move to target InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses what ensure_proved_recently refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:268
change.ensure_keeps_in(by.by()) refuses what ensure_keeps_in refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:269
When Refused with Where
!self.status.is_open() InvalidTransition domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses what ensure_proved_recently refuses domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:293
When Refused with Where
self.state != CloneState::Copying Conflict domains/tenant/clone.rs:383, through ensure_copying
When Refused with Where
self.state != CloneState::Copying Conflict domains/tenant/clone.rs:383, through ensure_copying
!self.parts.contains(&part) Validation domains/tenant/clone.rs:338
When Refused with Where
ensure_may_take(by, source.organization_id(), LifecycleStep::Provision) refuses what ensure_may_take refuses domains/tenant/clone.rs:192
ensure_pair(source, target) refuses what ensure_pair refuses domains/tenant/clone.rs:193
ensure_parts(&parts) refuses what ensure_parts refuses domains/tenant/clone.rs:194
When Refused with Where
tenant.status() != TenantStatus::Provisioning InvalidTransition domains/tenant/setup.rs:170
When Refused with Where
tenant.status() != TenantStatus::Deleted InvalidTransition domains/tenant/teardown.rs:142

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/webhooks/subscription_status.rs:42.

  • States: Active, Paused, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: Disabled
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled WebhookSubscription::record_failure none read none read
Active to Paused WebhookSubscription::pause PauseUseCase (webhooks) WebhookControl, WebhooksAction::Update
Paused to Active WebhookSubscription::create, WebhookSubscription::resume CreateUseCase (webhooks), ResumeUseCase (webhooks) WebhookControl, WebhooksAction::Update
Paused to Disabled WebhookSubscription::record_failure none read none read
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:157
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:511
self.is_active() Conflict domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:513
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:460
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:482
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:91
When Refused with Where
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:42
self.status.is_disabled() InvalidTransition domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:44

What kind of action it is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:379.

self Answer (ActionClass) Where
FindPerson Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
SuspendPerson Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
ResetTwoStep Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
SignOut Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
RevokeKeys Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
ForgetDevices Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
InvitePerson Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
ListMembers Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
AddToGroup Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
RemoveFromGroup Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
RemoveGroups Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
GrantAccess Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
DecideRequest Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
CheckAccess Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
BreakGlass Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
OpenReview Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
SuggestReview Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
PauseAgent Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
EndAgentRun Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
AgentActions Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
ReadRequests Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
CloseApp Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
AttackMode Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
SearchAudit Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
MakeAuditPack Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
ClassifyField Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
Notify Communicate domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391
OfferAccess Communicate domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391
RevokeAgentTasks Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
NarrowAgent Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
RemindUntilDecided Communicate domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391
PauseKey Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
ResumeKey Admin domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404
SendSignal Write domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392
HideFields Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
Allow Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381
Refuse Read domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381

The check that finds it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:66.

self Answer (GuardrailCheck) Where
Self::ClassifiedField(_) | Self::PersonalText(_) PersonalData domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:68
Self::ModelTrick(_) ModelTricks domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:69
Self::BannedWord BannedWords domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:70

The value, to match on.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/data.rs:219.

&self.value Answer (FlowValue) Where
Value::Null Null domains/workflows/data.rs:221
Value::Bool(value) FlowValue::Bool(* value) domains/workflows/data.rs:222
Value::Number(value) FlowValue::Number(* value) domains/workflows/data.rs:223
Value::Text(value) FlowValue::Text(value) domains/workflows/data.rs:224
Value::List(items) FlowValue::List(items) domains/workflows/data.rs:225
Value::Map(entries) FlowValue::Map(entries) domains/workflows/data.rs:226

What a step of kind gives the steps after it.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:30.

kind Answer (HandsOn) Where
NodeKind::AgentRun(_) Answer domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:32
NodeKind::Transform(mapping) Self::Fields(mapping.fields().iter().map(|(name, _) | name).collect()) domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:33
NodeKind::Action(_) OperationOutputs domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:36
NodeKind::Code(_) | NodeKind::Loop(_) Whole domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:37
NodeKind::Guardrail(_) Guarded domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:38
NodeKind::Condition(_) | NodeKind::Approval(_) | NodeKind::Wait(_) Nothing domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:39

Why a version published by acting_for can no longer use this account as used says, or nothing when it still can.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:22.

  • allowed is self.integration == used.integration && used.operation.as_ref().is_none_or(| operation | self.scope.allows(operation))
allowed Answer (AccountUnusable) Where
true None domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:45
false Some(AccountUnusable::NotForThisUse) domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:46

Refuses a memory set to be deleted, in which nothing is kept or found.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:323.

self.status Answer (DomainError) Where
MemoryStatus::Active Ok(()) domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:325
MemoryStatus::DeletionRequested {..} Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("workflows-the-memory-is-set-to-be-deleted", "the memory is set to be deleted, so nothing is kept in or found in it"))) domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:326

Who does a step of this kind’s work.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/design/node.rs:642.

self Answer (Work) Where
Self::Condition(_) | Self::Transform(_) InTheDomain domains/workflows/design/node.rs:644
Self::AgentRun(_) | Self::Action(_) | Self::Approval(_) | Self::Wait(_) | Self::Loop(_) | Self::Code(_) | Self::Guardrail(_) Outside domains/workflows/design/node.rs:645

The language whose registry it is found in.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:100.

self Answer (Language) Where
Self::Npm(_) JavaScript domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:102
Self::Pypi(_) Python domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:103

Checks value as a package name of language.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:82.

language Answer (PackageName) Where
Language::JavaScript NpmName::new(value).map(Self::Npm) domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:84
Language::Python PypiName::new(value).map(Self::Pypi) domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:85

Checks value as an exact version of a language package.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:172.

language Answer (PackageVersion) Where
Language::JavaScript NpmVersion::new(value).map(Self::Npm) domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:174
Language::Python PypiVersion::new(value).map(Self::Pypi) domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:175

The language its code is written in.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:109.

self Answer (Language) Where
Python311 Python domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111
Python312 Python domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111
Python313 Python domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111
Node20 JavaScript domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112
Node22 JavaScript domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112
Node24 JavaScript domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112

The language its code is written in; None for a company’s image, which holds no code.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:117.

self Answer (Language) Where
Self::Code(language) Some(language) domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:119
Self::OwnImage None domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:120

Where it stands, without what it holds.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:571.

self Answer (StepPhase) Where
Self::Waiting Waiting domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:573
Self::Ready {..} Ready domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:574
Self::Running {..} Running domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:575
Self::Succeeded {..} Succeeded domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:576
Self::Failed(_) Failed domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:577
Self::Skipped Skipped domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:578
Self::Stopped Stopped domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:579
Self::Abandoned {..} Abandoned domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:580

How sensitive data of this shape is.

Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/guardrail/shapes.rs:55.

self Answer (DataClassLevel) Where
any Confidential

Starts an execution of workflow because its schedule came round or its event happened, and runs every step the domain finishes itself, as far as they go.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:384.

params.cause Answer (DomainError) Where
Cause::Schedule | Cause::Event {..} | Cause::Before {..} Self::start_checked(workflow, params) domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:389
Cause::Webhook Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-webhook-starts-a-workflow-only", "a webhook starts a workflow only once its secret is checked"))) domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:392
Cause::Service Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-service-event-starts-a-workflow-only", "a service's event starts a workflow only once its subscription admits it"))) domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:396
Cause::Manual | Cause::Restart {..} Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-start-by-hand-acts-for", "a start by hand acts for the person who proves who they are"))) domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:400

What the check said, read from how its run went.

Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:198.

outcome Answer (CheckVerdict) Where
CodeOutcome::Succeeded(verdict) read_verdict(&verdict) domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:200
CodeOutcome::Failed(failure) CheckVerdict::NotRun(why_not_run(failure)) domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:201

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:59.

  • States: Active, Disabled
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Disabled IntegrationAccount::disable ChangeUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts
Disabled to Active IntegrationAccount::connect, IntegrationAccount::enable ConnectUseCase (workflows), FinishUseCase (workflows), ChangeUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:137.

  • States: Registering, AwaitingKey, AwaitingToken, AwaitingConfirmation, Live, Lapsed
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
AwaitingConfirmation to Live AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl
AwaitingKey to Live AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl
AwaitingToken to AwaitingConfirmation AccountChannel::receive_token StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows) none read
Lapsed to Live AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl
Live to Lapsed AccountChannel::lapse none read none read
Registering to Lapsed AccountChannel::lapse none read none read
Registering to Live AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:91.

  • States: Running, Ended
  • Final, which no move leaves: Ended
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Running to Ended WorkflowExecution::cancel, WorkflowExecution::expire, WorkflowExecution::stop_pass CancelUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Manage

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:78.

  • States: Active, DeletionRequested
  • Final, which no move leaves: none
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to DeletionRequested Memory::request_deletion DeleteUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete
DeletionRequested to Active Memory::create, Memory::restore CreateUseCase (workflows), RestoreUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Create, WorkflowAction::Delete

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:79.

  • States: Active, Archived
  • Final, which no move leaves: Archived
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Active to Archived Sandbox::archive ArchiveSandboxUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete

Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/design/workflow/version.rs:35.

  • States: Draft, Published, Archived
  • Final, which no move leaves: Archived
Move Made by Called by Proof or right
Draft to Archived Workflow::archive ArchiveWorkflowUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete
Draft to Published Workflow::flow, Workflow::publish CreateUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Create, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update
Published to Archived Workflow::archive ArchiveWorkflowUseCase (workflows) WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete
When Refused with Where
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses what ensure_sets_up_events refuses domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:386
self.status != ChannelStatus::AwaitingConfirmation InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to : ChannelStatus::Live, }.into() domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:388
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to, }.into() domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:465, through ensure_platform_registers
When Refused with Where
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses what ensure_sets_up_events refuses domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:317
self.setup != ChannelSetup::PastedKey Conflict domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:319
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to, }.into() domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:465, through ensure_platform_registers
When Refused with Where
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses what ensure_sets_up_events refuses domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:359
self.status != ChannelStatus::AwaitingConfirmation Conflict domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:361
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running
execution.status() is not ExecutionStatus::Ended(end) InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:263
self.place_running(execution.id()) is not Some(place) Conflict domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:269
self.cases.get(place) is missing an error domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:274
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing an error domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_waiting > ensure_running
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:408, through ensure_waiting
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing an error domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record
When Refused with Where
ensure_startable(set, workflow, by) refuses what ensure_startable refuses domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:121
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_waiting > ensure_running
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:408, through ensure_waiting
self.running().count() >= MAX_RUNNING_CASES Conflict domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:212
!self.is_its_test(execution) Conflict domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:218
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing an error domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record
When Refused with Where
always InvalidTransition domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:112
ensure_cases(&params.cases, params.gate) refuses what ensure_cases refuses domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:113
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:145
always Conflict domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:255, through ensure_of
ensure_cases(&params.cases, params.gate) refuses what ensure_cases refuses domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:147
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/sandbox/registry.rs:123
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/sandbox/registry.rs:176
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:237
When Refused with Where
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) Forbidden domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner
When Refused with Where
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) Forbidden domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner
When Refused with Where
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) Forbidden domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner
When Refused with Where
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) Forbidden domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:158
When Refused with Where
self.status is not MemoryStatus::DeletionRequested { deleted_after } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:299
now < deleted_after InvalidTransition domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:305
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:235
typed.trim() != self.name.as_str() Validation domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:237
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:271
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:172
ensure_raises(effect) refuses what ensure_raises refuses domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:173
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:112
ensure_raises(params.effect) refuses what ensure_raises refuses domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:113
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Manage) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:207
When Refused with Where
* state != self.state Forbidden domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:286, through ensure_answerable
self.expired_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) Conflict domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:367, through ensure_answerable > ensure_live
self.stage != ConnectionStage::AwaitingService Conflict domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:293, through ensure_answerable
When Refused with Where
&self.stage is not ConnectionStage::Answered { credential, code : handed_out, } Conflict domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:351, through answered_with
code != handed_out Forbidden domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:357, through answered_with
self.expired_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) Conflict domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:367, through ensure_live
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:198
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:344
self.status == SandboxStatus::Archived Conflict domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:386, through ensure_active
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:192
When Refused with Where
self.state != TrialState::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/sandbox/trial.rs:141
When Refused with Where
self.build != Build::Building InvalidTransition domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building
When Refused with Where
self.build != Build::Building InvalidTransition domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building
self.recipe.program().packages() is not Some(packages) Validation domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:169
!bundle.fits(packages) Validation domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:175
When Refused with Where
self.build != Build::Building InvalidTransition domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building
self.recipe.program() is not Program::Image(own) Validation domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:205
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:257
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:385
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:149
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
layout.ensure_fits(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_fits refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:151
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:168
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:74
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:97
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:113
params.layout.ensure_fits(&params.graph) refuses what ensure_fits refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:114
When Refused with Where
self.origin is not WorkflowOrigin::Flow(_) Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:160
* run.workflow_id() != self.id || run.version() != self.version Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:166
run.status() == ExecutionStatus::Running Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:172
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:120
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:81
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:82
ensure_flow_steps(&flow.graph) refuses what ensure_flow_steps refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:83
ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps(&flow.graph) refuses what ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:84
When Refused with Where
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Published Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow/hold.rs:155
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:309
reviewed != self.revision() Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:311
self.status may not move to WorkflowStatus::Published InvalidTransition domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:316
replaces.ensure_earlier_than(self.id, self.version) refuses what ensure_earlier_than refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:317
!sees.may_see(&on.event()) Forbidden domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:345, through ensure_trigger_visible
ensure_trigger_event_offered(&self.trigger, facts.events) refuses what ensure_trigger_event_offered refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:319
ensure_code_runnable(&self.graph, facts.runnable) refuses what ensure_code_runnable refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:321
ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:322
ensure_checks_are_of_other_agents(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_checks_are_of_other_agents refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:323
ensure_guardrails_read_text(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_guardrails_read_text refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:324
ensure_high_risk_actions_approved(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_high_risk_actions_approved refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:325
ensure_item_approvals_in_loops(&self.graph) refuses what ensure_item_approvals_in_loops refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:326
ensure_networked_code_approved(&self.graph, facts.runnable) refuses what ensure_networked_code_approved refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:327
ensure_before_decides(&self.trigger, &self.graph) refuses what ensure_before_decides refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:328
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:27
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:50
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft Conflict domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft
When Refused with Where
self.ensure_open(..) refuses what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through open_approval > running_step
self.position(..) refuses what position refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through open_approval > running_step
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through open_approval > running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through open_approval > running_step
(&running.underway, running.node.kind()) is not (Underway::Approval(wait), NodeKind::Approval(step)) InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:219, through open_approval
crate::shared::clock::now() >= wait.closes_at InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:225, through open_approval
approver.ensure_entitled(running.exposure) refuses what ensure_entitled refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:133
ensure_present_when_needed(&step, approver) refuses what ensure_present_when_needed refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:134
by.is_same_person_as(&self.acting_for) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:171, through ensure_may_approve
step.approvers_needed() == 2 && self.authors.includes(by) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:177, through ensure_may_approve
let FirstApproval::GivenBy(first) = &wait.first && first.is_same_person_as(by) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:185, through ensure_may_approve
self.input_seen_by(&running.seen)? != * shown Conflict domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:138
When Refused with Where
self.ensure_open(..) refuses what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through asking_for_items > running_step
self.position(..) refuses what position refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through asking_for_items > running_step
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through asking_for_items > running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through asking_for_items > running_step
(running.node.kind().clone(), running.underway) is not (NodeKind::Loop(step), Underway::Loop(progress)) not_asking() domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:351, through asking_for_items
progress.approval().waiting().cloned() is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:353, through asking_for_items
step.items_approval().map(|(_, approval) | approval.clone()) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:358, through asking_for_items
ensure_window_open(&asking.wait) refuses what ensure_window_open refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:238
approver.ensure_entitled(asking.looping.exposure) refuses what ensure_entitled refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:239
ensure_present_when_needed(&asking.approval, approver) refuses what ensure_present_when_needed refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:240
by.is_same_person_as(&self.acting_for) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:171, through ensure_may_approve
step.approvers_needed() == 2 && self.authors.includes(by) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:177, through ensure_may_approve
let FirstApproval::GivenBy(first) = &wait.first && first.is_same_person_as(by) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:185, through ensure_may_approve
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Action(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/action.rs:154
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Code(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:68
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind().clone() is not NodeKind::Loop(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:102
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Wait(wait) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:61
When Refused with Where
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:64
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Guardrail(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/guardrail.rs:75
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
!matches !(ready.node.kind(), NodeKind::AgentRun(_) | NodeKind::Code(_)) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/deferral.rs:45
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step
running.underway.decision_wait().is_none() InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:273
by.ensure_entitled(running.exposure) refuses what ensure_entitled refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:278
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step
running.underway is not Underway::Timer { until } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:84
crate::shared::clock::now() < until Conflict domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:90
When Refused with Where
crate::shared::clock::now() < self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:83
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step
running.underway.decision_wait() is not Some(wait) InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:300
crate::shared::clock::now() < wait.closes_at Conflict domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:306
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
!refusal.fits(ready.node.kind()) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:316
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Approval(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:52
When Refused with Where
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step
self.ensure_open(..) refuses what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step
self.position(..) refuses what position refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step
When Refused with Where
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step
self.ensure_open(..) refuses what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step
self.position(..) refuses what position refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step
step.underway != Underway::AgentRun(* run.id()) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:315
When Refused with Where
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step
self.ensure_open(..) refuses what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step
self.position(..) refuses what position refuses, not read this deep domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step
&step.underway is not Underway::Code(work) not_its_run() domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:134
work.run_id != run_id not_its_run() domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:137
When Refused with Where
pass.pass.as_ref().filter(| of | of.execution == self.id) is not Some(of) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:182
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ensure_due_again(ready.attempt, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses what ensure_due_again refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:108
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::AgentRun(step) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:110
When Refused with Where
starter.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:349
When Refused with Where
!evaluator.may_test() Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:178
When Refused with Where
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline Conflict domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open
self.steps().nth(index) is missing an error domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } InvalidTransition domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step
ensure_due_again(ready.attempt, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses what ensure_due_again refuses domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:144
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Code(code) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:146
code.version() != * version.id() Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:152
version.held_agent() is not Some(held) Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:158
When Refused with Where
!delivery.admits(workflow) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/starts/service.rs:50
When Refused with Where
params.cause is Cause::Webhook Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:392
params.cause is Cause::Service Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:396
params.cause is Cause::Manual | Cause::Restart {..} Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:400
When Refused with Where
!call.admits(workflow) Forbidden domains/workflows/execution/starts/webhook.rs:50
When Refused with Where
tester.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:142
tester.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:143
When Refused with Where
self.pass.is_none() Validation domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:215
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:101
* workflow.trigger() != Trigger::Webhook Validation domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:103
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:198
always Conflict domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:258, through ensure_starts
When Refused with Where
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses what ensure_may refuses domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:172
always Conflict domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:258, through ensure_starts