This page is written by ianua-audit rules --markdown from the domain’s code, and a test fails when it falls behind. Do not edit it by hand.
Each table says what the code says, with the file and line it says it in. A row marked not read rests on code the reader could not work out; read the code there.
- Decisions are the domain’s functions whose answer is chosen by a
match over enums. One whose inputs are all enums is worked out for every combination, and any means the answer is the same whatever that input is. One that decides on values it works out itself is shown arm by arm, as written.
- Status machines list the states, the moves the machine allows, the states no move leaves, and the changes that move a value into each state, with the use cases that call them and the right each takes.
- Refusals list, for each change, what leads it to refuse and with which error.
The activity category an event belongs to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/activity/category.rs:56.
event_type |
Answer (ActivityCategory) |
Where |
EventType::Authentication(_) |
Authentication |
domains/activity/category.rs:58 |
EventType::Proxy(_) | EventType::Routing(_) |
Access |
domains/activity/category.rs:59 |
EventType::Authorization(_) | EventType::Operator(_) | EventType::Agents(_) | EventType::Workflows(_) |
Administration |
domains/activity/category.rs:60 |
EventType::Identity(_) |
Identity |
domains/activity/category.rs:64 |
EventType::Organization(_) | EventType::Tenant(_) |
Provisioning |
domains/activity/category.rs:65 |
EventType::Federation(_) | EventType::OAuth(_) | EventType::Webhooks(_) | EventType::Messaging(_) | EventType::Consumers(_) | EventType::Signals(_) | EventType::Branding(_) | EventType::Crypto(_) | EventType::Notifications(_) |
Other |
domains/activity/category.rs:66 |
The cap the gateway counts requests against, when there is one.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:83.
self.max_requests |
Answer (Restriction) |
Where |
Restriction::To(max_requests) |
Restriction::To(RequestBudget { max_requests, window_seconds : self.window_seconds, }) |
domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:85 |
Restriction::Unrestricted |
Unrestricted |
domains/agents/authority/capability/budget.rs:89 |
Records what the check said of the answer waiting for it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:181.
verdict |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
CheckVerdict::Passed |
self.pass_check() |
domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:190 |
CheckVerdict::Broken(said) |
{ self.record_failed_check(&said)? ; if last_try { self.fail() ; } Ok(()) } |
domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:191 |
CheckVerdict::NotRun(why) |
{ self.record_failed_check(&why)? ; self.fail() ; Ok(()) } |
domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:198 |
The standing of an agent with status that does or does not owe a re-attestation.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:42.
status |
reattestation |
Answer (AgentStanding) |
Where |
Active |
Required |
MustReattest |
domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:46 |
Active |
Current |
Active |
domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:47 |
Suspended |
any |
Suspended |
domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:45 |
Revoked |
any |
Revoked |
domains/agents/identity/standing.rs:44 |
Reads a stored origin back, with the class its request was stored under.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:92.
stored |
action_class |
Answer (ApprovalOrigin) |
Where |
StoredApprovalOrigin::Opened(by) |
any |
Ok(Self::Opened(by)) |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:97 |
StoredApprovalOrigin::Run(run) |
DeclaredAction::Declared(class) |
Ok(Self::Run(RunOrigin::stored(run, class))) |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:98 |
StoredApprovalOrigin::Run(_) |
DeclaredAction::Undeclared |
Err(DomainError::corrupt_row("approval request", "a run's request with no class"),) |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/origin.rs:101 |
The kind of workload token this method proves an agent with, or None for a method a platform vouches with.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:83.
self |
Answer (WorkloadKind) |
Where |
Self::KubernetesServiceAccount |
Some(WorkloadKind::Kubernetes) |
domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:85 |
Self::GithubActions |
Some(WorkloadKind::GithubActions) |
domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:86 |
Self::OidcToken |
Some(WorkloadKind::Oidc) |
domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:87 |
Self::Spiffe | Self::AwsIam | Self::GcpInstanceIdentity | Self::Tpm | Self::AzureManagedIdentity |
None |
domains/agents/identity/attestation.rs:88 |
What a task token minted for this delegation is bound to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:477.
&self.lineage |
Answer (TokenKey) |
Where |
Lineage::Minted { signed_in_with,..} |
TokenKey::SignedInWith(* signed_in_with) |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:482 |
Lineage::Root | Lineage::Under(_) |
AgentsActiveKey |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:483 |
The attack this refusal looks like, or None when it may be the agent’s own slip.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:142.
self |
Answer (TokenAttack) |
Where |
Self::NotSent | Self::ByAnotherKey |
Some(TokenAttack::StolenBinding) |
domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:144 |
Self::NotChecked |
None |
domains/agents/identity/token_attack.rs:145 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and held call.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:191.
status |
pending |
Answer (RunState) |
Where |
RunStatus::Running |
any |
next_call(next).map(Self::Running) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:196 |
RunStatus::Paused |
any |
next_call(next).map(Self::Paused) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:197 |
RunStatus::AwaitingApproval |
Some(call) |
Ok(Self::AwaitingApproval(call)) when !call.is_approved() |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:198 |
RunStatus::AwaitingApproval |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg("a stored run awaiting approval holds no call waiting for a person",)) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:201 |
RunStatus::Completed |
any |
Ok(Self::Completed) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:204 |
RunStatus::Failed |
any |
Ok(Self::Failed) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:205 |
RunStatus::Cancelled |
any |
Ok(Self::Cancelled) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:206 |
RunStatus::Halted |
any |
Ok(Self::Halted) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:207 |
RunStatus::OverBudget |
any |
Ok(Self::OverBudget) |
domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:208 |
How the token this destination takes is held to the agent’s key.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/runner.rs:92.
self |
Answer (TokenBinding) |
Where |
Self::Gateway |
ProofOfPossession |
domains/agents/runner.rs:94 |
Self::Relay(_) |
Bearer |
domains/agents/runner.rs:95 |
The check a run starts with: asking once it spent ask_past, or never.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:41.
ask_past |
Answer (SpendCheck) |
Where |
Restriction::To(mark) |
Self::AskAt(mark) |
domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:43 |
Restriction::Unrestricted |
Off |
domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:44 |
The kind of a request with this HTTP method, to a route the proxy classed as class.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:49.
method |
class |
Answer (TouchKind) |
Where |
Get |
Read |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51 |
Post |
Read |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
Put |
Read |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
Patch |
Read |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
Delete |
Read |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
Head |
Read |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51 |
Options |
Read |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:51 |
Any |
Read |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Write |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Delete |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Configure |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Communicate |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Financial |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
| any |
Admin |
Write |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:52 |
The kind of a request with this HTTP method.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:36.
method |
Answer (TouchKind) |
Where |
Get |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37 |
Post |
Write |
|
Put |
Write |
|
Patch |
Write |
|
Delete |
Write |
|
Head |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37 |
Options |
Read |
domains/agents/execution/convergence.rs:37 |
Any |
Write |
|
The attestation method a token of this kind is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:53.
self |
Answer (AttestationMethod) |
Where |
Kubernetes |
KubernetesServiceAccount |
domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:55 |
GithubActions |
GithubActions |
domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:56 |
Oidc |
OidcToken |
domains/agents/identity/attestation/workload.rs:57 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/identity/status.rs:40.
- States:
Active, Suspended, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
AgentIdentity::revoke, AgentIdentity::contain |
RevokeAgentUseCase (agents), ContainAgentUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Delete |
Active to Suspended |
AgentIdentity::suspend |
DetectConvergenceUseCase (agents), EvaluateDriftUseCase (agents), HearConvergenceUseCase (agents), HearDriftUseCase (agents), HearEgressDenialUseCase (agents), RespondToEgressDenialUseCase (agents), SuspendAgentUseCase (agents) |
SuspendedBy, AgentAction::Update |
Suspended to Active |
AgentIdentity::create, AgentIdentity::resume |
CreateAgentUseCase (agents), ResumeAgentUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Create, AgentAction::Update |
Suspended to Revoked |
AgentIdentity::revoke, AgentIdentity::contain |
RevokeAgentUseCase (agents), ContainAgentUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Delete |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/oversight/approval_status.rs:53.
- States:
Pending, Approved, Denied, Expired, Consumed, Withdrawn
- Final, which no move leaves:
Denied, Expired, Consumed, Withdrawn
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Approved to Consumed |
ApprovalRequest::consume, ApprovalRequest::release |
ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents) |
ActionAuthority |
Pending to Approved |
ApprovalRequest::approve |
ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents) |
Approver |
Pending to Denied |
ApprovalRequest::deny |
DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents) |
Approver |
Pending to Expired |
ApprovalRequest::approve, ApprovalRequest::deny, ApprovalRequest::expire, ApprovalRequest::withdraw, ApprovalRequest::supersede |
ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) |
Approver, RunCancelled, RevisedCall |
Pending to Withdrawn |
ApprovalRequest::withdraw, ApprovalRequest::supersede |
ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) |
RunCancelled, RevisedCall |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/authority/delegation/record.rs:193.
- States:
Active, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
Delegation::revoke |
DeactivateUseCase (identity), DeleteOrgUserUseCase (organization), DeleteUseCase (identity), EvaluateDriftUseCase (agents), ExchangeTokenForAgentUseCase (agents), HearDriftUseCase (agents), ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), RequestOrgErasureUseCase (organization), RevokeUseCase (agents), UpdateOrgUserStatusUseCase (organization), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
Revoker |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/model_provider/status.rs:27.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
ModelProvider::disable |
UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage |
Disabled to Active |
ModelProvider::create, ModelProvider::enable |
ConnectUseCase (agents), UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/run/status.rs:44.
- States:
Running, Completed, Failed, Cancelled, Halted, AwaitingApproval, Paused, OverBudget
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, Failed, Cancelled, Halted, OverBudget
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
AwaitingApproval to Cancelled |
AgentRun::cancel |
ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) |
CancelOrder |
AwaitingApproval to Failed |
AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
AwaitingApproval to Halted |
AgentRun::halt |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
AwaitingApproval to OverBudget |
AgentRun::record_model_usage |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
AwaitingApproval to Running |
AgentRun::start, AgentRun::start_without_tools, AgentRun::approve_pending, AgentRun::deny_pending, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::reply_to_pending, AgentRun::resume, AgentRun::record_allowed, AgentRun::record_denied |
AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ResumeUseCase (agents) |
RunStarter, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update, ReleasedCall, DeniedCall, AgentControl, AgentAction::Update |
Paused to Cancelled |
AgentRun::cancel |
ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) |
CancelOrder |
Paused to Failed |
AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Paused to Halted |
AgentRun::halt |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Paused to OverBudget |
AgentRun::record_model_usage |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Paused to Running |
AgentRun::start, AgentRun::start_without_tools, AgentRun::approve_pending, AgentRun::deny_pending, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::reply_to_pending, AgentRun::resume, AgentRun::record_allowed, AgentRun::record_denied |
AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveUseCase (agents), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (agents), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), ResumeUseCase (agents) |
RunStarter, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update, ReleasedCall, DeniedCall, AgentControl, AgentAction::Update |
Running to AwaitingApproval |
AgentRun::await_approval, AgentRun::revise_pending |
DriveUseCase (agents), ReviseCallUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Approve |
Running to Cancelled |
AgentRun::cancel |
ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), CancelUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), RerunUseCase (workflows), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) |
CancelOrder |
Running to Completed |
AgentRun::record_answer, AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::complete |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Running to Failed |
AgentRun::record_check, AgentRun::fail_at_approval_limit, AgentRun::fail |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Running to Halted |
AgentRun::halt |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Running to OverBudget |
AgentRun::record_model_usage |
DriveUseCase (agents) |
none read |
Running to Paused |
AgentRun::pause_at_spend_check, AgentRun::pause |
DriveUseCase (agents), PauseUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Update |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/agents/execution/tool/status.rs:24.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
AgentTool::disable |
UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage |
Disabled to Active |
AgentTool::register, AgentTool::enable |
RegisterUseCase (agents), UpdateStatusUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Manage |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.ending.has_ended() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:430 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(sender_owner, AgentAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:226 |
ensure_openable(¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_openable refuses |
domains/agents/channels/channel.rs:227 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* agent.id() != self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:588, through ensure_may |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:597, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* agent.id() != self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:588, through ensure_may |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/credential.rs:597, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.offer.open_to(clock::now()) is not Some(offered) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:270 |
!offered.is_same_account_as(recipient.by()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:276 |
ensure_may_own(recipient) refuses |
what ensure_may_own refuses |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:281 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Create) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent.rs:123 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/agent.rs:429 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
handover is Handover::Given |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over |
handover is Handover::OwnerLeft |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over |
to.is_same_account_as(&self.owner) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:361, through ensure_not_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_active() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/agent/attesting.rs:177 |
| always |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/attesting.rs:230, through ensure_trusts |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
handover is Handover::Given |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over |
handover is Handover::OwnerLeft |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over |
ensure_may_own(recipient) refuses |
what ensure_may_own refuses |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:206 |
to.is_same_account_as(&self.owner) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:361, through ensure_not_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.offer.open_to(now) is not Some(offered) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:300 |
!offered.is_same_account_as(control.by()) and handover is Handover::Given |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:347, through ensure_may_hand_over |
!offered.is_same_account_as(control.by()) and handover is Handover::OwnerLeft |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/agent/ownership.rs:351, through ensure_may_hand_over |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
order.run_id() != &self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/announce.rs:120 |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/announce.rs:126 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
released.run_id() != &self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:84 |
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:90 |
!released.call().matches(pending) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:96 |
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:105 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act |
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act |
self.status() != RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:48 |
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left |
&self.state is RunState::Running(NextCall::Approved(_)) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:152, through held_call |
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::AwaitingApproval |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:56 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
order.run_id() != &self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:276 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.check != RunCheck::Unchecked |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:211 |
self.status() != RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push |
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Completed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:221 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:139 |
self.status() may not move to RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:145 |
self.status() != RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:95, through ensure_may_steer |
&self.state is not RunState::Running(next) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:41 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act |
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act |
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left |
ensure_approved(admission, self.held_call(call.call())?) refuses |
what ensure_approved refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:108 |
self.status() != RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.due_check() is not Some(due) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/check.rs:183 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.steps_taken() >= self.max_steps |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:195, through ensure_step_left |
&self.state is RunState::Running(NextCall::Approved(_)) |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:152, through held_call |
self.status() != RunStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:316, through push |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
provider.id() != &self.provider_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/spend.rs:90 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:95, through ensure_may_steer |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act |
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act |
&self.state is not RunState::Paused(next) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/steering.rs:76 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:174, through ensure_agent_may_act |
!agent.may_act_at(clock::now()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/stepping.rs:180, through ensure_agent_may_act |
!editor.holds_agent(AgentAction::Approve) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:235, through ensure_may_edit |
editor.authority().data_clearance() < self.exposure |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:241, through ensure_may_edit |
&self.state is not RunState::AwaitingApproval(pending) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:210 |
ensure_revises(pending, &revised) refuses |
what ensure_revises refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/pause.rs:215 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
start::ensure_step_limit(params.max_steps) refuses |
what ensure_step_limit refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:126 |
start::ensure_spend_check_below_limit(¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_spend_check_below_limit refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:127 |
start::ensure_startable(&starter, ¶ms, delegation, agent, now) refuses |
what ensure_startable refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:128 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
start::ensure_toolless(¶ms, agent, now) refuses |
what ensure_toolless refuses |
domains/agents/execution/run/mod.rs:153 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:318 |
self.state != SightingState::Unreviewed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:320 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:291 |
matches !(self.state, SightingState::Registered {..}) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/sighting.rs:293 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages_tools refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:502 |
self.is_active() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:504 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages_tools refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:428 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages_tools refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:463 |
ensure_route_serves(route, params.method, ¶ms.path) refuses |
what ensure_route_serves refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:464 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages_tools refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:439 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages_tools(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages_tools refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:252 |
ensure_route_serves(route, params.method, ¶ms.path) refuses |
what ensure_route_serves refuses |
domains/agents/execution/tool.rs:253 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.origin.is_requester(by) || self.parties.include(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:449, through ensure_not_answerable |
approver.ensure_entitled(self.exposure()) refuses |
what ensure_entitled refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:395 |
self.needs_presence() && approver.presence() != Presence::Proven |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:418, through ensure_present |
self.has_lapsed(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open |
!self.state.status().is_pending() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open |
gave_the_first |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:464, through ensure_not_first_approver |
self.state.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:624, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.grants_action_at(crate::shared::clock::now(), authority) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:501 |
self.state.clone() is not ApprovalState::Approved { approval, first } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:507 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_entitled(self.exposure()) refuses |
what ensure_entitled refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:480 |
self.has_lapsed(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open |
!self.state.status().is_pending() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open |
self.state.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:624, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.run() is not Some(run) |
Validation |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:530 |
!self.grants_action_at(crate::shared::clock::now(), authority) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:501, through consume |
self.state.clone() is not ApprovalState::Approved { approval, first } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:507, through consume |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let ApprovalOrigin::Run(run) = ¶ms.origin and ensure_fits_run(run, ¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_fits_run refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:100 |
ensure_parties_fit(¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_parties_fit refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:102 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.run() is not Some(run) |
Validation |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:600 |
run.run_id() != revised.run_id() |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:606 |
run.pending_call() != revised.previous() |
Conflict |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:612 |
self.has_lapsed(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open |
!self.state.status().is_pending() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.run() is not Some(run) |
Validation |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:568 |
run.run_id() != cancelled.run_id() |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:574 |
self.has_lapsed(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:431, through ensure_open |
!self.state.status().is_pending() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/approval/mod.rs:437, through ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_valid_at(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/identity/challenge.rs:188 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
delegate.ensure_may_receive() refuses |
what ensure_may_receive refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:112 |
!params.granted.subset_of(held.caps()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:114 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_owned_and_held(agent, &request.granted, ceiling, now) refuses |
what ensure_owned_and_held refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:233 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:29 |
!self.granted.resources().contains(capability) and ensure_within(self, &widened, ceiling) refuses |
what ensure_within refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:51, through widen |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.lineage != Lineage::Root || !person_granted |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:79, through ensure_renewable_by |
held.holder() != self.delegator |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:85, through ensure_renewable_by |
!self.granted.subset_of(held.caps()) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:91, through ensure_renewable_by |
delegate.id() != self.delegate |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:51 |
delegate.ensure_may_receive() refuses |
what ensure_may_receive refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:56 |
!self.is_valid(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/renewal.rs:59 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_revoke(&self.delegator) refuses |
what ensure_may_revoke refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/mod.rs:556 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_revoke(&self.delegator) refuses |
what ensure_may_revoke refuses |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:77 |
self.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation/resources.rs:79 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:373, through ensure_open |
held.holder() != self.asked_of.principal() |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:299 |
delegate.id() != self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:305 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
identity.id() != agent.agent() || !identity.may_act_at(now) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:156 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!asked && !control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Manage) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:347 |
agent.id() != &self.agent_id |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:353 |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/delegation_request.rs:373, through ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_lower(control, agent, ¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_may_lower refuses |
domains/agents/identity/exposure_reset.rs:69 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!control.holds_agent(AgentAction::Update) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/identity/fleet_suspension.rs:36 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:315 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:399 |
change.model == self.model && change.pricing == self.pricing |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:401 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:144 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:463 |
self.is_active() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:465 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:431 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:444 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:558 |
ensure_kind_embeds(self.kind, &embeddings) refuses |
what ensure_kind_embeds refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:559 |
embeddings == self.embeddings |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:561 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:515 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_manages(control) refuses |
what ensure_manages refuses |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:357 |
self.kind.requires_key() && key == ProviderKey::Keyless |
Validation |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:359 |
key == self.credential_ref |
Conflict |
domains/agents/execution/model_provider.rs:365 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(owners.reviewed, AgentAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:198 |
control.ensure_may(owners.reviewer, AgentAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:199 |
Self::ensure_may_review(params) refuses |
what ensure_may_review refuses |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:200 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.by().is_same_person_as(reviewed_owner) |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:373, through ensure_may_end |
| always |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:382, through ensure_may_end |
self.ending.has_ended() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:351 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:412 |
* reviewer.agent() != self.reviewer |
Forbidden |
domains/agents/oversight/review.rs:418 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() != TemplateStatus::Proposed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:470 |
self.proposed_by.is_same_person_as(approver.by()) |
Validation |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:476 |
approver.holds().ensure_may_hand_out(self.ceiling.http(), &[]) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:481 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_proposable(¶ms) refuses |
what ensure_proposable refuses |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:301 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(&self.proposed_by, AgentAction::Delegate) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:508 |
&self.state is TemplateState::Retired {..} |
InvalidTransition |
domains/agents/authority/task_template.rs:513 |
The scope an organization and a tenant give: the tenant when one is known, else the organization, else the platform.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/audit/record.rs:31.
tenant |
organization |
Answer (AuditScope) |
Where |
Fact::Known(tenant) |
any |
Self::Tenant { organization, tenant, } |
domains/audit/record.rs:33 |
Fact::Unknown |
Fact::Known(organization) |
Self::Organization(organization) |
domains/audit/record.rs:37 |
Fact::Unknown |
Fact::Unknown |
Platform |
domains/audit/record.rs:38 |
What kind of destination this is, which records may name.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/audit/streaming.rs:370.
self |
Answer (StreamDestinationKind) |
Where |
Self::Splunk(_) |
Splunk |
domains/audit/streaming.rs:372 |
Self::Datadog(_) |
Datadog |
domains/audit/streaming.rs:373 |
Self::Syslog(_) |
Syslog |
domains/audit/streaming.rs:374 |
Self::Http(_) |
Http |
domains/audit/streaming.rs:375 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/audit/export/state.rs:42.
- States:
Pending, Ready, Failed, Expired
- Final, which no move leaves:
Failed, Expired
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Pending to Failed |
AuditLogExport::give_up |
ExpireUseCase (audit) |
none read |
Pending to Ready |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Ready to Expired |
AuditLogExport::expire |
ExpireUseCase (audit) |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state.downloadable_at(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:277 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:326, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
now < self.requested_at.saturating_add(WRITE_DEADLINE) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:260 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
access.log() != self.log |
Forbidden |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:304 |
self.state is not AuditExportState::Ready { rows,..} |
Conflict |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:310 |
!self.state.downloadable_at(now) |
Conflict |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:316 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
file.seal.is_some() != is_sealed(self.log, ready) |
Validation |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:241 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/audit/export/mod.rs:326, through move_to |
Whether an account with signs is under attack at now, under the lockout policy.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:138.
reached is signs.networks >= attacking_networks(policy)
signs.mark |
reached |
Answer (AccountAttack) |
Where |
AttackMark::Marked |
true | false |
Ongoing |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:141 |
AttackMark::Unmarked |
false |
Quiet |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:142 |
AttackMark::Unmarked |
true |
Self::Begun(AttackBegun { networks : signs.networks, until : attack_held_for(policy).ends_after(now), }) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/attack.rs:143 |
The level the strongest factor used reaches.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:71.
strongest |
Answer (AssuranceLevel) |
Where |
PasswordOrSso |
Aal1 |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:73 |
SoftwareMfa |
Aal2 |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:74 |
HardwareMfa |
Aal3 |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/assurance.rs:75 |
What setting a password whose breach lookup gave found comes to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:112.
status is match(self, found) {(Self::Off, _) => return Ok(NewPasswordBreach::NotChecked),(Self::Block, Lookup::Unavailable) => { return Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("authentication-this-password-could-not-be-checked", "this password could not be checked against known data breaches; try again"))) ; }(Self::Warn, Lookup::Unavailable) => return Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Unchecked),(Self::Warn | Self::Block, Lookup::Unknown) => BreachStatus::Clean,(Self::Warn | Self::Block, Lookup::Known(status)) => * status, }
self |
status |
Answer (NewPasswordBreach) |
Where |
| any |
BreachStatus::Clean |
Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Clean) |
domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:126 |
Self::Block |
BreachStatus::Breached(_) |
Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("authentication-this-password-appears-in-known-data", "this password appears in known data breaches; choose another"))) |
domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:127 |
Self::Off | Self::Warn |
BreachStatus::Breached(count) |
Ok(NewPasswordBreach::Breached(count)) |
domains/authentication/credentials/breach.rs:131 |
The step a proof for a kind challenge leads to once the provider judged it: a passed one goes on, any other is refused and told to solve a fresh one.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:150.
self |
kind |
Answer (GateStep) |
Where |
Passed |
any |
Proceed |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:152 |
Failed |
any |
Refuse |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:153 |
What a change owed for reason asks, where mail says whether a mail reaches the person and factor whether they hold a second factor that can answer here.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:47.
reason |
mail |
factor |
Answer (ChangeProof) |
Where |
SetByAdmin |
Available |
NotEnrolled |
MailedLink |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:59 |
SetByAdmin |
NotSetUp |
NotEnrolled |
NotPossible |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:62 |
SetByAdmin |
any |
Enrolled |
OwnFactor |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:54 |
Expired |
any |
any |
PasswordAlone |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:49 |
What the change shows about the person beyond the password they proved: nothing, their mailbox, their own factor, or, refused, that nothing they hold is enough.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:79.
self |
Answer (PersonProof) |
Where |
PasswordAlone |
Nothing |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:81 |
OwnFactor |
OwnFactor |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:83 |
MailedLink |
Mailbox |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:82 |
NotPossible |
Refused |
domains/authentication/recovery/change_proof.rs:84 |
The demand once a further signal asks too, such as a breached password.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:93.
self |
Answer (Demand) |
Where |
Policy |
SignalAndPolicy |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:95 |
Signal |
Signal |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96 |
SignalAndPolicy |
SignalAndPolicy |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:95 |
OwnFactor |
Signal |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96 |
NotAsked |
Signal |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:96 |
The kind of factor.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:99.
self |
Answer (MfaMethod) |
Where |
Self::Totp(_) |
Totp |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:101 |
Self::EmailCode |
EmailCode |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:102 |
Self::SmsCode(_) |
SmsCode |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:103 |
Reads a state back from its stored columns.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:150.
confirmation is Confirmation::from_stored(verified_at, recovery_codes_hash)?
status |
confirmation |
disabled_at |
Answer (EnrollmentState) |
Where |
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Pending |
None |
None |
Ok(Self::Pending) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:158 |
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Verified |
Some(confirmation) |
None |
Ok(Self::Verified(confirmation)) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:159 |
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled |
None |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Abandoned { at }) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:162 |
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled |
Some(confirmation) |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Disabled { confirmation, at }) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:163 |
MfaEnrollmentStatus::Pending | MfaEnrollmentStatus::Verified | MfaEnrollmentStatus::Disabled |
any |
any |
Err(DomainError::corrupt_row("MFA enrollment", "a status its confirmation and disable times contradict",)) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_state.rs:166 |
What the sign-in’s session owes.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:251.
self |
Answer (SecondFactor) |
Where |
NotOwed |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:253 |
Verify |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:254 |
Enrol |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:255 |
ConfirmByEmail |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:256 |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:257 |
Refused |
refused |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:258 |
What answering it shows about the person beyond their password.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:276.
self |
Answer (PersonProof) |
Where |
NotOwed |
Nothing |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:278 |
Verify |
OwnFactor |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:280 |
Enrol |
Nothing |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:278 |
ConfirmByEmail |
Mailbox |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:279 |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
Mailbox |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:279 |
Refused |
Refused |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:281 |
Determines password sign-in requirements from policy, demand and available proof.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:181.
policy |
demand |
enrolment |
mail |
vouching |
Answer (FactorOwed) |
Where |
Disabled |
Policy |
Enrolled |
any |
Fresh |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
Policy |
any |
any |
Absent |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
Signal |
Enrolled |
Available |
Fresh |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212 |
Disabled |
Signal |
any |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212 |
Disabled |
SignalAndPolicy |
Enrolled |
Available |
Fresh |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212 |
Disabled |
SignalAndPolicy |
any |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212 |
Disabled |
OwnFactor |
Enrolled |
any |
Fresh |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
OwnFactor |
any |
any |
Absent |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
NotAsked |
Enrolled |
any |
Fresh |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
NotAsked |
any |
any |
Absent |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Disabled |
any |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Fresh |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Optional |
Policy |
Enrolled |
any |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Optional |
Policy |
NotEnrolled |
any |
any |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Optional |
Signal |
Enrolled |
Available |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Optional |
Signal |
NotEnrolled |
Available |
Fresh |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Optional |
Signal |
NotEnrolled |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmByEmail |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:212 |
Optional |
Signal |
NotEnrolled |
NotSetUp |
Fresh |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Optional |
SignalAndPolicy |
Enrolled |
Available |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Optional |
SignalAndPolicy |
NotEnrolled |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213 |
Optional |
SignalAndPolicy |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Fresh |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Optional |
OwnFactor |
Enrolled |
any |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Optional |
OwnFactor |
NotEnrolled |
any |
any |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Optional |
NotAsked |
any |
any |
any |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:209 |
Required |
Policy |
Enrolled |
NotSetUp |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Required |
Policy |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Absent |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Required |
Signal |
NotEnrolled |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213 |
Required |
SignalAndPolicy |
NotEnrolled |
Available |
Absent |
ConfirmThenEnrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:213 |
Required |
OwnFactor |
Enrolled |
NotSetUp |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Required |
OwnFactor |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Absent |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Required |
NotAsked |
Enrolled |
NotSetUp |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Required |
NotAsked |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Absent |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
Required |
any |
Enrolled |
Available |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:210 |
Required |
any |
NotEnrolled |
any |
Fresh |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:211 |
| any |
Signal |
Enrolled |
NotSetUp |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:222 |
| any |
Signal |
NotEnrolled |
NotSetUp |
Absent |
Refused |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:227 |
| any |
SignalAndPolicy |
Enrolled |
NotSetUp |
any |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:222 |
| any |
SignalAndPolicy |
NotEnrolled |
NotSetUp |
Absent |
Refused |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:227 |
The factor as storage keeps it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:112.
self |
Answer (MfaFactor) |
Where |
Self::NoneYet |
None |
domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:114 |
Self::Proved(factor) |
Some(factor) |
domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_factor.rs:115 |
The answer as a [Fact].
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:216.
self |
Answer (Fact) |
Where |
Self::Known(answer) |
Fact::Known(answer) |
domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:218 |
Self::Unknown | Self::Unavailable |
Unknown |
domains/authentication/operations/password_login/mod.rs:219 |
Takes this factor away from an account that passes to a new holder, whether it is in force or still being set up.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:452.
self.state |
Answer (MfaEnrollmentError) |
Where |
EnrollmentState::Verified(_) |
self.turn_off() |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:457 |
EnrollmentState::Pending |
self.give_up() |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:458 |
EnrollmentState::Abandoned {..} | EnrollmentState::Disabled {..} |
Ok(()) |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:459 |
The assurance a password sign-in reaches once this factor is answered.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:53.
self |
Answer (AssuranceLevel) |
Where |
Totp |
Aal2 |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:55 |
EmailCode |
Aal1 |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:56 |
SmsCode |
Aal1 |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:56 |
Where the code to answer this factor comes from.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:62.
self |
Answer (CodeDelivery) |
Where |
Totp |
Generated |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:64 |
EmailCode |
Sent |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:65 |
SmsCode |
Sent |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrolled_factor.rs:65 |
What following this link would do for holder, answered without using it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:422.
self.state |
Answer (TokenState) |
Where |
ResetState::Completed {..} |
Consumed |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:427 |
ResetState::Expired | ResetState::Cancelled |
Expired |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:428 |
ResetState::Pending |
self.pending_state(holder, now) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:429 |
How pressure moved from before to this.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:125.
self |
before |
Answer (PressureShift) |
Where |
Normal |
Normal |
Held |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:129 |
Normal |
High |
Eased |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:128 |
High |
Normal |
Rose |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:127 |
High |
High |
Held |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:129 |
The record of this shift in tenant_id’s password sign-in, made by the platform, or none when pressure held.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:152.
self |
Answer (DomainEvent) |
Where |
Self::Rose |
Some(scoped(tenant_id, SignInPressureRose { failures : failures.get(), threshold : threshold.get(), occurred_at, },).system(),) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:160 |
Self::Eased |
Some(scoped(tenant_id, SignInPressureEased { threshold : threshold.get(), occurred_at, },).system(),) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:171 |
Self::Held |
None |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/pressure.rs:181 |
What it means that failures failures from one origin against one account are now counted in the window, the latest at now.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:104.
failures.cmp(&max) |
Answer (AttemptOutcome) |
Where |
Ordering::Less |
AttemptOutcome::Allowed { remaining : max.saturating_sub(failures), } |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:108 |
Ordering::Equal |
AttemptOutcome::LockedOut(OriginLockout { failed_attempts : failures, until, }) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:111 |
Ordering::Greater |
AttemptOutcome::PastTheLimit { until } |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/rate_limit.rs:115 |
The kind to solve, when one can be set.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:58.
self |
Answer (ChallengeKind) |
Where |
Self::Solve(kind) |
Some(kind) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:60 |
Self::Unavailable |
None |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:61 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and completion time.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:117.
status |
completed_at |
Answer (ResetState) |
Where |
ResetStatus::Completed |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Completed { at }) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:122 |
ResetStatus::Pending |
None |
Ok(Self::Pending) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:123 |
ResetStatus::Expired |
None |
Ok(Self::Expired) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:124 |
ResetStatus::Cancelled |
None |
Ok(Self::Cancelled) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:125 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} password reset has a completion time that contradicts it"))) |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:126 |
What a sign-in owes when nothing but the person’s own factor asks.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:347.
policy |
enrolment |
Answer (SecondFactor) |
Where |
Disabled |
any |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:301 |
Optional |
Enrolled |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:310 |
Optional |
NotEnrolled |
NotOwed |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:308 |
Required |
Enrolled |
Verify |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:323 |
Required |
NotEnrolled |
Enrol |
domains/authentication/mfa/owed.rs:334 |
What one use of this session, seen at now, comes to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:37.
last is self.last_use.known()
last |
place |
Answer (UseNoted) |
Where |
Some(last) |
any |
{ self.last_use = Fact::Known(last.stamped(place, now)) ; UseNoted::Moved } when last.network() == &network |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:41 |
Some(last) |
Fact::Known(place) |
LooksTakenOver when last.is_fast_travel_to(&place, now) |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:45 |
| any |
Fact::Known(place) |
{ self.last_use = Fact::Known(LastUse::new(network, place, now)) ; UseNoted::Moved } |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:48 |
| any |
Fact::Unknown |
Unchanged |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/watching.rs:52 |
Whether a sign-in from here is from a country the person has signed in from before.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:47.
here |
Answer (Familiarity) |
Where |
Fact::Known(place) |
Known when self.countries.contains(place.country_code()) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:52 |
Fact::Known(_) | Fact::Unknown |
New |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/history.rs:55 |
Why this sign-in is asked for a second factor, if it is.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:450.
signal_asks is self.signal_fired(ctx) && !current.satisfies(self.asked_aal(ctx))
policy_asks is !current.satisfies(self.required_aal(ctx))
signal_asks |
policy_asks |
ctx.device |
Answer (Demand) |
Where |
true |
true |
any |
SignalAndPolicy |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:455 |
true |
false |
any |
Signal |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:456 |
false |
true |
any |
Policy |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:457 |
false |
false |
Familiarity::New |
OwnFactor |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:458 |
false |
false |
Familiarity::Known |
NotAsked |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/step_up.rs:459 |
The step signals lead to while sign-in is under high pressure.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:130.
signals.device |
signals.setup |
signals.proof |
Answer (GateStep) |
Where |
Familiarity::Known |
any |
any |
Proceed |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:132 |
Familiarity::New |
ChallengeSetup::Unconfigured |
any |
GateStep::Refuse(RequiredChallenge::Unavailable) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:133 |
Familiarity::New |
ChallengeSetup::Configured(kind) |
None |
GateStep::Refuse(RequiredChallenge::Solve(kind)) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:136 |
Familiarity::New |
ChallengeSetup::Configured(kind) |
Some(proof) |
GateStep::CheckProof(kind, proof) |
domains/authentication/risk_engine/challenge.rs:139 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/device_status.rs:34.
- States:
Trusted, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Trusted to Revoked |
TrustedDevice::revoke |
RevokeOrgDeviceUseCase (organization) |
AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment_status.rs:37.
- States:
Pending, Verified, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Disabled to Pending |
MfaEnrollment::begin |
BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgBeginUseCase (organization) |
FactorOffer, FactorSetupProof |
Pending to Disabled |
MfaEnrollment::turn_off_with_code, MfaEnrollment::reset_by_admin, MfaEnrollment::abandon, MfaEnrollment::withdraw |
DisableUseCase (authentication), OrgDisableUseCase (organization), ResetMfaUseCase (organization), AbandonUseCase (authentication), BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgAbandonUseCase (organization), OrgBeginUseCase (organization), InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) |
AnsweredCode, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn, FactorSetupProof, FactorWithdrawal |
Pending to Verified |
MfaEnrollment::verify |
ConfirmUseCase (authentication), OrgConfirmUseCase (organization) |
AnsweredCode |
Verified to Disabled |
MfaEnrollment::turn_off_with_code, MfaEnrollment::reset_by_admin, MfaEnrollment::abandon, MfaEnrollment::withdraw |
DisableUseCase (authentication), OrgDisableUseCase (organization), ResetMfaUseCase (organization), AbandonUseCase (authentication), BeginUseCase (authentication), CodeFactorBeginUseCase (authentication), OrgAbandonUseCase (organization), OrgBeginUseCase (organization), InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) |
AnsweredCode, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn, FactorSetupProof, FactorWithdrawal |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:71.
- States:
Pending, Completed, Expired, Cancelled
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, Expired, Cancelled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Pending to Cancelled |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Pending to Completed |
PasswordResetRequest::complete, PasswordResetRequest::complete_in_sign_in |
AppResetPasswordUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), ResetConfirmUseCase (authentication), AppChangePasswordUseCase (authentication), ChangeDueUseCase (authentication), TenantChangeDueUseCase (authentication) |
none read |
Pending to Expired |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:56.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
DirectoryServiceAccount::disable |
ChangeStatusUseCase (directory) |
DirectoryControlCheck |
Disabled to Active |
DirectoryServiceAccount::create, DirectoryServiceAccount::enable |
CreateUseCase (directory), ChangeStatusUseCase (directory) |
DirectoryControlCheck |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authentication/sessions/status.rs:41.
- States:
Active, Suspended, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
Session::revoke, Session::sign_out, Session::end_with_account, Session::stop_taken_over, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::revoke |
AnswerAppUseCase (federation), AnswerProviderUseCase (federation), AppLogOutUseCase (authentication), EndSessionUseCase (oauth), LogoutUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), RevokeSessionUseCase (identity), SignOutOtherSessionsUseCase (identity), DeactivateUseCase (identity), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity), WatchUseUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLogoutUseCase (organization), RevokeMemberSessionUseCase (organization) |
AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ShutOut, OrgSessionCheck, ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update) |
Active to Suspended |
Session::suspend, Session::stop_taken_over |
WatchUseUseCase (authentication) |
none read |
Suspended to Active |
Session::create, Session::rotate, Session::hand_over, Session::resume, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::create |
AppPasskeyConfirmUseCase (authentication), AppSsoCallbackUseCase (authentication), ConsumeMagicLinkUseCase (authentication), LinkedTenantSwitchUseCase (organization), LoginConfirmUseCase (authentication), OidcLoginUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), SamlLoginUseCase (authentication), TokenRefreshUseCase (authentication), ExchangeSignInCodeUseCase (authentication), ResumeSessionUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLoginConfirmUseCase (organization), OrgMagicLinkUseCase (organization), OrgSsoCallbackUseCase (organization) |
MaySignIn, SessionCheck, ProvedFactor, OrgSessionCheck, OrgSignInStart |
Suspended to Revoked |
Session::revoke, Session::sign_out, Session::end_with_account, Session::stop_taken_over, OrgSession::switch_to, OrgSession::revoke |
AnswerAppUseCase (federation), AnswerProviderUseCase (federation), AppLogOutUseCase (authentication), EndSessionUseCase (oauth), LogoutUseCase (authentication), ReceiveUseCase (authentication), RevokeSessionUseCase (identity), SignOutOtherSessionsUseCase (identity), DeactivateUseCase (identity), RemoveScimUseCase (scim), RequestErasureUseCase (identity), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity), WatchUseUseCase (authentication), SwitchOrgTenantUseCase (organization), OrgLogoutUseCase (organization), RevokeMemberSessionUseCase (organization) |
AccountKeeper, AccountAction::ShutOut, OrgSessionCheck, ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update) |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_grant(scope.access()) refuses |
what ensure_may_grant refuses |
domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:272 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_grant(new.scope.access()) refuses |
what ensure_may_grant refuses |
domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:139 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_grant(self.scope.access()) refuses |
what ensure_may_grant refuses |
domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:327 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_grant(self.scope.access()) refuses |
what ensure_may_grant refuses |
domains/authentication/directory_service/account.rs:247 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/authentication/operations/factor_reset.rs:78 |
ensure_all_held_by(account, &held) refuses |
what ensure_all_held_by refuses |
domains/authentication/operations/factor_reset.rs:79 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(params.user_id)) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/ldap_certificate.rs:156 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&PrincipalId::from(self.user_id), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn,) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/ldap_certificate.rs:308 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_open(now, max_failed_attempts) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:180 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!waiting |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:76 |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(CHALLENGE_LONGEST, "a second-factor challenge") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/sessions/mfa_challenge.rs:81 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.lets_set_up(&self.subject_id) |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotProvedNow |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:434 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.method().delivery() != CodeDelivery::Generated |
CodeRefused::OtherKind |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:330 |
self.state is EnrollmentState::Abandoned {..} | EnrollmentState::Disabled {..} |
CodeRefused::Retired |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:507, through ensure_answers > ensure_in_use |
self.is_locked_out(lockout) |
CodeRefused::Locked |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:354, through ensure_answers |
matched is not Some(step) |
CodeRefused::Wrong |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:338 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
offer.method() != factor.method() |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotOffered |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:100 |
!proof.lets_set_up(&subject_id) |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotProvedNow |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:103 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&account, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:420 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!answer.is_for(self.subject_id, self.enrolled_at) |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotItsCode |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:402 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!answer.is_for(self.subject_id, self.enrolled_at) |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotItsCode |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:381 |
self.status() may not move to to |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:517, through ensure_moves_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!by.withdraws_from(&self.subject_id) |
MfaEnrollmentError::NotThisAccount |
domains/authentication/mfa/enrollment.rs:454 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_sendable(factor) refuses |
what ensure_sendable refuses |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:118 |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(SENT_CODE_LONGEST, "a sent code") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:119 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id || factor.enrolled_at() != self.enrolled_at |
CodeRefused::ForAnotherAccount |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:283 |
factor.ensure_answers(lockout) refuses |
what ensure_answers refuses |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:285 |
!self.takes_tries_at(now) |
CodeRefused::Lapsed |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:288 |
* hash != self.code_hash |
CodeRefused::Wrong |
domains/authentication/mfa/one_time_code.rs:293 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.usage.is_used() |
Validation |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:362 |
self.purpose != expected |
Validation |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:369 |
now >= self.expires_at |
Validation |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey_ceremony.rs:377 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.lets_set_up(¶ms.user_id.into()) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:270 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.user_id.into(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:446 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.user_id.into(), AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:425 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
new_count <= self.sign_count && self.sign_count > 0 |
Unauthorized |
domains/authentication/credentials/passkey.rs:407 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(* account.id())) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/operations/password_change.rs:40 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.initiator == ResetInitiator::System |
TokenRefused::other_kind() |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:467 |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:503, through finish_reset |
self.status().try_transition(ResetStatus::Completed).is_err() |
TokenRefused::spent() |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:510, through finish_reset |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.initiator != ResetInitiator::System |
TokenRefused::other_kind() |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:490 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
params.initiator == ResetInitiator::System |
Validation |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:234 |
ensure_may_sign_in(holder) refuses |
what ensure_may_sign_in refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:239 |
ensure_proved_address(holder) refuses |
what ensure_proved_address refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:240 |
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(RESET_LONGEST, "a reset link") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:241 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_sign_in(holder) refuses |
what ensure_may_sign_in refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:268 |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(IN_SIGN_IN_LONGEST, "a sign-in's password change") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/reset.rs:269 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
answer.subject() != subject_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:183 |
ensure_each_hash_once(&hashes) refuses |
what ensure_each_hash_once refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:189 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id |
CodeRefused::ForAnotherAccount |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:373, through ensure_stands_in_for |
!factor.is_active() |
CodeRefused::Retired |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:376, through ensure_stands_in_for |
factor.is_locked_out(lockout) |
CodeRefused::Locked |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:379, through ensure_stands_in_for |
!self.spend(hash) |
CodeRefused::Wrong |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:356 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.lets_set_up(&self.subject_id) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:232 |
factor.subject_id() != self.subject_id || !factor.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:238 |
ensure_each_hash_once(&hashes) refuses |
what ensure_each_hash_once refuses |
domains/authentication/recovery/codes.rs:244 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id |
SignInRefused::ForAnotherAccount |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:657 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let SessionChannel::App(_) = self.channel |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:618 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* holder.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:587 |
holder.can_authenticate() |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:593 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!handed |
RotationRefused::NotUsable |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/rotation.rs:84 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id || proof.for_account(own).is_err() |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:110 |
!self.status.is_active() || !self.progress.is_complete() |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:116 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id || !proof.proves_recently(&PrincipalId::from(self.user_id)) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:47 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id || holder.subject() != own |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/kept_through.rs:77 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!device.is_trusted_by(PrincipalId::from(self.user_id)) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:346 |
!fresh |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:354 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_suspended() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/suspension.rs:80 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&holder, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:527 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!check.admits(parent) |
RotationRefused::NotUsable |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/rotation.rs:36 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* presented != self.refresh_token_hash |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/session/mod.rs:556 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!session.is_usable(now) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:124 |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(HANDOFF_LONGEST, "a handoff code") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:129 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.admits(landing, now) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/handoff.rs:250 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!session.status().is_active() || session.is_expired(now) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:86 |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(SIGN_IN_CODE_LONGEST, "a sign-in code") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:91 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* dashboard != self.dashboard_hash |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:183 |
!self.is_live_at(now) |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/sessions/sign_in_code.rs:189 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!holder.can_authenticate() |
Forbidden |
domains/authentication/operations/sign_in_link.rs:34 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.subject_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:447 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.subject_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:459 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!progress.is_complete() || progress.assurance_level() < AssuranceLevel::Aal2 |
DeviceTrustRefused::SecondFactorNotProven |
domains/authentication/device_trust.rs:287 |
Checks the condition can mean what it says.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:119.
self |
Answer (ValidationError) |
Where |
Self::CountryIn(countries) | Self::CountryNotIn(countries) |
validate_count("countries", countries.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) |
domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:121 |
Self::MethodIn(methods) |
validate_count("methods", methods.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) |
domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:124 |
Self::SourceIpIn(ranges) | Self::SourceIpNotIn(ranges) |
validate_count("ranges", ranges.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) |
domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:125 |
Self::HostIn(hosts) |
validate_count("hosts", hosts.len(), 1..= MAX_LISTED) |
domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:128 |
Self::PathPrefix(_) | Self::PathExact(_) | Self::RoleIs(_) | Self::RoleIsNot(_) | Self::DeviceUnknown | Self::DeviceKnown | Self::RiskAtLeast(_) | Self::SensitiveOperation | Self::GroupIs(_) | Self::GroupIsNot(_) | Self::PermissionHeld(_) | Self::ClaimEquals {..} | Self::TimeWithin(_) |
Ok(()) |
domains/authorization/policy/condition.rs:129 |
The right that changes which roles principal holds.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:76.
principal |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
PrincipalRef::User(_) | PrincipalRef::OrgUser(_) |
SystemPermission::Users(UserAction::Update) |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:78 |
PrincipalRef::Agent(_) |
SystemPermission::Agents(AgentAction::Update) |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:81 |
PrincipalRef::Consumer(_) |
SystemPermission::Consumers(ConsumersAction::Update) |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:82 |
The user right acting on someone else’s account needs.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/authorization/granter.rs:235.
action |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
| any |
Users |
domains/authorization/granter.rs:237 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/access_request.rs:155.
- States:
Pending, Approved, Denied, Cancelled, Expired
- Final, which no move leaves:
Approved, Denied, Cancelled, Expired
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Pending to Approved |
AccessRequest::approve |
ApproveUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign) |
Pending to Cancelled |
AccessRequest::cancel |
CancelUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority |
Pending to Denied |
AccessRequest::deny |
DenyUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign) |
Pending to Expired |
AccessRequest::expire |
ExpireUseCase (authorization) |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/access_review.rs:119.
- States:
Open, Completed, Cancelled
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, Cancelled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Open to Cancelled |
AccessReview::cancel |
CancelUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority |
Open to Completed |
AccessReview::finish |
CompleteOverdueUseCase (authorization), CompleteUseCase (authorization) |
ReviewCompletion |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/authorization/policy/status.rs:54.
- States:
Draft, Review, Active, Archived
- Final, which no move leaves:
Archived
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Archived |
PolicySet::archive |
ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority |
Draft to Archived |
PolicySet::archive |
ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority |
Draft to Review |
PolicySet::submit_for_review |
none read |
TenantAuthority |
Review to Active |
PolicySet::activate |
ChangeStatusUseCase (authorization) |
PolicyApprover, SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Activate) |
Review to Draft |
PolicySet::start_draft, PolicySet::reject |
StartDraftUseCase (authorization) |
TenantAuthority, SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update) |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status may not move to to |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:569, through answerable |
now >= self.answer_by() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:571, through answerable |
grant.asked() != self.asked |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:577, through answerable |
approver.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:583, through answerable |
grant.ensure_given_by(&self.requester.principal(), &approver.standing()) refuses |
what ensure_given_by refuses |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:588, through answerable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!by.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:495 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status may not move to to |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:569, through answerable |
now >= self.answer_by() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:571, through answerable |
grant.asked() != self.asked |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:577, through answerable |
approver.who().is_same_person_as(&self.requester) |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:583, through answerable |
grant.ensure_given_by(&self.requester.principal(), &approver.standing()) refuses |
what ensure_given_by refuses |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:588, through answerable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
now < self.answer_by() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:519 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
new.length.ensure_at_most(limits.longest().duration(), "access asked for") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/authorization/access_request.rs:291 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ACCESS) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/request_policy.rs:109 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(RUNS_REVIEWS) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:526 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
item.ensure_review(self) refuses |
what ensure_review refuses |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:369, through ensure_decider |
!names(&self.reviewers, person) |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:372, through ensure_decider |
person.principal() == * item.holder() |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:378, through ensure_decider |
(pending, removed) is not (Some(pending), Some(removed)) |
Infrastructure: access review |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:443, through changed_counts |
ensure_counts(self.holder_count, pending, removed) refuses |
what ensure_counts refuses |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:448, through changed_counts |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
completion.ensure_finished(self) refuses |
what ensure_finished refuses |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:501 |
self.holder_count.checked_sub(completion.removed()) is missing |
an error |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:502 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(RUNS_REVIEWS) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:405 |
self.status != AccessReviewStatus::Open || crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.due |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/access_review.rs:415, through ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_grantable(&grant, policy, now) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:370 |
ensure_approver_may_give(&approved_by, &ceiling) refuses |
what ensure_approver_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:373 |
ceiling.ensure_may_hand_out(grant.access.system(), grant.access.custom()) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:374 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.may_be_revoked_by(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:509 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_within(&self.tenant_id) refuses |
what ensure_within refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:264 |
held.ensure_controls(HANDS_USERS_RIGHTS, &self.self_service.handout()) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:266 |
held.ensure_may_give(&self_service.handout()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/break_glass.rs:267 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to) refuses |
what ensure_may_clear refuses |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:156 |
self.position(&rule.permission).is_some() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:158 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_above_internal(up_to) refuses |
what ensure_above_internal refuses |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:192 |
self.position(permission) is missing |
an error |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:193 |
self.rules.get_mut(at) is missing |
an error |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:194 |
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to.max(up_to)) refuses |
what ensure_may_clear refuses |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:195 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.position(permission) is missing |
an error |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:220 |
self.rules.get(at) is missing |
an error |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:221 |
ensure_may_clear(by, rule.up_to) refuses |
what ensure_may_clear refuses |
domains/authorization/clearance.rs:222 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:404 |
granter.ensure_may_give(&role.grants()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:405 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:172 |
inherited.ensure_for(params.place) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:173 |
granter.ensure_may_give(&inherited.handout()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:174 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(self.id)) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:473 |
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete), &conferred.handout(),) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:474 |
tree.has_subgroups(&self.id) |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:547, through ensure_no_subgroups |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses |
what ensure_speaks refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:510 |
self.origin is GroupOrigin::Dashboard |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:564, through ensure_kept_by_directory |
tree.has_subgroups(&self.id) |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:547, through ensure_no_subgroups |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses |
what ensure_speaks refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:196 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
current.ensure_for(self.place) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:365 |
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update), ¤t.handout(),) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:366 |
inherited.lineage().contains(&self.id) |
Validation |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:371 |
granter.ensure_may_give(&inherited.handout()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:376 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:326 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses |
what ensure_speaks refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:493 |
self.origin is GroupOrigin::Dashboard |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:564, through ensure_kept_by_directory |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign), &role.grants()) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/group/mod.rs:436 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
group.id != self.group_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of |
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(self.group_id)) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:251 |
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign), &conferred.handout(),) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:252 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses |
what ensure_speaks refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:273 |
group.id != self.group_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of |
group.ensure_kept_by_directory() refuses |
what ensure_kept_by_directory refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:275 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
directory.ensure_speaks() refuses |
what ensure_speaks refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:132 |
group.ensure_kept_by_directory() refuses |
what ensure_kept_by_directory refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:133 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_ends_later(holding.until, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses |
what ensure_ends_later refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:85 |
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Assign)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:86 |
conferred.ensure_for(GroupPlace::Under(group.id)) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:87 |
granter.ensure_may_give(&conferred.handout()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:88 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
group.id != self.group_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of |
ensure_lapsed(self.expires, now) refuses |
what ensure_lapsed refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:204 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
group.id != self.group_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:324, through ensure_of |
removals.ensure_names(&self.principal, ReviewScope::Group(self.group_id)) refuses |
what ensure_names refuses |
domains/authorization/group/membership.rs:294 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_second_person(&self.submitted, approver) refuses |
what ensure_second_person refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:517 |
approver.authority().ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Activate)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:518 |
self.status may not move to PolicyStatus::Active |
InvalidTransition |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:521 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
viewer.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::View)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:620 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:413 |
history.ensure_no_open_draft() refuses |
what ensure_no_open_draft refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:414 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(needed)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:640, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::PolicySet(PolicySetAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:460, through ensure_editable_by |
!self.status.is_editable() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/policy/set.rs:462, through ensure_editable_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_written_by(&self.object, &self.link, catalogue, by) refuses |
what ensure_written_by refuses |
domains/authorization/relationship.rs:230 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_written_by(&new.object, &new.link, catalogue, by) refuses |
what ensure_written_by refuses |
domains/authorization/relationship.rs:196 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:189 |
params.key.ensure_not_reserved("resource_type_key") refuses |
what ensure_not_reserved refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:190 |
ensure_concrete("resource_type_key", ¶ms.key) refuses |
what ensure_concrete refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:191 |
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(¶ms.key, &[], ¶ms.actions)?) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:193 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:498 |
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &[], &self.actions)?) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:499 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:471, through redraw_actions |
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &self.actions, &actions)?) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:473, through redraw_actions |
ensure_grantable(editor, &widening(&self.key, &actions, &self.actions)?) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:474, through redraw_actions |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:403, through rename |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:446, through reclassify |
class < self.data_class && editor.data_clearance() < self.data_class |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:448, through reclassify |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/resource_type/mod.rs:420, through describe |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_make_default(assignment, editor) refuses |
what ensure_may_make_default refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:372 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_may_hand_out(&moves.grant_system, &moves.grant_custom) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/authorization/role/permission_moves.rs:62 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
granter.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Create)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:133 |
ensure_may_make_default(role.assignment, granter) refuses |
what ensure_may_make_default refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:134 |
granter.ensure_may_hand_out(&role.system_permissions, &role.custom_permissions) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:135 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
granter.ensure_controls(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Delete), &self.grants()) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:402 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
editor.ensure_holds(SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Update)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/role/mod.rs:338 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_ends_later(holding.until, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses |
what ensure_ends_later refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:135 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!role.is_default() |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:176 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
held.ensure_holds(assignment_right(&principal)) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:110 |
held.ensure_may_give(&role.grants()) refuses |
what ensure_may_give refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:111 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
invitation.status() != InvitationStatus::Accepted |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:286 |
invitation.role_id() != role.id() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:292 |
invitee.id() != invitation.user_id() |
Conflict |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:298 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* role.id() != self.role_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:440 |
ensure_lapsed(self.expires, now) refuses |
what ensure_lapsed refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:445 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* role.id() != self.role_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:370 |
granter.ensure_controls(assignment_right(&self.principal), &role.grants()) refuses |
what ensure_controls refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:375 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* role.id() != self.role_id |
Forbidden |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:400 |
removals.ensure_names(&self.principal, ReviewScope::Role(self.role_id)) refuses |
what ensure_names refuses |
domains/authorization/role_assignment.rs:405 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ROLES) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/separation.rs:75 |
first.id() == second.id() |
Validation |
domains/authorization/separation.rs:77 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_holds(SHAPES_ROLES) refuses |
what ensure_holds refuses |
domains/authorization/separation.rs:109 |
What kind of provider this is, which records may name.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:233.
self |
Answer (MailProviderKind) |
Where |
Self::Platform |
Platform |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:235 |
Self::Smtp(_) |
Smtp |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:236 |
Self::SendGrid {..} |
SendGrid |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:237 |
Self::Ses {..} |
Ses |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:238 |
Self::Postmark {..} |
Postmark |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:239 |
Self::Mailgun {..} |
Mailgun |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:240 |
The provider mail goes out through now: the one named once a test send through it worked, the platform’s own until then.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:389.
self.check |
Answer (MailProvider) |
Where |
ProviderCheck::Verified {..} |
&self.provider |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:391 |
ProviderCheck::Unverified | ProviderCheck::Failed {..} |
&PLATFORM_MAIL |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:392 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/email_template.rs:443 |
template.ensure_placeholders_fit() refuses |
what ensure_placeholders_fit refuses |
domains/branding/email_template.rs:456 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/email_template.rs:557 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:253 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:272 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:190 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:234 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:290 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:315 |
domain.verification_status() != VerificationStatus::Verified |
Forbidden |
domains/branding/config.rs:317 |
!address.domain().eq_ignore_ascii_case(domain.domain().as_str()) |
Forbidden |
domains/branding/config.rs:326 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:344 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/config.rs:213 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.provider == MailProvider::Platform |
Conflict |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:445 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change() refuses |
what ensure_may_change refuses |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:419 |
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses |
what ensure_proved_recently refuses |
domains/branding/mail_provider.rs:420 |
Refuses a JWT credential naming tenant_issuer, the tenant’s own token issuer.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/consumers/credential.rs:54.
self |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
Self::JwtBearer { issuer,..} |
Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("consumers-a-consumer-s-tokens-come-from", "a consumer's tokens come from its own issuer, not the tenant's"))) when issuer == tenant_issuer |
domains/consumers/credential.rs:56 |
Self::ApiKey {..} | Self::ClientCert {..} | Self::JwtBearer {..} |
Ok(()) |
domains/consumers/credential.rs:62 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/consumers/consumer.rs:49.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
Consumer::disable |
DisableUseCase (consumers), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) |
ConsumerControl, ConsumersAction::Update |
Disabled to Active |
Consumer::create, Consumer::enable |
CreateUseCase (consumers), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), EnableUseCase (consumers) |
ConsumerControl, ConsumersAction::Create, ConsumersAction::Update |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:297 |
control.ensure_may_clear(clearance) refuses |
what ensure_may_clear refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:298 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:448 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:530 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:477 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:144 |
control.ensure_may_clear(params.clearance) refuses |
what ensure_may_clear refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:145 |
params.credential.ensure_foreign_to(tenant_issuer) refuses |
what ensure_foreign_to refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:146 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:563 |
self.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:565 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:360, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:360, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:419 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(ConsumersAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:505 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
takeover.ensure_for(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_for refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:389 |
rotation.credential.ensure_foreign_to(tenant_issuer) refuses |
what ensure_foreign_to refuses |
domains/consumers/consumer.rs:390 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and rotation time.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/crypto/key_status.rs:84.
status |
rotated_at |
Answer (KeyState) |
Where |
KeyStatus::Active |
None |
Ok(Self::Active) |
domains/crypto/key_status.rs:89 |
KeyStatus::Rotated |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Rotated { at }) |
domains/crypto/key_status.rs:90 |
KeyStatus::Revoked |
None |
Ok(Self::Revoked { before : PriorRotation::NotRotated, }) |
domains/crypto/key_status.rs:91 |
KeyStatus::Revoked |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Revoked { before : PriorRotation::RotatedAt(at), }) |
domains/crypto/key_status.rs:94 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} key has a rotation time that contradicts it"))) |
domains/crypto/key_status.rs:97 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and target key.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:74.
status |
target_key_id |
Answer (MigrationState) |
Where |
MigrationStatus::Planned |
None |
Ok(Self::Planned) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:79 |
MigrationStatus::Cancelled |
None |
Ok(Self::Cancelled) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:80 |
MigrationStatus::InProgress |
Some(key) |
Ok(Self::InProgress(key)) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:81 |
MigrationStatus::Validating |
Some(key) |
Ok(Self::Validating(key)) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:82 |
MigrationStatus::Completed |
Some(key) |
Ok(Self::Completed(key)) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:83 |
MigrationStatus::RolledBack |
Some(key) |
Ok(Self::RolledBack(key)) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:84 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} algorithm migration has a target key that contradicts it"))) |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:85 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/crypto/key_status.rs:162.
- States:
Active, Rotated, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Rotated |
AgentCredential::rotate |
RotateUseCase (agents) |
AgentControl, AgentAction::Update |
Rotated to Revoked |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/crypto/migration_status.rs:64.
- States:
Planned, InProgress, Validating, Completed, RolledBack, Cancelled
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, RolledBack, Cancelled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
InProgress to RolledBack |
none read |
none read |
none read |
InProgress to Validating |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Planned to Cancelled |
AlgorithmMigration::cancel |
CancelUseCase (crypto) |
CryptoControlCheck, SystemPermission::Crypto(CryptoAction::Update) |
Planned to InProgress |
AlgorithmMigration::start |
StartUseCase (crypto) |
CryptoControlCheck, SystemPermission::Crypto(CryptoAction::Update) |
Validating to Completed |
none read |
none read |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:403 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:355 |
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) |
InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:334 |
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) |
InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:381 |
self.state.target_key_id().cloned() is not Some(target) |
InvalidMigrationTransition { from : self.status(), to : status, } |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:420, through carry_target_to |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through carry_target_to > move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:300 |
* target.kid() == self.source_key_id |
Validation |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:302 |
target.algorithm() != self.target_algorithm |
Validation |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:308 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/crypto/algorithm_migration.rs:430, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_due(schedule, now) |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/assertion_key.rs:400 |
self.keys.iter().any(| key | key.kid() == new_key.kid()) |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/assertion_key.rs:406 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:416 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:582, through ensure_new_kid |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:492, through revoke_migrated_key |
this_signs && !another_signs |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through revoke_migrated_key > ensure_not_last_signer |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:492 |
this_signs && !another_signs |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through ensure_not_last_signer |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:513 |
this_signs && !another_signs |
Conflict |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:597, through ensure_not_last_signer |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_keys() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_keys refuses |
domains/crypto/signing_key.rs:434 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_rules refuses |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:255 |
matches !(rule.redaction(), RedactionStrategy::Encrypt) |
Validation |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:257 |
self.classify(rule.field_path().as_str()).is_some() |
Conflict |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:263 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_rules refuses |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:335 |
matches !(redaction, RedactionStrategy::Encrypt) |
Validation |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:337 |
self.rules.iter_mut().find(| r | r.id() == rule_id) is missing |
an error |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:342 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_rules refuses |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:154 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_rules() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_rules refuses |
domains/data_classification/classification.rs:300 |
The protocol this configuration speaks.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/connection/config.rs:186.
self |
Answer (FederationProtocol) |
Where |
Self::Saml(_) |
Saml |
domains/federation/connection/config.rs:188 |
Self::Oidc(_) |
Oidc |
domains/federation/connection/config.rs:189 |
The built-in permission this right is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/federation/control.rs:42.
self |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
CreateConnection |
Federation |
domains/federation/control.rs:44 |
EditConnection |
Federation |
domains/federation/control.rs:45 |
TrustConnection |
Federation |
domains/federation/control.rs:46 |
DeleteConnection |
Federation |
domains/federation/control.rs:47 |
ConfigureScim |
Scim |
domains/federation/control.rs:48 |
How a link made on these grounds was made.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/link.rs:122.
self |
Answer (LinkSource) |
Where |
Self::Admitted(_) |
FirstSignIn |
domains/federation/link.rs:124 |
Self::Control(_) |
Admin |
domains/federation/link.rs:125 |
Self::Holder(_) |
Holder |
domains/federation/link.rs:126 |
The status an answer’s top-level and second-level codes say.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:68.
partial is Self::Partial.sub_code() == Some(sub)
top == Self::Success.status_code() |
partial |
Answer (LogoutStatus) |
Where |
true |
true |
Partial |
domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:71 |
true |
false |
Success |
domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:72 |
false |
any |
Failed |
domains/federation/saml/logout.rs:73 |
Reads OIDC’s amr claim from RFC 8176.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:70.
says("mfa") |
says("hwk") |
Answer (ProviderFactor) |
Where |
true |
true |
HardwareKey |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:73 |
true |
false |
Performed |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:74 |
false |
true | false |
NotPerformed |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:75 |
Reads a SAML assertion’s AuthnContextClassRef.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:82.
class_ref |
Answer (ProviderFactor) |
Where |
Fact::Known(class) |
HardwareKey when HARDWARE_KEY_SAML_CONTEXTS.contains(&class) |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:84 |
Fact::Known(class) |
Performed when MULTI_FACTOR_SAML_CONTEXTS.contains(&class) |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:85 |
Fact::Known(_) | Fact::Unknown |
NotPerformed |
domains/federation/vouched_identity.rs:86 |
Who removes a link on these grounds.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/federation/link.rs:231.
self |
Answer (UnlinkSource) |
Where |
Self::Control(_) |
Admin |
domains/federation/link.rs:233 |
Self::Holder(_) |
Holder |
domains/federation/link.rs:234 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/federation/connection_status.rs:33.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
FederatedIdpConnection::disable, SamlServiceProvider::disable, OrgIdentityProvider::add |
DisableUseCase (federation), ChangeStatusUseCase (federation), AddOrgUseCase (organization) |
FederationControl, FederationRight::EditConnection, OrgControl |
Disabled to Active |
FederatedIdpConnection::create, FederatedIdpConnection::activate, SamlServiceProvider::create, SamlServiceProvider::activate |
CreateUseCase (federation), ActivateUseCase (federation), ChangeStatusUseCase (federation) |
FederationControl, FederationRight::CreateConnection, FederationRight::TrustConnection |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:356 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(trust.needs()) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/trust.rs:25 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(self.right_to_bind(&allowed)) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:485 |
let Some(twice) = first_repeat(&allowed) |
Validation |
domains/federation/connection.rs:487 |
!hint_is_allowed(&domains.hint, &allowed) |
Conflict |
domains/federation/connection.rs:493 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(trust.needs()) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/trust.rs:81 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::CreateConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:152 |
config.ensure_stable_subject() refuses |
what ensure_stable_subject refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:153 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::DeleteConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:582 |
self.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/connection.rs:584 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:375 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:71 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:134 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:48 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&saml.metadata_url is not Setting::Set(followed) |
Conflict |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:99 |
metadata.source() != &Setting::Set(followed.clone()) |
Conflict |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:105 |
metadata.entity_id() != &saml.entity_id |
Conflict |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:111 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:559 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:531 |
let Some(field) = first_repeat(mapping.values()) |
Validation |
domains/federation/connection.rs:533 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:145 |
&mut self.config is not ConnectionConfig::Saml(saml) |
not_saml() |
domains/federation/connection/saml.rs:147 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:157 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection/provisioning.rs:76 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:417 |
config.provider() != self.config.provider() |
Conflict |
domains/federation/connection.rs:419 |
config.ensure_stable_subject() refuses |
what ensure_stable_subject refuses |
domains/federation/connection.rs:424 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
connection.id() != identity.connection_id() |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/link.rs:273 |
grounds.ensure_allows(identity, account) refuses |
what ensure_allows refuses |
domains/federation/link.rs:278 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/link.rs:364, through ensure_ends |
* connection.id() != self.connection_id |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/link.rs:370, through ensure_ends |
ensure_fresh_holder(proof, account) refuses |
what ensure_fresh_holder refuses |
domains/federation/link.rs:344 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
grounds is UnlinkGrounds::Control(control) and control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/federation/link.rs:451 |
grounds is UnlinkGrounds::Holder(person) and ensure_holder(* person, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/federation/link.rs:453 |
* account.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/link.rs:364, through ensure_ends |
* connection.id() != self.connection_id |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/link.rs:370, through ensure_ends |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/service_provider.rs:446 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::CreateConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/service_provider.rs:121 |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::TrustConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/service_provider.rs:122 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::DeleteConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/service_provider.rs:477 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::EditConnection) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/service_provider.rs:462 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:343, through change_default_role |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:395, through change_activation |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:410, through change_removal |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:123 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:262 |
self.enabled == Enablement::Disabled |
InvalidTransition |
domains/federation/scim.rs:264 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:240 |
self.enabled == Enablement::Enabled |
InvalidTransition |
domains/federation/scim.rs:242 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(FederationRight::ConfigureScim) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/federation/scim.rs:287 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!connection.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/federation/sign_in_start.rs:36 |
Refuses a filter value this kind could never be compared with as text, such as 2026-9-1 for a date.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:403.
self |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
Self::Date | Self::DateTime |
self.check_format(value) |
domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:405 |
Self::Text | Self::LongText | Self::WholeNumber | Self::Decimal | Self::Money | Self::Percent | Self::YesNo | Self::SingleChoice | Self::MultipleChoice | Self::Tags | Self::Email | Self::Phone | Self::Link | Self::Colour | Self::Country | Self::Rating |
Ok(()) |
domains/identity/attribute/kind.rs:406 |
Refuses writer when they may not write an attribute in this namespace.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:73.
self |
writer |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
User |
Holder |
not read |
domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:79 |
App |
Holder |
refused |
domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:75 |
| any |
Administrator |
not read |
domains/identity/attribute/namespace.rs:79 |
How many values this operator compares against.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:103.
self |
Answer (OperandArity) |
Where |
Is |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
IsNot |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
Contains |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
IsOneOf |
Many |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106 |
GreaterThan |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
GreaterThanOrEqual |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
LessThan |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
LessThanOrEqual |
One |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:107 |
HasAny |
Many |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106 |
HasAll |
Many |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:106 |
IsPresent |
None |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:105 |
IsAbsent |
None |
domains/identity/attribute/operator.rs:105 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and completion time.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:113.
status |
completed_at |
Answer (ErasureState) |
Where |
ErasureStatus::Completed |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Completed { at }) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:118 |
ErasureStatus::Pending |
None |
Ok(Self::Pending) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:119 |
ErasureStatus::Processing |
None |
Ok(Self::Processing) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:120 |
ErasureStatus::Cancelled |
None |
Ok(Self::Cancelled) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:121 |
ErasureStatus::Held |
None |
Ok(Self::Held) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:122 |
ErasureStatus::Failed |
None |
Ok(Self::Failed) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:123 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} erasure request has a completion time that contradicts it"))) |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:124 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and times.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:99.
status |
ready_at |
available_until |
Answer (ExportState) |
Where |
ExportStatus::Requested |
None |
None |
Ok(Self::Requested) |
domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:105 |
ExportStatus::Ready |
Some(at) |
Some(available_until) |
Ok(Self::Ready { at, available_until, }) |
domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:106 |
ExportStatus::Expired |
None |
None |
Ok(Self::Expired) |
domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:110 |
| any |
any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {} data export has times that contradict it", status.as_str()))) |
domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:111 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and the time it began.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:185.
status |
since |
Answer (ImpersonationState) |
Where |
ImpersonationStatus::AwaitingConsent |
None |
Ok(Self::AwaitingConsent) |
domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:190 |
ImpersonationStatus::Active |
Some(since) |
Ok(Self::Active { since }) |
domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:191 |
ImpersonationStatus::Declined |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Declined { at }) |
domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:192 |
ImpersonationStatus::Ended |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Ended { at }) |
domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:193 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {} support impersonation has a time that contradicts it", status.as_str()))) |
domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:194 |
Closes invitee’s account once this invitation ended without being accepted: it expired, was declined or was revoked.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:397.
self.status() |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
InvitationStatus::Expired | InvitationStatus::Declined | InvitationStatus::Revoked |
Ok(invitee.close_unanswered_invite()?) |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:400 |
InvitationStatus::Pending | InvitationStatus::Accepted |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("identity-only-an-invitation-nobody-accepted-closes", "only an invitation nobody accepted closes its account"))) |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:403 |
What following the link at now gets you.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:193.
self.state |
Answer (InvitationLifecycle) |
Where |
OfferState::Pending |
Pending when now < self.expires_at |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:195 |
OfferState::Pending | OfferState::Expired |
Expired |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:196 |
OfferState::Accepted {..} | OfferState::Declined | OfferState::Revoked |
Closed |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:197 |
What following the link shows about the person: that they hold the invited mailbox when it was mailed there, nothing when it was handed over.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:44.
self |
Answer (PersonProof) |
Where |
Mailed |
Mailbox |
domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:46 |
HandedOver |
Nothing |
domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:47 |
The route a link takes on a deployment whose mail is as mail says: mailed where a mail reaches, handed to the inviter otherwise.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:33.
mail |
Answer (InvitationRoute) |
Where |
Available |
Mailed |
domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:35 |
NotSetUp |
HandedOver |
domains/identity/invitations/route.rs:36 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and acceptance time.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:52.
status |
accepted_at |
Answer (OfferState) |
Where |
InvitationStatus::Accepted |
Some(at) |
Ok(Self::Accepted { at }) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:57 |
InvitationStatus::Pending |
None |
Ok(Self::Pending) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:58 |
InvitationStatus::Declined |
None |
Ok(Self::Declined) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:59 |
InvitationStatus::Expired |
None |
Ok(Self::Expired) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:60 |
InvitationStatus::Revoked |
None |
Ok(Self::Revoked) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:61 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} invitation has an acceptance time that contradicts it"))) |
domains/identity/invitations/offer.rs:62 |
Reads a value of this type from text.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:74.
self |
Answer (MetadataValue) |
Where |
Self::Text | Self::TextArray |
Some(MetadataValue::String(text.to_owned())) |
domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:76 |
Self::Integer |
text.parse().ok().map(MetadataValue::Integer) |
domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:77 |
Self::Number |
text.parse::< f64 >().ok().filter(| n | n.is_finite()).map(MetadataValue::Number) |
domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:78 |
Self::Boolean |
match text { "true" => Some(MetadataValue::Bool(true)), "false" => Some(MetadataValue::Bool(false)), _ => None, } |
domains/identity/attribute/value_type.rs:83 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/privacy/erasure_status.rs:56.
- States:
Pending, Processing, Completed, Cancelled, Held, Failed
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, Cancelled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Failed to Processing |
ErasureRequest::start_processing, ErasureRequest::retry, OrgErasureRequest::start_processing, OrgErasureRequest::retry |
ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) |
none read |
Held to Cancelled |
ErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, ErasureRequest::cancel_for, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_for |
CancelErasureUseCase (identity), CancelOrgErasureByLinkUseCase (organization), CancelOrgErasureUseCase (organization) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl |
Held to Pending |
ErasureRequest::submit, ErasureRequest::submit_for, ErasureRequest::release, OrgErasureRequest::submit, OrgErasureRequest::submit_for, OrgErasureRequest::release |
RequestErasureUseCase (identity), HoldErasureUseCase (identity), ReleaseErasureUseCase (identity), RequestOrgErasureUseCase (organization), HoldOrgErasureUseCase (organization), ReleaseOrgErasureUseCase (organization) |
SignedInPerson, AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgControl, OrgAccountControl |
Pending to Cancelled |
ErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, ErasureRequest::cancel_for, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_from_link, OrgErasureRequest::cancel_for |
CancelErasureUseCase (identity), CancelOrgErasureByLinkUseCase (organization), CancelOrgErasureUseCase (organization) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl |
Pending to Held |
ErasureRequest::hold, OrgErasureRequest::hold |
HoldErasureUseCase (identity), ReleaseErasureUseCase (identity), HoldOrgErasureUseCase (organization), ReleaseOrgErasureUseCase (organization) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::Erase, OrgAccountControl |
Pending to Processing |
ErasureRequest::start_processing, ErasureRequest::retry, OrgErasureRequest::start_processing, OrgErasureRequest::retry |
ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) |
none read |
Processing to Completed |
ErasureRequest::complete, OrgErasureRequest::complete |
ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) |
none read |
Processing to Failed |
ErasureRequest::fail, OrgErasureRequest::fail |
ProcessErasuresUseCase (identity), ProcessOrgErasuresUseCase (organization) |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/privacy/export_state.rs:39.
- States:
Requested, Ready, Expired
- Final, which no move leaves:
Expired
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Ready to Expired |
DataExportRequest::expire |
ExpireExportsUseCase (identity) |
none read |
Requested to Ready |
DataExportRequest::mark_ready |
BuildExportsUseCase (identity) |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/impersonation/state.rs:116.
- States:
AwaitingConsent, Active, Declined, Ended
- Final, which no move leaves:
Declined, Ended
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Ended |
SupportImpersonation::end |
EndUseCase (identity) |
SignedInPerson |
AwaitingConsent to Active |
SupportImpersonation::approve |
ApproveUseCase (identity) |
SignedInPerson |
AwaitingConsent to Declined |
SupportImpersonation::decline |
DeclineUseCase (identity) |
SignedInPerson |
AwaitingConsent to Ended |
SupportImpersonation::end |
EndUseCase (identity) |
SignedInPerson |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/account/import/state.rs:40.
- States:
Pending, Running, Finished, Failed
- Final, which no move leaves:
Finished, Failed
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Pending to Failed |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Pending to Running |
UserImport::take_up |
RunUseCase (identity) |
none read |
Running to Failed |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Running to Finished |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/invitations/status.rs:78.
- States:
Pending, Accepted, Declined, Expired, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Accepted, Declined, Expired, Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Pending to Accepted |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Pending to Declined |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Pending to Expired |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Pending to Revoked |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/identity/account/user_status.rs:89.
- States:
Invited, PendingVerification, Active, Locked, Deactivated, Closing
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Closing |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Locked |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Closing to Active |
User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock |
RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail |
Closing to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Deactivated to Active |
User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock |
RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail |
Invited to Active |
User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock |
RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail |
Invited to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Locked to Active |
User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock |
RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail |
Locked to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
PendingVerification to Active |
User::switch_by_directory, User::verify_email, User::change_verified_email, User::activate, User::unlock |
RemoveScimUseCase (scim), UpdateScimUseCase (scim), VerifyUseCase (identity), ConfirmChangeUseCase (identity), CreateScimUseCase (scim), RegisterUseCase (identity), UpdateStatusUseCase (identity) |
AccountControlCheck, AccountAction::LetIn, AccountAction::ShutOut, VerifiedEmail |
PendingVerification to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:543 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:462 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:521 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:573 |
lowers && !by.clearance().admits_sensitive() |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:576 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:158 |
definition.ensure_fits_its_kind() refuses |
what ensure_fits_its_kind refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:180 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:412 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:444 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:428 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:487 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_schema() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_schema refuses |
domains/identity/attribute/definition/mod.rs:394 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:225 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:99 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&user_id, AccountAction::RecordForThem) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/consent.rs:140 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:394 |
!self.state.downloadable_at(now) |
Conflict |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:396 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state.downloadable_at(now) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:417 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:431, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:431, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, account.id()) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:227 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::Export) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/export.rs:242 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:461 |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:466 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* account.id() != self.user_id || * account.email() != self.sent_to |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:437 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:492 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:510 |
self.state != ErasureState::Held |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:512 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != ErasureState::Failed |
InvalidErasureTransition { from : self.status(), to : ErasureStatus::Processing, } |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:552 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state == ErasureState::Pending && now < self.scheduled_at |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:396 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:578, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, account.id()) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:215 |
departure.ensure_may_leave(account.id()) refuses |
what ensure_may_leave refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:216 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(account.id(), AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/privacy/erasure.rs:238 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
role.invited_role_id() != self.role_id |
Conflict |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:292 |
!inviter.is_inviter(&self.invited_by) |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:298 |
role.ensure_offered_by(inviter) refuses |
what ensure_offered_by refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:303 |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for |
invitee.status() != UserStatus::Invited |
Conflict |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:306 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
role.ensure_offered_by(granter) refuses |
what ensure_offered_by refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:118 |
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:119 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_sent_for |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
presented != self.offer.token_hash() |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:480 |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for |
invitee.status() != UserStatus::Invited |
Conflict |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:527, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent |
invitee.credentials_changed_at().since(self.created_at) |
Conflict |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:533, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent |
self.offer.state(now) == InvitationLifecycle::Pending |
Conflict |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:489 |
renewed.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:494 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_sent_for |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.user_id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:351 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Invitation) refuses |
what ensure_may_open refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:446 |
* invitee.id() != self.user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:515, through ensure_still_for > ensure_sent_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:324, through ensure_still_for |
new_lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/identity/invitations/invitation.rs:448 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
account.id != self.principal_id || * account.email != self.from_email |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:458 |
self.state != ChangeState::Waiting |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:464 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(account, now)) |
refused |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:425 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!proof.proves_recently(&account.id) |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:198 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* presented != self.token_hash |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:513 |
ensure_only_ran_out(self.state_for(account, now)) refuses |
what ensure_only_ran_out refuses |
domains/identity/account/email_change.rs:518 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/identity/tokens/secure.rs:225 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:250 |
now >= self.requested_at.saturating_add(CONSENT_WAIT) |
Conflict |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:344, through ensure_not_lapsed |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:268 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:364, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!(by.is_holder_of(&self.admin) || by.is_holder_of(&self.user_id)) |
Forbidden |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:295 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:364, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_act_as(&terms.admin, account, signed_in, control) refuses |
what ensure_may_act_as refuses |
domains/identity/impersonation/mod.rs:112 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::LetIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:90, through let_in |
self.status == UserStatus::Closing |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:92, through let_in |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:466 |
self.status == UserStatus::Deactivated |
Conflict |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:468 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ChangeSignIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:407 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:140 |
let Some(locale) = locale and by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:161, through change_locale |
let Some(timezone) = timezone and by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:173, through change_timezone |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:518, through finish_onboarding > apply_transition |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:124, through shut_out |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:495 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:142 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Import) refuses |
what ensure_may_open refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/import.rs:41 |
import.records.names_as_own_manager(&id) |
Validation |
domains/identity/account/user/import.rs:43 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Invitation) refuses |
what ensure_may_open refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:175 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::ShutOut) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:124, through shut_out |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Registration) refuses |
what ensure_may_open refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:126 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:113 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::LetIn) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:106, through let_back_in |
self.status != UserStatus::Locked |
InvalidUserTransition { from : self.status, to : UserStatus::Active, }.into() |
domains/identity/account/user/directory.rs:108, through let_back_in |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_edit(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:39 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_allowed(&self.id, AccountAction::EditRecords) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:70 |
records.names_as_own_manager(&self.id) |
Validation |
domains/identity/account/user/profile.rs:72 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/account/user/mod.rs:518, through finish_onboarding > apply_transition |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != ImportState::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:358 |
expected != Some(outcome.end) || worked != taken |
Conflict |
domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:390, through ensure_covers |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_open(AccountOpening::Import) refuses |
what ensure_may_open refuses |
domains/identity/account/import/run.rs:186 |
The class as stored, with None for nothing declared.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/action.rs:248.
self |
Answer (ActionClass) |
Where |
Self::Undeclared |
None |
types/action.rs:250 |
Self::Declared(class) |
Some(class) |
types/action.rs:251 |
The event type, regardless of scope.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/events/event.rs:248.
self |
Answer (EventType) |
Where |
Self::Tenant { event,..} |
event.event_type() |
shared/events/event.rs:250 |
Self::Organization { event,..} |
event.event_type() |
shared/events/event.rs:251 |
Self::Platform { event,..} |
event.event_type() |
shared/events/event.rs:252 |
Where the event came from: outside any workflow, or from an execution’s work.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/events/event.rs:191.
self |
Answer (EventOrigin) |
Where |
Self::Tenant { origin,..} |
* origin |
shared/events/event.rs:193 |
Self::Organization {..} | Self::Platform {..} |
Outside |
shared/events/event.rs:194 |
The fact borrowed.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/choice/fact.rs:53.
self |
Answer (Fact) |
Where |
Self::Known(value) |
Fact::Known(value) |
types/choice/fact.rs:55 |
Self::Unknown |
Unknown |
types/choice/fact.rs:56 |
The same fact about something derived from it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/choice/fact.rs:44.
self |
Answer (Fact) |
Where |
Self::Known(value) |
Fact::Known(derive(value)) |
types/choice/fact.rs:46 |
Self::Unknown |
Unknown |
types/choice/fact.rs:47 |
The account or machine, as a principal.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/actor/person.rs:187.
self |
Answer (PrincipalRef) |
Where |
Self::Human(human) |
human.principal() |
types/actor/person.rs:189 |
Self::Agent(id) |
PrincipalRef::Agent(* id) |
types/actor/person.rs:190 |
Self::Consumer(id) |
PrincipalRef::Consumer(* id) |
types/actor/person.rs:191 |
Joined at now, or unchanged if it already joined.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/joining.rs:33.
self |
Answer (Joining) |
Where |
Self::NotYet |
Self::Joined { at : now } |
types/lifecycle/joining.rs:35 |
Self::Joined {..} |
self |
types/lifecycle/joining.rs:36 |
The token status alone, without the policy.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:90.
self |
Answer (TokenStatus) |
Where |
Self::Valid(_) | Self::ValidWithoutPassword |
Valid |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:92 |
Self::Expired |
Expired |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:93 |
Self::AlreadyUsed |
AlreadyUsed |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:94 |
Self::Invalid |
Invalid |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:95 |
The answer for a link that offers no password form, or None when the link is usable and the answer still needs the policy it will be held to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:79.
status |
Answer (PasswordLinkStatus) |
Where |
TokenStatus::Valid |
None |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:81 |
TokenStatus::Expired |
Some(Self::Expired) |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:82 |
TokenStatus::AlreadyUsed |
Some(Self::AlreadyUsed) |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:83 |
TokenStatus::Invalid |
Some(Self::Invalid) |
types/lifecycle/link_status.rs:84 |
The account of the person this refers to, or None for an agent or a consumer, which no person signs in as.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/actor/principal_ref.rs:100.
self |
Answer (HumanAccount) |
Where |
Self::User(id) |
Some(HumanAccount::User(* id)) |
types/actor/principal_ref.rs:102 |
Self::OrgUser(id) |
Some(HumanAccount::OrgUser(* id)) |
types/actor/principal_ref.rs:103 |
Self::Agent(_) | Self::Consumer(_) |
None |
types/actor/principal_ref.rs:104 |
What self may be when it sits under ceiling.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/model/restriction.rs:43.
ceiling |
self |
Answer (Restriction) |
Where |
Self::Unrestricted |
any |
Some(asked) |
shared/model/restriction.rs:48 |
Self::To(limit) |
Self::Unrestricted |
Some(Self::To(limit.clone())) |
shared/model/restriction.rs:49 |
Self::To(limit) |
Self::To(asked) |
fits(&asked, limit).then_some(Self::To(asked)) |
shared/model/restriction.rs:50 |
Revoked at now, or unchanged if it is already revoked.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:49.
self |
Answer (Revocation) |
Where |
Self::InForce |
Self::Revoked { at : now } |
types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:51 |
Self::Revoked {..} |
self |
types/lifecycle/revocation.rs:52 |
Refuses a URL whose host is an IP address this policy does not permit, or, where it permits no internal network, a name that can only be internal.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/security/ssrf.rs:89.
url.host() |
Answer (ValidationError) |
Where |
UrlHost::Address(ip) |
self.check_ip(ip, field) |
shared/security/ssrf.rs:91 |
UrlHost::Name(name) |
Err(internal_refused(field)) when self.0.is_empty() && is_never_public(name) |
shared/security/ssrf.rs:92 |
UrlHost::Name(_) |
Ok(()) |
shared/security/ssrf.rs:95 |
Fails with the first error from the chain, if any.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at shared/validation/validator.rs:472.
self.errors.into_iter().next() |
Answer (ValidationError) |
Where |
Some(err) |
Err(err) |
shared/validation/validator.rs:474 |
None |
Ok(()) |
shared/validation/validator.rs:475 |
Who made it, as the actor an audit record names.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/control.rs:144.
self |
Answer (ActorRef) |
Where |
Self::Person(person) |
ActorRef::from(person.account()) |
domains/messaging/control.rs:146 |
Self::Consumer(id) |
ActorRef::Service(* id) |
domains/messaging/control.rs:147 |
How messages are delivered.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/subscription.rs:246.
self.delivery |
Answer (DeliveryMode) |
Where |
SubscriptionDelivery::Pull |
Pull |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:248 |
SubscriptionDelivery::Push(_) |
Push |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:249 |
Refuses this subscription joining the group member belongs to unless the two read alike.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/messaging/subscription.rs:283.
same_group && reads_alike |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
true |
Ok(()) |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:291 |
false |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("messaging-a-consumer-group-s-subscriptions-filter", "a consumer group's subscriptions filter and acknowledge alike"))) |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:292 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/messaging/topic.rs:84.
- States:
Active, Paused, Archived
- Final, which no move leaves:
Archived
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Archived |
Topic::archive |
none read |
MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Delete |
Active to Paused |
Topic::pause |
none read |
MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Manage |
Paused to Active |
Topic::create, Topic::resume |
CreateUseCase (messaging) |
MessagingCreator, MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Manage |
Paused to Archived |
Topic::archive |
none read |
MessagingControl, MessagingAction::Delete |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/schema.rs:394 |
self.versions.len() >= MAX_VERSIONS |
Validation |
domains/messaging/schema.rs:396 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/schema.rs:434 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_create() refuses |
what ensure_may_create refuses |
domains/messaging/schema.rs:227 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
subscriber.ensure_may_subscribe() refuses |
what ensure_may_subscribe refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:159 |
ensure_subscribable(topic, clearance) refuses |
what ensure_subscribable refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:160 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:473 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:499, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_consume() refuses |
what ensure_may_consume refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:450 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:499, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:372 |
&self.delivery is not SubscriptionDelivery::Push(endpoint) |
Conflict |
domains/messaging/subscription.rs:374 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_active() |
Forbidden |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:319 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:414 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable |
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived |
InvalidTransition |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable |
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived |
InvalidTransition |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
creator.ensure_may_create() refuses |
what ensure_may_create refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:174 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:543 |
self.is_active() |
Conflict |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:545 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:376 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:561, through ensure_writable |
self.status == TopicStatus::Archived |
InvalidTransition |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:563, through ensure_writable |
data_class < self.data_class |
Forbidden |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:510 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(MessagingAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/messaging/topic.rs:395 |
What kind of place it posts to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:175.
self.0 |
Answer (DestinationKind) |
Where |
Target::Slack(_) |
Slack |
domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:177 |
Target::Teams(_) |
Teams |
domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:178 |
Target::Webhook {..} |
Webhook |
domains/notifications/destination/endpoint.rs:179 |
The record that mail was given up on, in the trail of the tenant it was sent for, or the platform’s for the platform’s own mail.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/events.rs:218.
sent_for |
Answer (DomainEvent) |
Where |
MailSentFor::Tenant(tenant_id) |
crate::shared::events::raised::scoped(tenant_id, body) |
domains/notifications/events.rs:227 |
MailSentFor::Platform |
DomainEvent::platform(Box::new(body)) |
domains/notifications/events.rs:230 |
The record it is about: the group offered, or none.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/notice.rs:65.
self |
Answer (AboutResource) |
Where |
Self::Nothing |
Nothing |
domains/notifications/notice.rs:67 |
Self::JoinGroup(group, _) |
AboutResource::Resource(* group.as_uuid()) |
domains/notifications/notice.rs:68 |
The category an event type belongs to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/category.rs:116.
event_type |
Answer (NotificationCategory) |
Where |
EventType::Identity(_) |
Identity |
domains/notifications/category.rs:118 |
EventType::Notifications(event) |
Self::of_notifications(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:119 |
EventType::Crypto(_) |
Crypto |
domains/notifications/category.rs:120 |
EventType::OAuth(_) |
OAuth |
domains/notifications/category.rs:121 |
EventType::Authorization(event) |
Self::of_authorization(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:122 |
EventType::Agents(_) |
Agents |
domains/notifications/category.rs:123 |
EventType::Federation(event) |
Self::of_federation(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:124 |
EventType::Routing(_) |
Routing |
domains/notifications/category.rs:125 |
EventType::Proxy(event) |
Self::of_proxy(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:126 |
EventType::Signals(_) |
Signals |
domains/notifications/category.rs:127 |
EventType::Webhooks(_) |
Webhooks |
domains/notifications/category.rs:128 |
EventType::Branding(event) |
Self::of_branding(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:129 |
EventType::Authentication(_) |
Authentication |
domains/notifications/category.rs:130 |
EventType::Organization(_) | EventType::Operator(_) |
Organization |
domains/notifications/category.rs:131 |
EventType::Tenant(event) |
Self::of_tenant(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:132 |
EventType::Messaging(event) |
Self::of_messaging(* event) |
domains/notifications/category.rs:133 |
EventType::Consumers(_) |
Consumers |
domains/notifications/category.rs:134 |
EventType::Workflows(_) |
Workflows |
domains/notifications/category.rs:135 |
The permission needed to see this category’s notifications in a tenant.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/notifications/category.rs:371.
self |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
Identity |
Users |
domains/notifications/category.rs:373 |
Crypto |
Crypto |
domains/notifications/category.rs:374 |
OAuth |
ApiKeys |
domains/notifications/category.rs:375 |
Authorization |
Roles |
domains/notifications/category.rs:376 |
Federation |
Federation |
domains/notifications/category.rs:377 |
Routing |
Routing |
domains/notifications/category.rs:378 |
Pipeline |
Pipeline |
domains/notifications/category.rs:379 |
Signals |
Signals |
domains/notifications/category.rs:380 |
Webhooks |
Webhooks |
domains/notifications/category.rs:381 |
Branding |
Branding |
domains/notifications/category.rs:382 |
Authentication |
AuthConfig |
domains/notifications/category.rs:383 |
Organization |
AuditLog |
domains/notifications/category.rs:384 |
Tenant |
TenantSettings |
domains/notifications/category.rs:385 |
Agents |
Agents |
domains/notifications/category.rs:386 |
Consumers |
Consumers |
domains/notifications/category.rs:387 |
Messaging |
Messaging |
domains/notifications/category.rs:388 |
Domains |
Domains |
domains/notifications/category.rs:389 |
Mtls |
Mtls |
domains/notifications/category.rs:390 |
Scim |
Scim |
domains/notifications/category.rs:391 |
Classification |
Classification |
domains/notifications/category.rs:392 |
Policy |
PolicySet |
domains/notifications/category.rs:393 |
Audit |
AuditLog |
domains/notifications/category.rs:394 |
Workflows |
Workflows |
domains/notifications/category.rs:395 |
How the person is reached, given the channel they chose for the category and whether their address was proved theirs.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/reach.rs:90.
self |
address |
Answer (NotificationChannel) |
Where |
Self::ByRights | Self::Addressed |
any |
chose |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:92 |
Self::OwnAccount |
MailAddress::Confirmed |
InAppAndEmail |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:93 |
Self::OwnAccount |
MailAddress::Unconfirmed |
InApp |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:94 |
How someone told about an event of event_type as told_as is reached: on their own account’s safety whatever they hold, and by their rights otherwise.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/notifications/reach.rs:62.
told_as |
Answer (NotificationReach) |
Where |
ToldAs::Subject |
OwnAccount when concerns_account_safety(event_type) |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:64 |
ToldAs::Addressee |
Addressed when is_addressed_notice(event_type) |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:65 |
ToldAs::Subject | ToldAs::Addressee | ToldAs::Overseer |
ByRights |
domains/notifications/reach.rs:66 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!by.is_member(&self.org_user_id) |
Forbidden |
domains/notifications/personal.rs:164 |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, UPDATES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/personal.rs:169 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(member.organization_id(), UPDATES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/personal.rs:101 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:185 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:338 |
self.state != from |
InvalidTransition |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:394, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:314 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:380 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, MANAGES_NOTIFICATIONS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:359 |
self.state != from |
InvalidTransition |
domains/notifications/destination.rs:394, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.operator() != &self.operator_id |
Forbidden |
domains/notifications/personal.rs:261 |
The token_endpoint_auth_method this is (RFC 7591 2).
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:47.
self |
Answer (TokenEndpointAuthMethod) |
Where |
Self::Secret(secret) |
match secret.sent_by { SecretSentBy::Basic => TokenEndpointAuthMethod::ClientSecretBasic, SecretSentBy::Post => TokenEndpointAuthMethod::ClientSecretPost, } |
domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:49 |
Self::PrivateKeyJwt(_) |
PrivateKeyJwt |
domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:53 |
Self::TlsClientAuth(_) |
TlsClientAuth |
domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:54 |
Self::Public |
None |
domains/oauth/clients/credential.rs:55 |
Whether the person’s consent covers a request, given what they recorded: a first-party client is covered without asking.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:57.
self |
recorded |
Answer (ConsentStanding) |
Where |
AskPerson |
Missing |
Missing |
|
FirstParty |
Missing |
Covers |
domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:60 |
| any |
Covers |
Covers |
domains/oauth/clients/settings.rs:60 |
Reads a state back from its stored status and approver.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:73.
status |
approved_by |
Answer (DeviceAuthState) |
Where |
DeviceAuthStatus::Approved |
Some(by) |
Ok(Self::Approved { by }) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:78 |
DeviceAuthStatus::Redeemed |
Some(by) |
Ok(Self::Redeemed { by }) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:79 |
DeviceAuthStatus::Pending |
None |
Ok(Self::Pending) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:80 |
DeviceAuthStatus::Denied |
None |
Ok(Self::Denied) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:81 |
DeviceAuthStatus::Expired |
None |
Ok(Self::Expired) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:82 |
| any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} device authorization has an approver that contradicts it"))) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:83 |
The built-in permission this right is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/oauth/control.rs:29.
self |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
| any |
ApiKeys |
domains/oauth/control.rs:31 |
The assurance the sign-in reached, when it is known.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:246.
&self.facts |
Answer (AssuranceLevel) |
Where |
SignInFacts::Stated { assurance,..} |
Some(* assurance) |
domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:248 |
SignInFacts::NotStated |
None |
domains/oauth/grants/id_token_grant.rs:249 |
What the person must still do before a code is issued, as facts say.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:275.
ask_consent is facts.consent == ConsentStanding::Missing || facts.prompts.asks(Prompt::Consent)
silent is facts.prompts.asks(Prompt::None)
ask_consent |
silent |
Answer (Interaction) |
Where |
true |
true |
Interaction::Refuse(AuthorizeRefusal::ConsentRequired) |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:287 |
true |
false |
Consent |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:288 |
false |
any |
IssueNow |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:289 |
The request for client, sending its answers to redirect_uri, asking asked, screened.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:142.
refusal(client, asked) |
Answer (RequestScreen) |
Where |
Some(refused) |
RequestScreen::TellClient(refused) |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:151 |
None |
Proceed |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_request.rs:152 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/oauth/grants/device_auth_status.rs:45.
- States:
Pending, Approved, Denied, Expired, Redeemed
- Final, which no move leaves:
Denied, Expired, Redeemed
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Approved to Redeemed |
DeviceAuthorization::redeem |
CollectDeviceTokensUseCase (oauth) |
none read |
Pending to Approved |
DeviceAuthorization::approve |
ApproveDeviceUseCase (oauth) |
SignedInPerson |
Pending to Denied |
DeviceAuthorization::deny |
DenyDeviceUseCase (oauth) |
SignedInPerson |
Pending to Expired |
DeviceAuthorization::expire |
ExpireDeviceAuthorizationsUseCase (oauth) |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/oauth/clients/status.rs:34.
- States:
Active, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
OAuthClient::revoke, OAuthClient::deregister |
RevokeUseCase (oauth) |
OAuthControl, OAuthRight::Revoke, SelfManagement |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!may |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:261 |
let Some(scope) = client.first_unallowed_scope(&scopes) |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:267 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* client.id() != params.client_id |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:232 |
ensure_tunnel_for(client, route) refuses |
what ensure_tunnel_for refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:237 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/access_token.rs:525 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_create(&key, control, now) refuses |
what ensure_may_create refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:163 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:362 |
self.standing != KeyStanding::Working |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:364 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:390 |
ensure_grantable(&self.scopes, control.holds().system()) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:391 |
self.standing == KeyStanding::Working |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:393 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:499 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/api_key.rs:476 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.is_consumed() |
AuthCodeError::AlreadyConsumed |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:463 |
self.is_expired(now) |
AuthCodeError::Expired |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:466 |
!client_may_exchange |
AuthCodeError::ClientRefused |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:484, through ensure_exchanged_by |
client.first_unallowed_scope(&self.scopes).is_some() |
AuthCodeError::ScopeWithdrawn |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:487, through ensure_exchanged_by |
!self.matches_redirect_uri(exchange.redirect_uri) |
AuthCodeError::RedirectMismatch |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:490, through ensure_exchanged_by |
!self.answers_challenge(exchange.verifier_challenge) |
AuthCodeError::VerifierMismatch |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:493, through ensure_exchanged_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_code_client(client, ¶ms.redirect_uri, ¶ms.scopes) refuses |
what ensure_code_client refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:217 |
session.signed_in(consenting.check) is not Some(person) |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/authorization_code.rs:220 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_signed_in_as(by, &user_id) refuses |
what ensure_signed_in_as refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:449 |
self.is_expired(now) |
DeviceAuthError::Expired |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:451 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_device_client(client, ¶ms.scopes) refuses |
what ensure_device_client refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:255 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_signed_in_as(by, &user_id) refuses |
what ensure_signed_in_as refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:477 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
too_soon |
DeviceAuthError::SlowDown |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:423 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!may_redeem |
DeviceAuthError::ClientRefused |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:509 |
self.is_expired(now) |
DeviceAuthError::Expired |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:512 |
self.state is not DeviceAuthState::Approved { by } |
DeviceAuthError::InvalidTransition(InvalidDeviceAuthTransition { from : self.status(), to : DeviceAuthStatus::Redeemed, },) |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:515 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/grants/device_authorization.rs:541, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
spent |
Unauthorized |
domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:215 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:102 |
new.lifetime.ensure_at_most(LONGEST_LIFETIME, "an initial access token") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:104 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:232 |
self.revocation.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/oauth/clients/registration.rs:234 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:172 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:607, through ensure_managed_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_self_registrable(&client.grant_types, &client.settings) refuses |
what ensure_self_registrable refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:200 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Revoke) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:446 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:592, through ensure_editable |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:596, through ensure_editable |
&self.credential is not ClientCredential::Secret(secret) |
Conflict |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:531 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(OAuthRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:592, through ensure_editable |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:596, through ensure_editable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/clients/client.rs:607, through ensure_managed_by |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:146 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:191, through ensure_given_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:69 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_holder(by, &self.user_id) refuses |
what ensure_holder refuses |
domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:173 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/oauth/clients/consent.rs:191, through ensure_given_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_refresh(client, code.client_id()) refuses |
what ensure_may_refresh refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:195 |
!code.is_consumed() |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:197 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_refresh(client, device.client_id()) refuses |
what ensure_may_refresh refuses |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:224 |
device.collected_by() is not Some(user_id) |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:226 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) |
Forbidden |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:505 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.belongs_to(client.id()) |
RefreshRefusal::OtherClient |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:409 |
!client.is_active() || !client.supports_grant_type(GrantType::RefreshToken) |
RefreshRefusal::ClientRefused |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:412 |
!self.binding.admits(&request.proof) |
RefreshRefusal::UnprovedKey |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:415 |
self.state is RefreshState::Rotated {..} |
self.reused(client, now) |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:440, through ensure_usable |
self.state is RefreshState::Revoked {..} |
RefreshRefusal::Revoked |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:441, through ensure_usable |
self.state is RefreshState::Active and now >= self.expires_at |
RefreshRefusal::Expired |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:442, through ensure_usable |
asked is RefreshScopes::Narrowed(_) |
RefreshRefusal::ScopeWidened |
domains/oauth/grants/refresh_token.rs:478, through kept_scopes |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
screen(Some(client), ¶meters.redirect_uri, ¶meters.asked) is RequestScreen::TellClient(refused) |
refused |
domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:187 |
screen(Some(client), ¶meters.redirect_uri, ¶meters.asked) is RequestScreen::TellBrowser |
AuthorizeRefusal::InvalidRequest |
domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:188 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.client_id != * client.id() |
PushedRefusal::OtherClient |
domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:299, through ensure_usable_by |
self.usage.is_used() |
PushedRefusal::Used |
domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:302, through ensure_usable_by |
now >= self.expires_at |
PushedRefusal::Expired |
domains/oauth/grants/pushed_request.rs:305, through ensure_usable_by |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/operator/status.rs:31.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
Operator::disable |
DisableOperatorUseCase (operator) |
OperatorAuthority |
Disabled to Active |
Operator::create, Operator::install_first, Operator::enable |
CreateOperatorUseCase (operator), InstallFirstOperatorUseCase (operator), EnableOperatorUseCase (operator) |
OperatorAuthority |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_tenant_allows_impersonation(tenant, tenant_id) refuses |
what ensure_tenant_allows_impersonation refuses |
domains/operator/impersonation.rs:158 |
ensure_within_window(expires_at, now) refuses |
what ensure_within_window refuses |
domains/operator/impersonation.rs:160 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* by.operator() != self.operator_id |
Forbidden |
domains/operator/impersonation.rs:443 |
self.revocation.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/operator/impersonation.rs:449 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_manages_another(&id) refuses |
what ensure_manages_another refuses |
domains/operator/identity.rs:63 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_manages_another(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_manages_another refuses |
domains/operator/identity.rs:183 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_manages_another(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_manages_another refuses |
domains/operator/identity.rs:202 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
holder.id() != by.operator() |
Forbidden |
domains/operator/api_key.rs:91 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* by.operator() != self.operator_id |
Forbidden |
domains/operator/api_key.rs:247, through revoke_without_event |
self.revocation.is_revoked() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/operator/api_key.rs:253, through revoke_without_event |
The account as a principal.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:50.
self |
Answer (PrincipalRef) |
Where |
Self::User(user) |
PrincipalRef::User(* user.id()) |
domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:52 |
Self::Member(now) |
PrincipalRef::OrgUser(* now.member.id()) |
domains/organization/members/account_now.rs:53 |
The cloud this credential opens.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:234.
self |
Answer (CloudProvider) |
Where |
Self::AwsAssumeRole {..} |
Aws |
domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:236 |
Self::GcpServiceAccount {..} |
Gcp |
domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:237 |
Self::AzureServicePrincipal {..} |
Azure |
domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:238 |
Self::DigitalOceanToken {..} |
DigitalOcean |
domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:239 |
Self::KubernetesServiceAccount {..} |
Kubernetes |
domains/organization/cloud/credential.rs:240 |
The cloud.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:163.
self |
Answer (CloudProvider) |
Where |
Self::Aws {..} |
Aws |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:165 |
Self::Gcp |
Gcp |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:166 |
Self::Azure |
Azure |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:167 |
Self::DigitalOcean |
DigitalOcean |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:168 |
Self::Kubernetes |
Kubernetes |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:169 |
Closes invitee’s account once this invitation ended without being accepted: it expired, was declined or was revoked.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:386.
self.status() |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
InvitationStatus::Expired | InvitationStatus::Declined | InvitationStatus::Revoked |
invitee.close_unanswered_invite() |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:394 |
InvitationStatus::Pending | InvitationStatus::Accepted |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("identity-only-an-invitation-nobody-accepted-closes", "only an invitation nobody accepted closes its account"))) |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:397 |
How far this role reaches into the organization’s tenants.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/organization/members/membership.rs:124.
self |
Answer (TenantReach) |
Where |
Viewer |
Nothing |
domains/organization/members/membership.rs:128 |
Billing |
Nothing |
domains/organization/members/membership.rs:128 |
Member |
Granted |
domains/organization/members/membership.rs:127 |
Admin |
Every |
domains/organization/members/membership.rs:126 |
Owner |
Every |
domains/organization/members/membership.rs:126 |
Records that a charge failed, so a payment is owed from now.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:437.
self.state |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
SubscriptionState::Trialing {..} |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("organization-nothing-is-charged-while-a-trial", "nothing is charged while a trial runs"))) |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:439 |
SubscriptionState::PastDue {..} |
Ok(()) |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:443 |
SubscriptionState::Active |
{ self.touch() ; self.state = SubscriptionState::PastDue { since : self.updated_at, } ; self.raised.raise_organization(OrgPaymentFailed { organization_id : self.organization_id, occurred_at : self.updated_at, }) ; Ok(()) } |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:444 |
Where the session opened here works.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/organization/access/landing.rs:86.
self |
Answer (SessionPlace) |
Where |
Self::Tenant(tenant) |
SessionPlace::Tenant(* tenant.id()) |
domains/organization/access/landing.rs:88 |
Self::Organization |
Organization |
domains/organization/access/landing.rs:89 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:44.
- States:
Active, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
OrgApiKey::revoke |
RevokeOrgUseCase (organization) |
ActedBy, OrgControl, OrgPermission::ApiKeys(OrgApiKeyAction::Revoke) |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/members/org_user_status.rs:115.
- States:
Invited, PendingVerification, Active, Locked, Deactivated, Closing
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Closing |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Locked |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Closing to Active |
OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation |
ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) |
VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress |
Closing to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Deactivated to Active |
OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation |
ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) |
VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress |
Deactivated to Invited |
OrgUser::reopen_for_invitation |
InviteOrgUserUseCase (organization) |
OrgControl, MemberAction::Invite, SystemPermission::Roles(RoleAction::Escalate) |
Invited to Active |
OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation |
ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) |
VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress |
Invited to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Locked to Active |
OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation |
ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) |
VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress |
Locked to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
PendingVerification to Active |
OrgUser::verify_email, OrgUser::confirm_as_installer, OrgUser::accept_invitation |
ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding), AcceptOrgUseCase (organization) |
VerifiedEmail, InstallerProof, AcceptedAddress |
PendingVerification to Deactivated |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/organization/status.rs:39.
- States:
Active, Suspended, Closed
- Final, which no move leaves:
Closed
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Closed |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Active to Suspended |
Organization::suspend_for_non_payment |
SuspendOverdueOrganizationsUseCase (organization) |
none read |
Suspended to Active |
Organization::lift_non_payment_suspension, Organization::create, Organization::create_installation |
ReceivePaymentNoticeUseCase (organization), ConfirmSignupUseCase (onboarding), FoundAnotherOrganizationUseCase (onboarding), InstallUseCase (onboarding) |
none read |
Suspended to Closed |
none read |
none read |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, UPDATE) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:310 |
ensure_credential_fits(&self.setup, &credential) refuses |
what ensure_credential_fits refuses |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:311 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&organization_id, UPDATE) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:224 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state.credential().cloned() is not Some(credential) |
Conflict |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:381 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state.credential().cloned() is not Some(credential) |
Conflict |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:338 |
let CloudBinding::Bound(tied) = &self.binding && * tied != identity |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/cloud/account.rs:346 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* organization.id() != self.organization_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:445, through ensure_organization |
ensure_tenant_of(organization, by.tenant_id()) refuses |
what ensure_tenant_of refuses |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:508 |
ensure_tenant_of(organization, account.tenant_id()) refuses |
what ensure_tenant_of refuses |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:509 |
!linked || account.email != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:589, through ensure_member_account |
account.email != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:512 |
self.is_linked_to(account.tenant_id()) |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:527, through ensure_not_linked |
self.links.iter().any(| link | link.user_id == account.user_id) |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:537, through ensure_not_linked |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_tenant_of(organization, first.tenant_id()) refuses |
what ensure_tenant_of refuses |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:281 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by is LinkRemoval::Holder(account) and !linked || account.email != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:589, through ensure_member_account |
by is LinkRemoval::Organization(acted) and ensure_platform_or_may(acted, &self.organization_id, OrgPermission::Members(MemberAction::Update),) refuses |
what ensure_platform_or_may refuses |
domains/organization/members/linked_identity.rs:561 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(¶ms.organization_id, OrgPermission::ApiKeys(OrgApiKeyAction::Create),) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:150 |
ensure_grantable(¶ms.scopes, &by.held()) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:155 |
params.expires_at.has_passed(crate::shared::clock::now()) |
Validation |
domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:157 |
ensure_within_parent(params.expires_at, by) refuses |
what ensure_within_parent refuses |
domains/organization/access/api_key.rs:162 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/branding.rs:142 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/branding.rs:159 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/branding.rs:180 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, CHANGES_BRANDING) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/branding.rs:193 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_in_person(member, by) refuses |
what ensure_in_person refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/consent.rs:79 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_on(member.id(), AccountAction::RecordForThem) refuses |
what ensure_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/consent.rs:97 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:349 |
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:354 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || * member.email() != self.sent_to |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:325 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:378 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_on(&self.org_user_id, AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:398 |
self.state != ErasureState::Held |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:400 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != ErasureState::Failed |
InvalidErasureTransition { from : self.status(), to : ErasureStatus::Processing, } |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:266 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state == ErasureState::Pending && now < self.scheduled_at |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:248 |
self.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:423, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_in_person(member, by) refuses |
what ensure_in_person refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:85 |
member.ensure_an_owner_stays(owners) refuses |
what ensure_an_owner_stays refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:86 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_on(member.id(), AccountAction::Erase) refuses |
what ensure_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:104 |
member.ensure_an_owner_stays(owners) refuses |
what ensure_an_owner_stays refuses |
domains/organization/members/privacy/erasure.rs:105 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&new.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:144 |
ensure_requests_unsigned(&new.config) refuses |
what ensure_requests_unsigned refuses |
domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:145 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:267 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:306 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, SIGN_IN_SETTINGS) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/access/identity_provider.rs:292 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for |
!still_may |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:307, through ensure_inviter_still_may |
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses |
what ensure_waiting refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:267 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(invitee.organization_id(), INVITE) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:108 |
ensure_may_hand_out(invitee.role(), by.by()) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:109 |
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses |
what ensure_waiting refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:110 |
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:111 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
presented != self.offer.token_hash() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:468 |
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for |
ensure_waiting(invitee) refuses |
what ensure_waiting refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:494, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent |
invitee.credentials_changed_at().since(self.created_at) |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:496, through ensure_unchanged_since_sent |
self.offer.state(now) == InvitationLifecycle::Pending |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:477 |
renewed.lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:482 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_platform_or_may(by, &self.organization_id, INVITE) refuses |
what ensure_platform_or_may refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:325 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* invitee.id() != self.org_user_id || * invitee.organization_id() != self.organization_id |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:281, through ensure_still_for |
* invitee.email() != self.email |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:287, through ensure_still_for |
by.ensure_may(&self.organization_id, INVITE) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:428 |
new_lifetime.ensure_at_most(MAX_INVITATION_LIFETIME, "an invitation") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/organization/members/invitation.rs:429 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.usage.is_used() |
Validation |
domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:202 |
self.purpose != expected |
Validation |
domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:209 |
now >= self.expires_at |
Validation |
domains/organization/access/passkey.rs:217 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id |
SignInRefused::ForAnotherAccount |
domains/organization/access/session.rs:485 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
member != * entry.member.id() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session.rs:189 |
params.lifetime.ensure_at_most(Duration::seconds(i64::from(MAX_SESSION_SECS)), "an organization session",) refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/organization/access/session.rs:194 |
ensure_may_enter(&entry, params.place) refuses |
what ensure_may_enter refuses |
domains/organization/access/session.rs:198 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || !proof.proves_recently(&own) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:48 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || proof.for_account(own).is_err() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:109 |
self.status != SessionStatus::Active || !self.progress.is_complete() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:115 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* member.id() != self.org_user_id || holder.subject() != own |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session/kept_through.rs:76 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!check.admits(from) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/access/session/switch.rs:53 |
ensure_may_enter(&to.entry, SessionPlace::Tenant(to.tenant_id)) refuses |
what ensure_may_enter refuses |
domains/organization/access/session/switch.rs:59 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state is not SubscriptionState::Trialing { ends_at } |
Conflict |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:392 |
crate::shared::clock::now() < ends_at |
Conflict |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:398 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state is SubscriptionState::Trialing {..} |
Conflict |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:439 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
founding.organization_id() != organization.id() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/billing/subscription.rs:177 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
Self::ensure_grantable(&request) refuses |
what ensure_grantable refuses |
domains/organization/members/tenant_grant.rs:85 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
founding.ensure_installation() refuses |
what ensure_installation refuses |
domains/organization/access/token.rs:116 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/organization/access/token.rs:298 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let Some(refused) = TokenRefused::of(self.state_for(holder, now)) |
refused |
domains/organization/access/token.rs:298, through redeem |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != OrgUserStatus::Invited |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:604 |
accepted.email() != self.email() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:610 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_edit_profile(self, by) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit_profile refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:39 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take_over(self, by) refuses |
what ensure_may_take_over refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:69 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.password_hash is not OrgPassword::Set(hash) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:129, through sign_in_with_password |
!hasher.verify(raw, hash)? |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:135, through sign_in_with_password |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take_over(self, by) refuses |
what ensure_may_take_over refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:43 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_edit_profile(self, by) refuses |
what ensure_may_edit_profile refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:197 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may_act_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:558 |
ensure_may_hand_out(role, by.by()) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:559 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may_act_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:410 |
to == OrgUserStatus::Invited |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:412 |
to == OrgUserStatus::Closing || self.status == OrgUserStatus::Closing |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:418 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.joining == Joining::NotYet |
Conflict |
domains/organization/members/org_user/profile.rs:138 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_bring_in(params.role, ¶ms.organization_id, added_by, MemberAction::Create,) refuses |
what ensure_may_bring_in refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:145 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!by.is_member(&self.id) || by.session().is_none() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:65, through ensure_hands_over_own |
by.ensure_genuine(&self.organization_id) refuses |
what ensure_genuine refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:70, through ensure_hands_over_own |
self.role != OrgRole::Owner |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:72, through ensure_hands_over_own |
ensure_may_inherit(self, heir) refuses |
what ensure_may_inherit refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user/ownership.rs:45 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_bring_in(params.role, ¶ms.organization_id, AddedBy::Member(* by), MemberAction::Invite,) refuses |
what ensure_may_bring_in refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:174 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Remove) refuses |
what ensure_may_act_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:487 |
by.is_member(&self.id) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:490 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_act_on(self, by, MemberAction::Invite) refuses |
what ensure_may_act_on refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:460 |
ensure_may_hand_out(role, by.by()) refuses |
what ensure_may_hand_out refuses |
domains/organization/members/org_user.rs:461 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
proof.as_email() != self.email() |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/members/org_user/credentials.rs:93 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(&self.id, OrgPermission::Organization(action)) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:543, through ensure_may_move |
to == OrganizationStatus::Active && matches !(self.suspended_by, Suspension::ByPlatform(_)) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:547, through ensure_may_move |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_organization_label(¶ms.slug, &[]) refuses |
what ensure_organization_label refuses |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:166 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.suspended_for_non_payment() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle/non_payment.rs:62 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_platform_or_may(by, &self.id, OrgPermission::Tenants(TenantAction::Delete)) refuses |
what ensure_platform_or_may refuses |
domains/organization/lifecycle/tenants.rs:61 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_may_update > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status == OrganizationStatus::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:561, through ensure_open |
by.ensure_may(&self.id, OrgPermission::Organization(OrganizationAction::AuthConfig),) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:377 |
by.session() is not Some(session) |
Forbidden |
domains/organization/lifecycle.rs:382 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
matches !(self.suspended_by, Suspension::ByPlatform(_)) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/organization/lifecycle/non_payment.rs:37 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
lifetime.ensure_at_most(LONGEST_LINK, "a sign-up link") refuses |
what ensure_at_most refuses |
domains/organization/signup.rs:90 |
Who the caller is in the tenant’s records.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/context.rs:108.
self |
Answer (PrincipalRef) |
Where |
Self::User { user_id,..} |
PrincipalRef::User(* user_id) |
domains/proxy/request/context.rs:110 |
Self::Agent { agent_id,..} |
PrincipalRef::Agent(* agent_id) |
domains/proxy/request/context.rs:111 |
Self::Consumer { consumer_id,..} |
PrincipalRef::Consumer(* consumer_id) |
domains/proxy/request/context.rs:112 |
Writes the answer onto ctx: its headers for whatever answers the request, and for a preflight the empty answer served instead of the upstream’s.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:91.
self |
Answer (StageDecision) |
Where |
Self::NotCrossOrigin |
pass("cors: not a cross-origin request") |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:93 |
Self::Allowed(headers) |
{ ctx.response_headers.extend(headers) ; pass("cors: origin allowed") } |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:94 |
Self::Preflight(headers) |
{ ctx.response_headers.extend(headers) ; ctx.response = ResponseSource::Ready(preflight_response()) ; pass("cors: preflight answered") } |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/cors.rs:98 |
The decision this stage takes on a client read as client: a pass when no automation was recognised, otherwise the configured action, a challenge to enroll as an agent among them.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:113.
self.action |
Answer (StageDecision) |
Where |
FingerprintAction::Allow |
StageDecision::Pass { reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} allowed by the stage"), } |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:121 |
FingerprintAction::Deny |
StageDecision::Deny { status : DenialStatus::FORBIDDEN, reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} refused"), } |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:124 |
FingerprintAction::Challenge |
StageDecision::Challenge { challenge_type : ChallengeType::DeviceEnroll, answer_at : AnswerAt::Retry, reason : format !("fingerprint: {what} must enroll as an agent"), } |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/fingerprint.rs:128 |
Whether the request proved possession of the key its credential is bound to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:26.
self |
Answer (DpopBinding) |
Where |
Self::Anonymous |
Unbound |
domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:28 |
Self::Proven(proven) |
proven.binding |
domains/proxy/request/identification.rs:29 |
The call method makes on target, the value of its target_parameter.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:117.
method |
target |
Answer (McpCall) |
Where |
McpMethod::AuthorityFree |
any |
Some(Self::AuthorityFree) |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:119 |
| any |
Fact::Unknown |
None |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:120 |
McpMethod::CallTool |
Fact::Known(name) |
Some(Self::Tool(name)) |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:121 |
McpMethod::ReadResource |
Fact::Known(uri) |
Some(Self::Resource(uri)) |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:122 |
McpMethod::GetPrompt |
Fact::Known(name) |
Some(Self::Prompt(name)) |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:123 |
The class of action the method is, when the method alone says it: reading a resource and fetching a prompt are reads.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:90.
self |
Answer (ActionClass) |
Where |
Self::ReadResource | Self::GetPrompt |
Some(ActionClass::Read) |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:92 |
Self::CallTool | Self::AuthorityFree |
None |
domains/proxy/stages/checks/mcp.rs:93 |
The stage decision the outcome comes to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:188.
self |
Answer (StageDecision) |
Where |
Self::Permit |
StageDecision::Pass { reason : "access_permitted".to_owned(), } |
domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:190 |
Self::Deny(code) |
code.decision() |
domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:193 |
Self::Challenge(challenge) |
challenge.decision() |
domains/proxy/access/decision.rs:194 |
The device a request names: the verified device certificate when the connection presented one, else the session’s trusted device.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/device.rs:34.
session_device |
Answer (RequestDevice) |
Where |
Fact::Known(device) |
Self::SessionTrusted(device) |
domains/proxy/request/device.rs:42 |
Fact::Unknown |
Unknown |
domains/proxy/request/device.rs:43 |
The trusted device the session recorded, when that is what names the device.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/request/device.rs:51.
self |
Answer (Fact) |
Where |
Self::SessionTrusted(device) |
Fact::Known(device) |
domains/proxy/request/device.rs:53 |
Self::Certified(_) | Self::Unknown |
Unknown |
domains/proxy/request/device.rs:54 |
Refuses this stage when it reads classification rules other than own, the tenant’s, or when the tenant has classified nothing.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:287.
own |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
TenantRules::Classified(own) |
Ok(()) when own == read |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:292 |
TenantRules::Classified(_) |
Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("proxy-stage-reads-another-tenants-rules", "the stage reads classification rules that are not this tenant's"))) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:293 |
TenantRules::Unclassified |
Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("proxy-stage-reads-no-rules", "the tenant has classified no fields, so the stage has no rules to read"))) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:297 |
The stage’s kind on its own, without its settings.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:211.
self |
Answer (StageKindName) |
Where |
Self::Waf(_) |
Waf |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:213 |
Self::GeoFence(_) |
GeoFence |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:214 |
Self::DevicePosture(_) |
DevicePosture |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:215 |
Self::Identity |
Identity |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:216 |
Self::DataClassify(_) |
DataClassify |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:217 |
Self::Policy |
Policy |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:218 |
Self::TokenExchange(_) |
TokenExchange |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:219 |
Self::RateLimit(_) |
RateLimit |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:220 |
Self::TokenRateLimit(_) |
TokenRateLimit |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:221 |
Self::StepUp(_) |
StepUp |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:222 |
Self::RequestSign(_) |
RequestSign |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:223 |
Self::Redact(_) |
Redact |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:224 |
Self::ResponseSign(_) |
ResponseSign |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:225 |
Self::Cache(_) |
Cache |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:226 |
Self::Custom(_) |
Custom |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:227 |
Self::Cors(_) |
Cors |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:228 |
Self::HoneypotRoutes(_) |
HoneypotRoutes |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:229 |
Self::ReconDetection(_) |
ReconDetection |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:230 |
Self::Fingerprint(_) |
Fingerprint |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:231 |
Self::SecurityHeaders(_) |
SecurityHeaders |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:232 |
Self::IpReputation(_) |
IpReputation |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:233 |
Self::CanaryToken(_) |
CanaryToken |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:234 |
Self::Terminate(_) |
Terminate |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:235 |
Self::GraphQl(_) |
GraphQl |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:236 |
Self::RequestTransform(_) |
RequestTransform |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:237 |
Self::ResponseTransform(_) |
ResponseTransform |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:238 |
Self::Mcp |
Mcp |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:239 |
Which chains this stage runs in.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:361.
self |
Answer (StagePhase) |
Where |
Self::Redact(_) | Self::ResponseSign(_) | Self::ResponseTransform(_) |
Response |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:363 |
Self::Cache(_) | Self::CanaryToken(_) | Self::TokenRateLimit(_) |
Both |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:367 |
Self::Waf(_) | Self::GeoFence(_) | Self::DevicePosture(_) | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify(_) | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange(_) | Self::RateLimit(_) | Self::StepUp(_) | Self::RequestSign(_) | Self::Custom(_) | Self::Cors(_) | Self::HoneypotRoutes(_) | Self::ReconDetection(_) | Self::Fingerprint(_) | Self::SecurityHeaders(_) | Self::IpReputation(_) | Self::Terminate(_) | Self::GraphQl(_) | Self::RequestTransform(_) | Self::Mcp |
Request |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind.rs:369 |
Checks that the settings this kind carries can do their job.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:46.
self |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
Self::Waf(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:48 |
Self::GeoFence(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:49 |
Self::TokenExchange(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:50 |
Self::RateLimit(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:51 |
Self::RequestSign(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:52 |
Self::ResponseSign(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:53 |
Self::Cache(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:54 |
Self::Cors(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:55 |
Self::HoneypotRoutes(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:56 |
Self::ReconDetection(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:57 |
Self::SecurityHeaders(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:58 |
Self::IpReputation(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:59 |
Self::CanaryToken(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:60 |
Self::Custom(c) |
c.validate() |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:61 |
Self::Identity | Self::DevicePosture(_) | Self::DataClassify(_) | Self::Policy | Self::TokenRateLimit(_) | Self::StepUp(_) | Self::Redact(_) | Self::Fingerprint(_) | Self::Terminate(_) | Self::GraphQl(_) | Self::RequestTransform(_) | Self::ResponseTransform(_) | Self::Mcp |
Ok(()) |
domains/proxy/stages/rules.rs:62 |
What this kind reads of a request body before the proxy decides, or None when it decides on the request line and headers alone.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:149.
self |
Answer (BodyReader) |
Where |
Self::Waf |
Some(BodyReader::Waf) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:151 |
Self::RequestSign |
Some(BodyReader::RequestSign) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:152 |
Self::Mcp |
Some(BodyReader::Mcp) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:153 |
Self::GraphQl |
Some(BodyReader::GraphQl) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:154 |
Self::GeoFence | Self::DevicePosture | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange | Self::RateLimit | Self::TokenRateLimit | Self::StepUp | Self::Redact | Self::ResponseSign | Self::Cache | Self::Custom | Self::Cors | Self::HoneypotRoutes | Self::ReconDetection | Self::Fingerprint | Self::SecurityHeaders | Self::IpReputation | Self::CanaryToken | Self::Terminate | Self::RequestTransform | Self::ResponseTransform |
None |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:155 |
Where this kind acts on the upstream’s answer, or None when it acts on the request alone.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:188.
self |
Answer (ResponseSlot) |
Where |
Self::Redact |
Some(ResponseSlot::Redact) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:190 |
Self::TokenRateLimit |
Some(ResponseSlot::ChargeTokens) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:191 |
Self::ResponseTransform |
Some(ResponseSlot::Transform) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:192 |
Self::CanaryToken |
Some(ResponseSlot::CanaryScan) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:193 |
Self::ResponseSign |
Some(ResponseSlot::Sign) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:194 |
Self::Cache |
Some(ResponseSlot::CacheStore) |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:195 |
Self::Waf | Self::GeoFence | Self::DevicePosture | Self::Identity | Self::DataClassify | Self::Policy | Self::TokenExchange | Self::RateLimit | Self::StepUp | Self::RequestSign | Self::Custom | Self::Cors | Self::HoneypotRoutes | Self::ReconDetection | Self::Fingerprint | Self::SecurityHeaders | Self::IpReputation | Self::Terminate | Self::GraphQl | Self::RequestTransform | Self::Mcp |
None |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/kind_name.rs:196 |
Decides one request.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:49.
screened(question) |
Answer (AccessDecision) |
Where |
Ok(requester) |
tenant::ruled(question, &requester) |
domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:51 |
Err(code) |
AccessDecision::refused(code) |
domains/proxy/access/mod.rs:52 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:53.
- States:
Active, Paused
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Paused |
LogShippingTarget::pause |
none read |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update |
Paused to Active |
LogShippingTarget::create, LogShippingTarget::resume |
CreateLogTargetUseCase (proxy) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Create, RoutingRight::Update |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/proxy/pipeline_status.rs:40.
- States:
Draft, Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
Pipeline::disable |
ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline |
Disabled to Active |
Pipeline::activate |
ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline |
Disabled to Draft |
Pipeline::with_defaults |
ConfigureUseCase (proxy), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::CreatePipeline |
Draft to Active |
Pipeline::activate |
ImportConfigUseCase (gateway) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/issued.rs:38 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:271 |
settings.destination.ensure_reachable_with(&settings.credential) refuses |
what ensure_reachable_with refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:272 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:126 |
settings.destination.ensure_reachable_with(&settings.credential) refuses |
what ensure_reachable_with refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:127 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:340 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:351, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:290 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/log_shipping/mod.rs:351, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:292 |
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.pipeline_id() != self.id) |
PipelineError::ForeignRoute |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:367, through ensure_its_own |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
stage.mandatory() |
PipelineError::CannotAddMandatory |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:403 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::DeletePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:352 |
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.pipeline_id() != self.id) |
PipelineError::ForeignRoute |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:367, through ensure_its_own |
!routes.is_empty() |
PipelineError::InUse |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:355 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:319 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing |
an error |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:514 |
stage.mandatory() |
PipelineError::CannotRemoveMandatory |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:521 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing |
an error |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:485 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
self.stages.iter_mut().find(| s | s.id() == stage_id) is missing |
an error |
domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:35 |
stage.mandatory() |
PipelineError::CannotReconfigureMandatory |
domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:41 |
stage.kind().name() != kind.name() |
PipelineError::OtherKind |
domains/proxy/pipeline/settings.rs:44 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
self.stages.iter().enumerate().find(|(_, s) | s.id() == stage_id) is missing |
an error |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:451 |
stage.mandatory() |
PipelineError::CannotRemoveMandatory |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:459 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:191 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:375, through require_mutable |
!self.status.allows_mutation() |
PipelineError::ActivePipelineImmutable |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:377, through require_mutable |
!names_each_stage_once || !self.stages.iter().all(| s | named.contains(s.id())) |
PipelineError::IncompleteOrder |
domains/proxy/pipeline/order.rs:52 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may(by, RoutingRight::CreatePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/pipeline.rs:92 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
removal.ensure_fits(&kind) refuses |
what ensure_fits refuses |
domains/proxy/stages/stage/mod.rs:184 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::ChangePipeline) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/proxy/issued.rs:76 |
The claim for the service service, whose assertions are set to name audience.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:40.
audience |
Answer (AssertionAudienceClaim) |
Where |
AssertionAudience::ServiceId |
Self::Service(service) |
domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:42 |
AssertionAudience::Named(name) |
Self::Named(name) |
domains/routing/backend/assertion.rs:43 |
Whether this policy lets request out.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/egress.rs:304.
request.agent_mark |
Answer (EgressDecision) |
Where |
AgentMark::Unattributed |
EgressDecision::Deny(EgressDenial::Unattributed) when self.max_data_class < DataClassLevel::Restricted |
domains/routing/egress.rs:313 |
AgentMark::Marked(mark) |
EgressDecision::Deny(EgressDenial::DataTooSensitive) when mark > self.max_data_class |
domains/routing/egress.rs:316 |
AgentMark::Unattributed | AgentMark::Marked(_) |
Allow |
domains/routing/egress.rs:319 |
What this way of picking asks of the sticky key.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:43.
self |
Answer (StickyKeyNeed) |
Where |
RoundRobin |
Either |
domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:45 |
LeastConnections |
Refused |
domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:46 |
ConsistentHash |
Required |
domains/routing/backend/balancing.rs:47 |
What kind of action this route takes.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:50.
self.reach |
self.action_class |
Answer (DeclaredAction) |
Where |
RouteReach::OpenEnded |
DeclaredAction::Declared(declared) |
DeclaredAction::Declared(declared) when declared.is_high_risk() |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:52 |
RouteReach::OpenEnded |
any |
DeclaredAction::Declared(ActionClass::Communicate) |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:57 |
RouteReach::Fixed |
any |
declared |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:58 |
How a signed-in caller stands against this policy.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/policy.rs:94.
self |
Answer (PolicyStanding) |
Where |
Self::Public | Self::Authenticated |
Met |
domains/routing/policy.rs:96 |
Self::RequireSystemPermission(wanted) |
one_of(wanted, | permission | holds_system(caller, permission)) |
domains/routing/policy.rs:97 |
Self::RequireCustomPermission(wanted) |
one_of(wanted, | permission | holds_custom(caller, permission)) |
domains/routing/policy.rs:100 |
Self::RequireScope(wanted) |
scope_standing(wanted, caller) |
domains/routing/policy.rs:103 |
The built-in permission this right is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/routing/control.rs:40.
self |
Answer (SystemPermission) |
Where |
Create |
Routing |
domains/routing/control.rs:42 |
Update |
Routing |
domains/routing/control.rs:43 |
Delete |
Routing |
domains/routing/control.rs:44 |
CreatePipeline |
Pipeline |
domains/routing/control.rs:45 |
ChangePipeline |
Pipeline |
domains/routing/control.rs:48 |
DeletePipeline |
Pipeline |
domains/routing/control.rs:45 |
What the gateway does with caller on a route that checks policy on the wire.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/stream/access.rs:121.
self |
caller |
Answer (StreamVerdict) |
Where |
Self::AnyHolder |
any |
Admit when policy == StreamPolicy::Public |
domains/routing/stream/access.rs:127 |
Self::AnyHolder |
StreamCaller::UnnamedCertificate | StreamCaller::Consumer(_) |
Admit |
domains/routing/stream/access.rs:128 |
Self::People(rule) |
StreamCaller::Person |
StreamVerdict::CheckPolicy(rule) |
domains/routing/stream/access.rs:131 |
Self::Consumers(named) |
StreamCaller::Consumer(id) |
Admit when named.names(id) |
domains/routing/stream/access.rs:132 |
Self::AnyHolder | Self::People(_) | Self::Consumers(_) |
any |
Refuse |
domains/routing/stream/access.rs:135 |
Checks a request against a route’s rules.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:131.
request.body |
Answer (ParameterViolation) |
Where |
BodyFields::None |
Ok(()) |
domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:154 |
BodyFields::Unreadable |
Err(ParameterViolation::BodyUnreadable) |
domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:155 |
BodyFields::Fields(fields) |
{ ensure_unique_keys("body", fields.iter().map(|(name, _) | name.as_str()))? ; fields.iter().try_for_each(|(name, value) | judge_body(rules, name, value)) } |
domains/routing/matching/parameter/screening.rs:156 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:63.
- States:
Active, Revoked
- Final, which no move leaves:
Revoked
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Revoked |
PrivateConnector::revoke |
RevokeUseCase (routing) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/routing/route_status.rs:33.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
Route::disable, Service::disable, StreamRoute::disable |
DisableUseCase (routing), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), SetStatusUseCase (routing) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Update |
Disabled to Active |
Route::create, Route::activate, Service::create, Service::activate, StreamRoute::create, StreamRoute::activate |
CreateUseCase (routing), ImportConfigUseCase (gateway), ActivateUseCase (routing), SetStatusUseCase (routing) |
RoutingControl, RoutingRight::Create, RoutingRight::Update |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/egress.rs:271 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/egress.rs:112 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/egress.rs:289 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/egress.rs:251 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/egress.rs:235 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:367 |
self.status == ConnectorStatus::Revoked |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:422, through ensure_active |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:136 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:402 |
self.status == ConnectorStatus::Active |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:404 |
reaching > 0 |
Conflict |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:410 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.enrollment is not ConnectorEnrollment::Awaiting { code_hash, expires_at, } |
enrollment_refused() |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:292 |
self.status != ConnectorStatus::Active || now >= * expires_at || code_hash != code |
enrollment_refused() |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:295 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.enrollment is not ConnectorEnrollment::Enrolled { key : enrolled, certificate_expires_at, enrolled_at, } |
renewal_refused() |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:330 |
self.status != ConnectorStatus::Active || enrolled != key |
renewal_refused() |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:333 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/connector/mod.rs:384 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:415 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/conditions.rs:36 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:303 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:591 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:569 |
ensure_matchable(&pattern) refuses |
what ensure_matchable refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:570 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:530 |
* service.id() != self.service_id |
Conflict |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:532 |
pipeline.pipeline_id() != self.pipeline_id |
Conflict |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:538 |
ensure_audience_pinned(&policy, service.upstream()) refuses |
what ensure_audience_pinned refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:543 |
ensure_cache_private(&policy, pipeline) refuses |
what ensure_cache_private refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:544 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:610 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:77 |
self.workflow_use == WorkflowUse::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:79 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
Self::ensure_creatable(¶ms, service, pipeline, by) refuses |
what ensure_creatable refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:122 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:82 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:37 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:108 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:457, through ensure_deletable |
self.is_active() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:459, through ensure_deletable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:434 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/attack.rs:120 |
!self.attack_mode.in_force_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/route/attack.rs:122 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:334 |
ensure_cache_private(&self.policy, pipeline) refuses |
what ensure_cache_private refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:335 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:501 |
ensure_audience_pinned(&self.policy, service.upstream()) refuses |
what ensure_audience_pinned refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:502 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:52 |
self.workflow_use == WorkflowUse::Open |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/route/workflows.rs:54 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/mod.rs:625 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:136 |
ensure_ruled_once(&rules) refuses |
what ensure_ruled_once refuses |
domains/routing/route/declarations.rs:137 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/route/attack.rs:98 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:353 |
* accepted.owner() == self.id |
Validation |
domains/routing/service.rs:360 |
!self.app_sign_in.is_unset() |
own_or_borrowed() |
domains/routing/service.rs:366 |
accepted.needs_own_audience() && self.upstream.expected_audience().is_none() |
audience_required() |
domains/routing/service.rs:369 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:426 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:317 |
turning_on && self.upstream.expected_audience().is_none() |
audience_required() |
domains/routing/service.rs:320 |
turning_on && !self.accepted_sign_in.is_unset() |
own_or_borrowed() |
domains/routing/service.rs:323 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:398 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:111 |
params.upstream.ensure_consistent() refuses |
what ensure_consistent refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:112 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:473 |
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.service_id() != self.id) |
Conflict |
domains/routing/service.rs:507, through ensure_own |
accepting.iter().any(| other | other.accepts_app_sign_in_of() != Some(&self.id)) |
Conflict |
domains/routing/service.rs:479 |
!routes.is_empty() |
Conflict |
domains/routing/service.rs:485 |
!accepting.is_empty() |
Conflict |
domains/routing/service.rs:491 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:439 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:413 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:283 |
routes.iter().any(| route | * route.service_id() != self.id) |
Conflict |
domains/routing/service.rs:507, through ensure_own |
upstream.ensure_consistent() refuses |
what ensure_consistent refuses |
domains/routing/service.rs:285 |
self.needs_audience() && upstream.expected_audience().is_none() |
audience_required() |
domains/routing/service.rs:287 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:510 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:308 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:493 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:472 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:162 |
self.workflow_use == StreamWorkflowUse::Closed |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:164 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:172 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:542 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:524 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:128 |
!matches !(self.access, StreamAccess::People(_)) |
Validation |
domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:130 |
self.workflow_use == StreamWorkflowUse::Open |
InvalidTransition |
domains/routing/stream/workflows.rs:136 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:429 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(RoutingRight::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/routing/stream/mod.rs:449 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/scheduling/job_status.rs:35.
- States:
Pending, Running, Completed, Failed, Dead, Superseded
- Final, which no move leaves:
Completed, Superseded
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Dead to Pending |
ScheduledJob::new, ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon, ScheduledJob::retry |
AddDomainUseCase (domain), AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), ApproveUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), FanOutUseCase (notifications), FireSchedulesUseCase (workflows), PlanAccountChecksUseCase (workflows), PlanBackChannelUseCase (oauth), PlanEventStartsUseCase (workflows), PlanPushesUseCase (messaging), PlanStreamsUseCase (audit), PlanUseCase (signals), PlanUseCase (tenant), PlanUseCase (webhooks), ReconcileUseCase (scheduling), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), RequestForOrgUseCase (audit), RequestForPlatformUseCase (audit), RequestForTenantUseCase (audit), RequestTlsUseCase (domain), RerunUseCase (workflows), ResumeUseCase (agents), RetryUseCase (domain), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunStepUseCase (tenant), RunUseCase (workflows), SaveUseCase (workflows), SaveVersionUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StartTrialUseCase (workflows), StartUseCase (identity), StartUseCase (tenant), StartUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling), RetryDeadUseCase (scheduling) |
none read |
Dead to Superseded |
ScheduledJob::supersede |
none read |
none read |
Failed to Dead |
ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon |
ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) |
none read |
Failed to Pending |
ScheduledJob::new, ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon, ScheduledJob::retry |
AddDomainUseCase (domain), AgentUseCase (agents), ApproveActionUseCase (agents), ApproveItemsUseCase (workflows), ApproveStepUseCase (workflows), ApproveUseCase (agents), CancelUseCase (workflows), CreateUseCase (workflows), DenyActionUseCase (agents), DenyStepUseCase (workflows), DenyUseCase (agents), DriveUseCase (workflows), FanOutUseCase (notifications), FireSchedulesUseCase (workflows), PlanAccountChecksUseCase (workflows), PlanBackChannelUseCase (oauth), PlanEventStartsUseCase (workflows), PlanPushesUseCase (messaging), PlanStreamsUseCase (audit), PlanUseCase (signals), PlanUseCase (tenant), PlanUseCase (webhooks), ReconcileUseCase (scheduling), ReplyToCallUseCase (agents), RequestForOrgUseCase (audit), RequestForPlatformUseCase (audit), RequestForTenantUseCase (audit), RequestTlsUseCase (domain), RerunUseCase (workflows), ResumeUseCase (agents), RetryUseCase (domain), RetryUseCase (workflows), RunCodeUseCase (workflows), RunStepUseCase (tenant), RunUseCase (workflows), SaveUseCase (workflows), SaveVersionUseCase (workflows), SettleAgentRunUseCase (workflows), SettleFinishedRunUseCase (workflows), SettlePassUseCase (workflows), StartByHandUseCase (workflows), StartOnEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows), StartOnTriggerUseCase (workflows), StartOnWebhookUseCase (workflows), StartTestUseCase (workflows), StartTrialUseCase (workflows), StartUseCase (identity), StartUseCase (tenant), StartUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling), RetryDeadUseCase (scheduling) |
none read |
Pending to Running |
ScheduledJob::mark_running |
none read |
none read |
Running to Completed |
ScheduledJob::mark_completed |
ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) |
none read |
Running to Failed |
ScheduledJob::mark_failed, ScheduledJob::abandon |
ProcessJobsUseCase (scheduling) |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != JobStatus::Dead |
Conflict |
domains/scheduling/job.rs:339 |
self.max_attempts.checked_add(1) is not Some(more) |
Conflict |
domains/scheduling/job.rs:345 |
The signal it goes out as.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/report.rs:33.
self |
Answer (SignalEvent) |
Where |
Self::RiskLevel(current) |
SignalEvent::RiskLevelChanged { current } |
domains/signals/report.rs:35 |
Self::CredentialCompromised(credential) |
SignalEvent::CredentialCompromised { credential } |
domains/signals/report.rs:36 |
Self::DeviceCompromised |
DeviceCompromised |
domains/signals/report.rs:39 |
The type streams subscribe to.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/signal.rs:195.
self |
Answer (SecuritySignalType) |
Where |
Self::AssuranceChanged {..} |
AssuranceChanged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:197 |
Self::CredentialCompromised {..} |
CredentialCompromised |
domains/signals/signal.rs:198 |
Self::IdentifierChanged |
IdentifierChanged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:199 |
Self::AccountPurged |
AccountPurged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:200 |
Self::SessionRevoked |
SessionRevoked |
domains/signals/signal.rs:201 |
Self::SessionSuspended |
SessionSuspended |
domains/signals/signal.rs:202 |
Self::CredentialChanged {..} |
CredentialChanged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:203 |
Self::AccountLocked |
AccountLocked |
domains/signals/signal.rs:204 |
Self::AccountDisabled |
AccountDisabled |
domains/signals/signal.rs:205 |
Self::PermissionsChanged {..} |
PermissionsChanged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:206 |
Self::DeviceCompromised |
DeviceCompromised |
domains/signals/signal.rs:207 |
Self::TokenCompromised |
TokenCompromised |
domains/signals/signal.rs:208 |
Self::RiskLevelChanged {..} |
RiskLevelChanged |
domains/signals/signal.rs:209 |
Whether the endpoint has shown it is the receiver’s.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/signals/stream.rs:399.
self.verification |
Answer (StreamVerificationStatus) |
Where |
EndpointVerification::Pending(_) |
Pending |
domains/signals/stream.rs:401 |
EndpointVerification::Verified |
Verified |
domains/signals/stream.rs:402 |
The subjects a new stream starts with.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/signals/subjects.rs:46.
default |
Answer (StreamSubjects) |
Where |
All |
AllExcept |
domains/signals/subjects.rs:48 |
None |
Only |
domains/signals/subjects.rs:49 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/signals/stream.rs:184.
- States:
Active, Paused, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves:
Disabled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
SignalStream::disable, SignalStream::record_failure |
DisableUseCase (signals), DispatchSignalUseCase (signals) |
SignalsControlCheck |
Active to Paused |
SignalStream::pause |
PauseUseCase (signals) |
SignalsControlCheck |
Paused to Active |
SignalStream::register, SignalStream::resume |
RegisterUseCase (signals), ResumeUseCase (signals) |
SignalsControlCheck |
Paused to Disabled |
SignalStream::disable, SignalStream::record_failure |
DisableUseCase (signals), DispatchSignalUseCase (signals) |
SignalsControlCheck |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_fits_the_subject(&subject, &event) refuses |
what ensure_fits_the_subject refuses |
domains/signals/signal.rs:383 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_manage refuses |
domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:54 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.verification is not EndpointVerification::Pending(challenge) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/signals/stream.rs:496 |
challenge != echoed |
Forbidden |
domains/signals/stream.rs:502 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:591 |
self.status != StreamStatus::Disabled |
Conflict |
domains/signals/stream.rs:593 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:556 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:520 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:313 |
ensure_names_a_type(¶ms.signal_types) refuses |
what ensure_names_a_type refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:314 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_manage refuses |
domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:85 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_manage(&self.id) refuses |
what ensure_may_manage refuses |
domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:119 |
!self.is_delivering() |
Conflict |
domains/signals/stream/receiver_requests.rs:121 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream.rs:539 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:47 |
let Some(signal_types) = &update.signal_types and ensure_names_a_type(signal_types) refuses |
what ensure_names_a_type refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:52 |
let Some(delivery_method) = update.delivery_method and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:109, through change_delivery_method |
let Some(authorization) = update.authorization and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:125, through change_authorization |
let Some(signal_types) = update.signal_types and by.ensure_may_change_streams() refuses |
what ensure_may_change_streams refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:143, through replace_signal_types |
let Some(signal_types) = update.signal_types and ensure_names_a_type(&signal_types) refuses |
what ensure_names_a_type refuses |
domains/signals/stream/changes.rs:144, through replace_signal_types |
Who renews it: the platform for one from ACME, the tenant for one it uploaded.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:212.
self.source |
Answer (Renewal) |
Where |
CertificateSource::Acme |
ByPlatform |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:214 |
CertificateSource::Uploaded(_) |
ByTenant |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:215 |
The jurisdiction this region sits in.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:143.
self |
Answer (DataResidency) |
Where |
UsEast1 |
Us |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:145 |
UsWest2 |
Us |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:145 |
CaCentral1 |
Canada |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:146 |
EuWest1 |
Eu |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147 |
EuWest2 |
Uk |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:150 |
EuWest3 |
Eu |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147 |
EuCentral1 |
Eu |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147 |
EuCentral2 |
Switzerland |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:151 |
EuNorth1 |
Eu |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147 |
EuSouth1 |
Eu |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:147 |
SaEast1 |
Brazil |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:152 |
ApSouth1 |
India |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:153 |
ApNortheast1 |
Japan |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:154 |
ApSoutheast2 |
Australia |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:156 |
ApSoutheast1 |
Singapore |
domains/tenant/provisioning/infrastructure/placement.rs:155 |
Reads a proof back from its stored status and times.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:123.
status |
verified_at |
failed_at |
Answer (DomainProof) |
Where |
VerificationStatus::Pending |
None |
None |
Ok(Self::Unproved) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:129 |
VerificationStatus::Verified |
Some(at) |
None |
Ok(Self::Verified { at }) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:130 |
VerificationStatus::Failed |
Some(verified_at) |
Some(failed_at) |
Ok(Self::Lost { verified_at, failed_at, }) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:131 |
| any |
any |
any |
Err(DomainError::infra_msg(format !("stored {status:?} domain has proof times that contradict it"))) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:135 |
The record type this value answers as.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:296.
self |
Answer (RecordKind) |
Where |
Self::Address(address) |
Aaaa when address.is_ipv6() |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:298 |
Self::Address(_) |
A |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:299 |
Self::Alias(_) |
Cname |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:300 |
Self::Text(_) |
Txt |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:301 |
Self::Mail(_) |
Mx |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:302 |
Self::Service(_) |
Srv |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:303 |
Self::Authority(_) |
Caa |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:304 |
The value of kind that a zone file spelling names.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:342.
kind |
Answer (RecordValue) |
Where |
RecordKind::A | RecordKind::Aaaa |
Self::parse_address(kind, value) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:346 |
RecordKind::Cname |
Ok(Self::Alias(host(value)?)) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:347 |
RecordKind::Txt |
Ok(Self::Text(TxtValue::new(value)?)) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:348 |
RecordKind::Mx |
Self::parse_mail(value) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:349 |
RecordKind::Srv |
Self::parse_service(value) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:350 |
RecordKind::Caa |
Self::parse_authority(value) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/value.rs:351 |
Refuses renewing this domain’s certificate.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:97.
self.tls_status |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
TlsStatus::NotRequired |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("tenant-never-asked-for-a-certificate-so", format !("{} never asked for a certificate, so there is none to renew", self.domain)))) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:108 |
TlsStatus::NoCertificate |
Err(DomainError::conflict(message !("tenant-had-its-certificate-removed-so-there", format !("{} had its certificate removed, so there is none to renew", self.domain)))) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:115 |
TlsStatus::Provisioning | TlsStatus::Active | TlsStatus::Expired |
Ok(()) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:122 |
What proves this domain is its tenant’s, the first time and on every later check.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:388.
self.connection |
Answer (ProofRoute) |
Where |
DomainConnection::SelfManaged |
Token |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:393 |
DomainConnection::Delegated |
Delegation |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:394 |
The record a bare domain uses, when the tenant holds the zone and an address is known.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:189.
self |
Answer (TrafficRecord) |
Where |
Self::SelfManaged { address,..} |
address.known() |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:191 |
Self::Delegated {..} |
None |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:192 |
The record a subdomain uses, when the tenant holds the zone.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:179.
self |
Answer (TrafficRecord) |
Where |
Self::SelfManaged { alias,..} |
Some(alias) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:181 |
Self::Delegated {..} |
None |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/traffic_record.rs:182 |
What we answer for name and kind.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:114.
self.zone_for(name) |
Answer (Resolution) |
Where |
Some(zone) |
resolve(zone, &self.authority, name, kind) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:116 |
None |
Refused |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/dns_zone/catalog.rs:117 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/status.rs:110.
- States:
Provisioning, Active, Suspended, Archived, Deleted
- Final, which no move leaves:
Deleted
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Archived |
Tenant::archive |
ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) |
Steward |
Active to Suspended |
Tenant::suspend |
SuspendTenantUseCase (tenant) |
Steward |
Archived to Active |
Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore |
ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) |
Steward |
Archived to Deleted |
Tenant::delete, Tenant::delete_early |
DeleteArchivedUseCase (tenant) |
Steward |
Provisioning to Active |
Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore |
ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) |
Steward |
Provisioning to Archived |
Tenant::archive |
ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) |
Steward |
Suspended to Active |
Tenant::activate, Tenant::reactivate, Tenant::restore |
ActivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RunStepUseCase (tenant), ReactivateTenantUseCase (tenant), RestoreTenantUseCase (tenant) |
Steward |
Suspended to Archived |
Tenant::archive |
ArchiveTenantUseCase (tenant), ChangeOrganizationStatusUseCase (organization) |
Steward |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/verification_status.rs:98.
- States:
NotRequired, Provisioning, Active, Expired, NoCertificate
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Expired |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_expired |
RenewUseCase (domain) |
none read |
Active to NoCertificate |
RegisteredDomain::remove_uploaded |
RemoveUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
Expired to Active |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded |
ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
Expired to NoCertificate |
RegisteredDomain::remove_uploaded |
RemoveUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
Expired to Provisioning |
none read |
none read |
none read |
NoCertificate to Active |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded |
ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
NoCertificate to Provisioning |
none read |
none read |
none read |
NotRequired to Active |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded |
ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
NotRequired to Provisioning |
none read |
none read |
none read |
Provisioning to Active |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_active, RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_renewed, RegisteredDomain::serve_uploaded |
ProvisionPendingTlsUseCase (domain), ProvisionTlsUseCase (domain), RenewUseCase (domain), UploadUseCase (domain) |
TenantControl, TenantArea::Domains |
Provisioning to Expired |
RegisteredDomain::mark_tls_expired |
RenewUseCase (domain) |
none read |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/tenant/custom_domains/verification_status.rs:37.
- States:
Pending, Verified, Failed
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Failed to Verified |
RegisteredDomain::mark_verified, RegisteredDomain::prove_on_arrival |
RetryUseCase (domain), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), AddDomainUseCase (domain) |
none read |
Pending to Verified |
RegisteredDomain::mark_verified, RegisteredDomain::prove_on_arrival |
RetryUseCase (domain), VerifyDomainUseCase (domain), AddDomainUseCase (domain) |
none read |
Verified to Failed |
RegisteredDomain::mark_verification_failed |
DomainHealthCheckUseCase (domain) |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_trusted(scope, by, proof) refuses |
what ensure_trusted refuses |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:158 |
new.existing_streams >= MAX_AUDIT_STREAMS |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:160 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:299 |
!self.is_sending() |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_trusted(scope, by, proof) refuses |
what ensure_trusted refuses |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:272 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_sending() |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.is_sending() |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:403, through ensure_sending |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:339 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::AuditStreaming) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:314 |
self.is_sending() |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/audit_streams.rs:316 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:136 |
domain.verification_status() != VerificationStatus::Verified |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/certificate.rs:138 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* from.id() != self.from || * to.id() != self.to |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:125 |
let HandoverOfferState::Accepted {..} = self.state |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:157, through ensure_open_at |
now >= self.expires_at() |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:163, through ensure_open_at |
to.ensure_changeable(by, TenantArea::Domains) refuses |
what ensure_changeable refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:132 |
DomainHandover { from, to, domain : &self.domain, }.ensure_still_possible() refuses |
what ensure_still_possible refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:133 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
handover.ensure_allowed(by) refuses |
what ensure_allowed refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/handover_offer.rs:81 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
parsed.subject_names.len() != 2 || !parsed.subject_names.contains(&row.root) || !parsed.subject_names.contains(&wildcard) || parsed.not_before > now || parsed.not_after <= now |
Infrastructure: the issued platform certificate does not cover its names and current time |
domains/tenant/hosts/certificate.rs:65 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:64 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:99, through ensure_renewable |
self.tls_status is TlsStatus::NotRequired |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:108, through ensure_renewable |
self.tls_status is TlsStatus::NoCertificate |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:115, through ensure_renewable |
cert.renewal() == Renewal::ByTenant |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:138 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.proof is not DomainProof::Verified { at } |
self.refused("verification", self.proof.status(), VerificationStatus::Failed,) |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:565 |
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through move_proof_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through proved_now > move_proof_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.proof.status() may not move to to.status() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:584, through proved_now > move_proof_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::DomainClaims) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:236 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::DomainRemoval) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain.rs:487 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:276, through ensure_uploaded_here |
cert.domain_id() != &self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:278, through ensure_uploaded_here |
cert.source() is not CertificateSource::Uploaded(details) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:284, through ensure_uploaded_here |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
cert.renewal() != Renewal::ByTenant || cert.domain_id() != &self.id |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:252 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:31 |
self.tls_status == TlsStatus::Active |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:40 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(scope.tenant_id(), TenantArea::Domains) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:276, through ensure_uploaded_here |
cert.domain_id() != &self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:278, through ensure_uploaded_here |
cert.source() is not CertificateSource::Uploaded(details) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:284, through ensure_uploaded_here |
!matches !(self.proof, DomainProof::Verified {..}) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/custom_domains/registered_domain/certificates.rs:180 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let ActedBy::By(_) = by |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:69 |
self.status != from |
InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Archive) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:132 |
(by, self.status) is (ActedBy::By(_), TenantStatus::Provisioning) |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:255, through ensure_setup_stopped_by_platform |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses |
what ensure_proved_recently refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:323 |
limits.ensure_allows(&posture) refuses |
what ensure_allows refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:324 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
* owned.tenant() != self.id |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:224, through primary_from |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
clone.ensure_copies(ClonePart::Settings, source.id(), &self.id) refuses |
what ensure_copies refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:359 |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:169 |
self.status != from |
InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in |
self.deletable_from() is not Some(from) |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:266, through ensure_grace_over |
now < from |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:273, through ensure_grace_over |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
let ActedBy::By(_) = by |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:199 |
self.status != from |
InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, ¶ms.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Provision) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle.rs:175 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, step) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:237, through ensure_may_bring_back |
(by, self.hold) is (ActedBy::By(_), PlatformHold::Held) |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:239, through ensure_may_bring_back |
self.status != from |
InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, step) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:237, through ensure_may_bring_back |
(by, self.hold) is (ActedBy::By(_), PlatformHold::Held) |
Forbidden |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:239, through ensure_may_bring_back |
self.status != from |
InvalidTenantTransition { from : self.status, to, } |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:291, through ensure_in |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, &self.organization_id, LifecycleStep::Suspend) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:90 |
self.status may not move to target |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/moves.rs:302, through move_to |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses |
what ensure_proved_recently refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:268 |
change.ensure_keeps_in(by.by()) refuses |
what ensure_keeps_in refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:269 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.status.is_open() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:395, through ensure_changeable > ensure_open |
by.ensure_proved_recently(proof) refuses |
what ensure_proved_recently refuses |
domains/tenant/lifecycle/settings.rs:293 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != CloneState::Copying |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:383, through ensure_copying |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != CloneState::Copying |
Conflict |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:383, through ensure_copying |
!self.parts.contains(&part) |
Validation |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:338 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_may_take(by, source.organization_id(), LifecycleStep::Provision) refuses |
what ensure_may_take refuses |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:192 |
ensure_pair(source, target) refuses |
what ensure_pair refuses |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:193 |
ensure_parts(&parts) refuses |
what ensure_parts refuses |
domains/tenant/clone.rs:194 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
tenant.status() != TenantStatus::Provisioning |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/setup.rs:170 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
tenant.status() != TenantStatus::Deleted |
InvalidTransition |
domains/tenant/teardown.rs:142 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/webhooks/subscription_status.rs:42.
- States:
Active, Paused, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves:
Disabled
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
WebhookSubscription::record_failure |
none read |
none read |
Active to Paused |
WebhookSubscription::pause |
PauseUseCase (webhooks) |
WebhookControl, WebhooksAction::Update |
Paused to Active |
WebhookSubscription::create, WebhookSubscription::resume |
CreateUseCase (webhooks), ResumeUseCase (webhooks) |
WebhookControl, WebhooksAction::Update |
Paused to Disabled |
WebhookSubscription::record_failure |
none read |
none read |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:157 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:511 |
self.is_active() |
Conflict |
domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:513 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:460 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription.rs:482 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:91 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
control.ensure_may(WebhooksAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:42 |
self.status.is_disabled() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/webhooks/subscription/changes.rs:44 |
What kind of action it is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:379.
self |
Answer (ActionClass) |
Where |
FindPerson |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
SuspendPerson |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
ResetTwoStep |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
SignOut |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
RevokeKeys |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
ForgetDevices |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
InvitePerson |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
ListMembers |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
AddToGroup |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
RemoveFromGroup |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
RemoveGroups |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
GrantAccess |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
DecideRequest |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
CheckAccess |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
BreakGlass |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
OpenReview |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
SuggestReview |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
PauseAgent |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
EndAgentRun |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
AgentActions |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
ReadRequests |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
CloseApp |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
AttackMode |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
SearchAudit |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
MakeAuditPack |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
ClassifyField |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
Notify |
Communicate |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391 |
OfferAccess |
Communicate |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391 |
RevokeAgentTasks |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
NarrowAgent |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
RemindUntilDecided |
Communicate |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:391 |
PauseKey |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
ResumeKey |
Admin |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:404 |
SendSignal |
Write |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:392 |
HideFields |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
Allow |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
Refuse |
Read |
domains/workflows/integration/company.rs:381 |
The check that finds it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:66.
self |
Answer (GuardrailCheck) |
Where |
Self::ClassifiedField(_) | Self::PersonalText(_) |
PersonalData |
domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:68 |
Self::ModelTrick(_) |
ModelTricks |
domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:69 |
Self::BannedWord |
BannedWords |
domains/workflows/guardrail/finding.rs:70 |
The value, to match on.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/data.rs:219.
&self.value |
Answer (FlowValue) |
Where |
Value::Null |
Null |
domains/workflows/data.rs:221 |
Value::Bool(value) |
FlowValue::Bool(* value) |
domains/workflows/data.rs:222 |
Value::Number(value) |
FlowValue::Number(* value) |
domains/workflows/data.rs:223 |
Value::Text(value) |
FlowValue::Text(value) |
domains/workflows/data.rs:224 |
Value::List(items) |
FlowValue::List(items) |
domains/workflows/data.rs:225 |
Value::Map(entries) |
FlowValue::Map(entries) |
domains/workflows/data.rs:226 |
What a step of kind gives the steps after it.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:30.
kind |
Answer (HandsOn) |
Where |
NodeKind::AgentRun(_) |
Answer |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:32 |
NodeKind::Transform(mapping) |
Self::Fields(mapping.fields().iter().map(|(name, _) | name).collect()) |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:33 |
NodeKind::Action(_) |
OperationOutputs |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:36 |
NodeKind::Code(_) | NodeKind::Loop(_) |
Whole |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:37 |
NodeKind::Guardrail(_) |
Guarded |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:38 |
NodeKind::Condition(_) | NodeKind::Approval(_) | NodeKind::Wait(_) |
Nothing |
domains/workflows/design/node/hands_on.rs:39 |
Why a version published by acting_for can no longer use this account as used says, or nothing when it still can.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:22.
allowed is self.integration == used.integration && used.operation.as_ref().is_none_or(| operation | self.scope.allows(operation))
allowed |
Answer (AccountUnusable) |
Where |
true |
None |
domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:45 |
false |
Some(AccountUnusable::NotForThisUse) |
domains/workflows/account/lending.rs:46 |
Refuses a memory set to be deleted, in which nothing is kept or found.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:323.
self.status |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
MemoryStatus::Active |
Ok(()) |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:325 |
MemoryStatus::DeletionRequested {..} |
Err(DomainError::invalid(message !("workflows-the-memory-is-set-to-be-deleted", "the memory is set to be deleted, so nothing is kept in or found in it"))) |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:326 |
Who does a step of this kind’s work.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/design/node.rs:642.
self |
Answer (Work) |
Where |
Self::Condition(_) | Self::Transform(_) |
InTheDomain |
domains/workflows/design/node.rs:644 |
Self::AgentRun(_) | Self::Action(_) | Self::Approval(_) | Self::Wait(_) | Self::Loop(_) | Self::Code(_) | Self::Guardrail(_) |
Outside |
domains/workflows/design/node.rs:645 |
The language whose registry it is found in.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:100.
self |
Answer (Language) |
Where |
Self::Npm(_) |
JavaScript |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:102 |
Self::Pypi(_) |
Python |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:103 |
Checks value as a package name of language.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:82.
language |
Answer (PackageName) |
Where |
Language::JavaScript |
NpmName::new(value).map(Self::Npm) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:84 |
Language::Python |
PypiName::new(value).map(Self::Pypi) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:85 |
Checks value as an exact version of a language package.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:172.
language |
Answer (PackageVersion) |
Where |
Language::JavaScript |
NpmVersion::new(value).map(Self::Npm) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:174 |
Language::Python |
PypiVersion::new(value).map(Self::Pypi) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/package.rs:175 |
The language its code is written in.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:109.
self |
Answer (Language) |
Where |
Python311 |
Python |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111 |
Python312 |
Python |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111 |
Python313 |
Python |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:111 |
Node20 |
JavaScript |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112 |
Node22 |
JavaScript |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112 |
Node24 |
JavaScript |
domains/workflows/sandbox/runtime.rs:112 |
The language its code is written in; None for a company’s image, which holds no code.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:117.
self |
Answer (Language) |
Where |
Self::Code(language) |
Some(language) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:119 |
Self::OwnImage |
None |
domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:120 |
Where it stands, without what it holds.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:571.
self |
Answer (StepPhase) |
Where |
Self::Waiting |
Waiting |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:573 |
Self::Ready {..} |
Ready |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:574 |
Self::Running {..} |
Running |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:575 |
Self::Succeeded {..} |
Succeeded |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:576 |
Self::Failed(_) |
Failed |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:577 |
Self::Skipped |
Skipped |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:578 |
Self::Stopped |
Stopped |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:579 |
Self::Abandoned {..} |
Abandoned |
domains/workflows/execution/step.rs:580 |
How sensitive data of this shape is.
Worked out for every combination of its inputs, at domains/workflows/guardrail/shapes.rs:55.
self |
Answer (DataClassLevel) |
Where |
| any |
Confidential |
|
Starts an execution of workflow because its schedule came round or its event happened, and runs every step the domain finishes itself, as far as they go.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:384.
params.cause |
Answer (DomainError) |
Where |
Cause::Schedule | Cause::Event {..} | Cause::Before {..} |
Self::start_checked(workflow, params) |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:389 |
Cause::Webhook |
Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-webhook-starts-a-workflow-only", "a webhook starts a workflow only once its secret is checked"))) |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:392 |
Cause::Service |
Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-service-event-starts-a-workflow-only", "a service's event starts a workflow only once its subscription admits it"))) |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:396 |
Cause::Manual | Cause::Restart {..} |
Err(DomainError::forbidden(message !("workflows-a-start-by-hand-acts-for", "a start by hand acts for the person who proves who they are"))) |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:400 |
What the check said, read from how its run went.
Its last match, arm by arm, as written, at domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:198.
outcome |
Answer (CheckVerdict) |
Where |
CodeOutcome::Succeeded(verdict) |
read_verdict(&verdict) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:200 |
CodeOutcome::Failed(failure) |
CheckVerdict::NotRun(why_not_run(failure)) |
domains/workflows/sandbox/agent.rs:201 |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:59.
- States:
Active, Disabled
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Disabled |
IntegrationAccount::disable |
ChangeUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts |
Disabled to Active |
IntegrationAccount::connect, IntegrationAccount::enable |
ConnectUseCase (workflows), FinishUseCase (workflows), ChangeUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:137.
- States:
Registering, AwaitingKey, AwaitingToken, AwaitingConfirmation, Live, Lapsed
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
AwaitingConfirmation to Live |
AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm |
PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl |
AwaitingKey to Live |
AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm |
PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl |
AwaitingToken to AwaitingConfirmation |
AccountChannel::receive_token |
StartOnServiceEventUseCase (workflows) |
none read |
Lapsed to Live |
AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm |
PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl |
Live to Lapsed |
AccountChannel::lapse |
none read |
none read |
Registering to Lapsed |
AccountChannel::lapse |
none read |
none read |
Registering to Live |
AccountChannel::register, AccountChannel::paste_key, AccountChannel::confirm |
PublishWorkflowUseCase (workflows), SetKeyUseCase (workflows), ConfirmUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:91.
- States:
Running, Ended
- Final, which no move leaves:
Ended
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Running to Ended |
WorkflowExecution::cancel, WorkflowExecution::expire, WorkflowExecution::stop_pass |
CancelUseCase (workflows), DriveUseCase (workflows), StopPassUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Manage |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:78.
- States:
Active, DeletionRequested
- Final, which no move leaves: none
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to DeletionRequested |
Memory::request_deletion |
DeleteUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete |
DeletionRequested to Active |
Memory::create, Memory::restore |
CreateUseCase (workflows), RestoreUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Create, WorkflowAction::Delete |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:79.
- States:
Active, Archived
- Final, which no move leaves:
Archived
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Active to Archived |
Sandbox::archive |
ArchiveSandboxUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete |
Its moves are read from try_transition, at domains/workflows/design/workflow/version.rs:35.
- States:
Draft, Published, Archived
- Final, which no move leaves:
Archived
| Move |
Made by |
Called by |
Proof or right |
Draft to Archived |
Workflow::archive |
ArchiveWorkflowUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete |
Draft to Published |
Workflow::flow, Workflow::publish |
CreateUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Create, WorkflowAction::Run, WorkflowAction::Update |
Published to Archived |
Workflow::archive |
ArchiveWorkflowUseCase (workflows) |
WorkflowControl, WorkflowAction::Delete |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses |
what ensure_sets_up_events refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:386 |
self.status != ChannelStatus::AwaitingConfirmation |
InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to : ChannelStatus::Live, }.into() |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:388 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to, }.into() |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:465, through ensure_platform_registers |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses |
what ensure_sets_up_events refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:317 |
self.setup != ChannelSetup::PastedKey |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:319 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition { from : self.status, to, }.into() |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:465, through ensure_platform_registers |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
account.ensure_sets_up_events(by) refuses |
what ensure_sets_up_events refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:359 |
self.status != ChannelStatus::AwaitingConfirmation |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/triggers/channel.rs:361 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running |
execution.status() is not ExecutionStatus::Ended(end) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:263 |
self.place_running(execution.id()) is not Some(place) |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:269 |
self.cases.get(place) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:274 |
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_waiting > ensure_running |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:408, through ensure_waiting |
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
ensure_startable(set, workflow, by) refuses |
what ensure_startable refuses |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:121 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_waiting > ensure_running |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:408, through ensure_waiting |
self.running().count() >= MAX_RUNNING_CASES |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:212 |
!self.is_its_test(execution) |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:218 |
self.outcomes.get_mut(place) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:416, through record |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
| always |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/evaluation/run.rs:397, through ensure_running |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:112 |
ensure_cases(¶ms.cases, params.gate) refuses |
what ensure_cases refuses |
domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:113 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:145 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:255, through ensure_of |
ensure_cases(¶ms.cases, params.gate) refuses |
what ensure_cases refuses |
domains/workflows/evaluation/set.rs:147 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/sandbox/registry.rs:123 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/sandbox/registry.rs:176 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:237 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!self.owner.is_same_account_as(by.by()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/mod.rs:530, through ensure_owner |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:158 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status is not MemoryStatus::DeletionRequested { deleted_after } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:299 |
now < deleted_after |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:305 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:235 |
typed.trim() != self.name.as_str() |
Validation |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:237 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/memory/mod.rs:271 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:172 |
ensure_raises(effect) refuses |
what ensure_raises refuses |
domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:173 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:112 |
ensure_raises(params.effect) refuses |
what ensure_raises refuses |
domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:113 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Manage) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/integration/risk_override.rs:207 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
* state != self.state |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:286, through ensure_answerable |
self.expired_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:367, through ensure_answerable > ensure_live |
self.stage != ConnectionStage::AwaitingService |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:293, through ensure_answerable |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
&self.stage is not ConnectionStage::Answered { credential, code : handed_out, } |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:351, through answered_with |
code != handed_out |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:357, through answered_with |
self.expired_at(crate::shared::clock::now()) |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:367, through ensure_live |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::ConnectAccounts) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/account/connection.rs:198 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:344 |
self.status == SandboxStatus::Archived |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:386, through ensure_active |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/sandbox/mod.rs:192 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.state != TrialState::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/sandbox/trial.rs:141 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.build != Build::Building |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.build != Build::Building |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building |
self.recipe.program().packages() is not Some(packages) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:169 |
!bundle.fits(packages) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:175 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.build != Build::Building |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:269, through ensure_building |
self.recipe.program() is not Program::Image(own) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:205 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/sandbox/version.rs:257 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Delete) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:385 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:149 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
layout.ensure_fits(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_fits refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:151 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:168 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:74 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:97 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:113 |
params.layout.ensure_fits(¶ms.graph) refuses |
what ensure_fits refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:114 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.origin is not WorkflowOrigin::Flow(_) |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:160 |
* run.workflow_id() != self.id || run.version() != self.version |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:166 |
run.status() == ExecutionStatus::Running |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:172 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:120 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Create) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:81 |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:82 |
ensure_flow_steps(&flow.graph) refuses |
what ensure_flow_steps refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:83 |
ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps(&flow.graph) refuses |
what ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/flow.rs:84 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Published |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/hold.rs:155 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:309 |
reviewed != self.revision() |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:311 |
self.status may not move to WorkflowStatus::Published |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:316 |
replaces.ensure_earlier_than(self.id, self.version) refuses |
what ensure_earlier_than refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:317 |
!sees.may_see(&on.event()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:345, through ensure_trigger_visible |
ensure_trigger_event_offered(&self.trigger, facts.events) refuses |
what ensure_trigger_event_offered refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:319 |
ensure_code_runnable(&self.graph, facts.runnable) refuses |
what ensure_code_runnable refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:321 |
ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_paths_name_earlier_steps refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:322 |
ensure_checks_are_of_other_agents(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_checks_are_of_other_agents refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:323 |
ensure_guardrails_read_text(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_guardrails_read_text refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:324 |
ensure_high_risk_actions_approved(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_high_risk_actions_approved refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:325 |
ensure_item_approvals_in_loops(&self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_item_approvals_in_loops refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:326 |
ensure_networked_code_approved(&self.graph, facts.runnable) refuses |
what ensure_networked_code_approved refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:327 |
ensure_before_decides(&self.trigger, &self.graph) refuses |
what ensure_before_decides refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:328 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:27 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/design/workflow/edits.rs:50 |
self.status != WorkflowStatus::Draft |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/design/workflow.rs:418, through ensure_draft |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.ensure_open(..) refuses |
what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through open_approval > running_step |
self.position(..) refuses |
what position refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through open_approval > running_step |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through open_approval > running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through open_approval > running_step |
(&running.underway, running.node.kind()) is not (Underway::Approval(wait), NodeKind::Approval(step)) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:219, through open_approval |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= wait.closes_at |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:225, through open_approval |
approver.ensure_entitled(running.exposure) refuses |
what ensure_entitled refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:133 |
ensure_present_when_needed(&step, approver) refuses |
what ensure_present_when_needed refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:134 |
by.is_same_person_as(&self.acting_for) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:171, through ensure_may_approve |
step.approvers_needed() == 2 && self.authors.includes(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:177, through ensure_may_approve |
let FirstApproval::GivenBy(first) = &wait.first && first.is_same_person_as(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:185, through ensure_may_approve |
self.input_seen_by(&running.seen)? != * shown |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:138 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.ensure_open(..) refuses |
what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through asking_for_items > running_step |
self.position(..) refuses |
what position refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through asking_for_items > running_step |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through asking_for_items > running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through asking_for_items > running_step |
(running.node.kind().clone(), running.underway) is not (NodeKind::Loop(step), Underway::Loop(progress)) |
not_asking() |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:351, through asking_for_items |
progress.approval().waiting().cloned() is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:353, through asking_for_items |
step.items_approval().map(|(_, approval) | approval.clone()) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:358, through asking_for_items |
ensure_window_open(&asking.wait) refuses |
what ensure_window_open refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:238 |
approver.ensure_entitled(asking.looping.exposure) refuses |
what ensure_entitled refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:239 |
ensure_present_when_needed(&asking.approval, approver) refuses |
what ensure_present_when_needed refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/items.rs:240 |
by.is_same_person_as(&self.acting_for) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:171, through ensure_may_approve |
step.approvers_needed() == 2 && self.authors.includes(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:177, through ensure_may_approve |
let FirstApproval::GivenBy(first) = &wait.first && first.is_same_person_as(by) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:185, through ensure_may_approve |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Action(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/action.rs:154 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Code(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:68 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind().clone() is not NodeKind::Loop(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:102 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Wait(wait) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:61 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:64 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Guardrail(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/guardrail.rs:75 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
!matches !(ready.node.kind(), NodeKind::AgentRun(_) | NodeKind::Code(_)) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/deferral.rs:45 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step |
running.underway.decision_wait().is_none() |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:273 |
by.ensure_entitled(running.exposure) refuses |
what ensure_entitled refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:278 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step |
running.underway is not Underway::Timer { until } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:84 |
crate::shared::clock::now() < until |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/wait.rs:90 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
crate::shared::clock::now() < self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:83 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through running_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through running_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through running_step |
running.underway.decision_wait() is not Some(wait) |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:300 |
crate::shared::clock::now() < wait.closes_at |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:306 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
!refusal.fits(ready.node.kind()) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:316 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Approval(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/approval.rs:52 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step |
self.ensure_open(..) refuses |
what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.position(..) refuses |
what position refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step |
self.ensure_open(..) refuses |
what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.position(..) refuses |
what position refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step |
step.underway != Underway::AgentRun(* run.id()) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:315 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:138, through reporting_step |
self.ensure_open(..) refuses |
what ensure_open refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:104, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.position(..) refuses |
what position refuses, not read this deep |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:105, through reporting_step > running_step |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:106, through reporting_step > running_step |
state is not StepState::Running { exposure, seen, underway, started_at, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:114, through reporting_step > running_step |
&step.underway is not Underway::Code(work) |
not_its_run() |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:134 |
work.run_id != run_id |
not_its_run() |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/code.rs:137 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
pass.pass.as_ref().filter(| of | of.execution == self.id) is not Some(of) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:182 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ensure_due_again(ready.attempt, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses |
what ensure_due_again refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:108 |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::AgentRun(step) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:110 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
starter.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:349 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!evaluator.may_test() |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:178 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.status != ExecutionStatus::Running |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:132, through ready_step > ensure_open |
crate::shared::clock::now() >= self.deadline |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/execution/progress.rs:138, through ready_step > ensure_open |
self.steps().nth(index) is missing |
an error |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:76, through ready_step |
state is not StepState::Ready { input, exposure, seen, attempt, } |
InvalidTransition |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/work.rs:84, through ready_step |
ensure_due_again(ready.attempt, crate::shared::clock::now()) refuses |
what ensure_due_again refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:144 |
ready.node.kind() is not NodeKind::Code(code) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:146 |
code.version() != * version.id() |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:152 |
version.held_agent() is not Some(held) |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/agent.rs:158 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!delivery.admits(workflow) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/starts/service.rs:50 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
params.cause is Cause::Webhook |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:392 |
params.cause is Cause::Service |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:396 |
params.cause is Cause::Manual | Cause::Restart {..} |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/mod.rs:400 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
!call.admits(workflow) |
Forbidden |
domains/workflows/execution/starts/webhook.rs:50 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
tester.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:142 |
tester.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Run) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/execution/starts/mode.rs:143 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
self.pass.is_none() |
Validation |
domains/workflows/execution/steps/loops.rs:215 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:101 |
* workflow.trigger() != Trigger::Webhook |
Validation |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:103 |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:198 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:258, through ensure_starts |
| When |
Refused with |
Where |
by.ensure_may(WorkflowAction::Update) refuses |
what ensure_may refuses |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:172 |
| always |
Conflict |
domains/workflows/triggers/secret.rs:258, through ensure_starts |